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Abstract 
Emotion regulation is fundamental to how we all feel, think about and experience our 
daily lives. So far the majority of studies into emotion regulation have focused on theories 
relating to strategies such as rumination, suppression and reappraisal. The first study focused 
on developing a wider understanding of how emotion is regulated through developing 
emotion regulation profiles of depression, anxiety and stress. The second study developed an 
emotion regulation questionnaire designed for experimental use. Unlike existing emotion 
regulation questionnaires it was designed to be atheoretical and considerably broader in 
scope. 
The relationship between catastrophising and other mental health traits was highlighted 
in the initial study and found to be mostly unexplored by the emotion regulation literature. 
The final three studies aimed to build on existing understanding of catastrophising. The first of 
these used a catastrophising induction developed for the study. The results suggested that in 
laboratory conditions, catastrophising reduces positive mood and increases negative mood 
compared to a control group. The forth study created and successfully validated the 
Catastrophising Questionnaire. This found catastrophising to generally fall into two groups, 
general catastrophising and health and safety catastrophising, where the later tended to be 
less associated with poor mental health outcomes. 
The final study developed a two-week intervention to reduce catastrophising, which was 
delivered to a community sample through a mobile phone or tablet based application. Where 
participants were randomly assigned to the control or the experimental group. Participants in 
the experimental condition were found to catastrophise comparatively less. They also 
reported less negative mood, more positive mood and improved more on mental health 
indicators than the control group. 
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1 Chapter One: Literature Review 
 
Fear, elation, jealousy, amusement and other emotions are elicited when an individual 
appraises a situation as being immediately relevant to their goals. Emotions typically involve 
physiological, experiential and behavioural responses, where an individual may feel, think and 
act out their emotion. Emotion has been defined by Keltner & Gross (1999) as: “episodic, 
relatively short-term, biologically based patterns of perception, experience, physiology, action, 
and communication that occur in response to specific physical and social challenges and 
opportunities.” Emotions are more developed and flexible interpretations than reflexes, which 
involve automatic responses to stimuli (Scherer, 1984). Additionally, unlike moods, emotions 
have more specific goals and intentions (Frijda, 1986) as well as operating over a shorter 
duration (Ekman, 1999).  
The episodic nature of emotion arises when the individual attends to and appraises a 
situation’s relevance to a specific and current goal (Ellsworth, & Scherer, 2003). These 
motivations may be brief or enduring. They may also be deliberate and complex (in terms of 
the mechanisms involved) as well as unconscious and basic. These emotions may also be 
typical reactions to situations or relatively unique. However, at their core, it is the individual’s 
goal and the interpreted meaning of the situation that generate the emotion. As both of these 
aspects change over time, so will the emotion. 
 Perception and physiology both contribute to the multifaceted nature of emotion. 
Emotions are expressed through the whole of the body and can lead to the incorrect 
interchanging of “feeling” and “emotion” as emotions do not only make us feel but drive us to 
act (Frijda, 1986). These impulses for action include more than situation specific actions such 
as running or shouting but also changes in facial behaviour and posture. These are associated 
 12 
 
with further neuroendocrine responses serving to anticipate and follow emotion, providing 
metabolic support suitable for the emotion’s goals (Lang & Bradley, 2010). 
 Emotion can also be defined through understanding other discrete affective 
processes. Stress and emotion both involve full body responses, yet stress in contrast to 
emotion, only involves specific negative responses (Lazarus, 1993). Additionally, stress and 
mood can be distinguished from emotions by duration. These emotions are typically 
generated by specific objects or situations prompting behavioural responses relevant to the 
situation. Stress and moods are less specific, promoting behaviours on a broader scale such as 
approach or withdraw (Lang, 1995; Lazarus, 1993). Moods also bias cognition more than they 
bias action (Siemer, 2001).  
1.1  Emotion Regulation 
 
Emotion regulation has occurred when an individual activates a goal (implicitly or 
explicitly) to influence the emotion generation process. This process can take many different 
forms and was defined by Thompson (1994) as: “the extrinsic and intrinsic processes 
responsible for monitoring, evaluating, and modifying emotional reactions, especially their 
intensive and temporal features to accomplish one’s goals.” The core of emotion regulation is 
a goal to modify emotion or its generation before it is fully developed (Gross, Sheppes, & Urry, 
2011). This goal can be activated for intrinsic emotions or externally for emotions that others 
are experiencing, the latter being more studied in children and infants (Gross, 2014). Although, 
it is worth noting that these methods may co-occur for any individual. 
 From Thompson’s (1994) definition, the second vital aspect when defining emotion 
regulation are the processes responsible for modifying emotional reactions, which can be both 
implicit and explicit. These processes are on a continuum from unconscious 
(effortless/automatic) to conscious (effortful/deliberate) regulation (Gyurak & Etkin, 2014; 
Masters, 1991). The third key aspect of emotion regulation are its intensive and temporal 
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features, also referred to as its impact on emotion dynamics (Thompson, 1990). Emotion 
dynamics are the magnitude, duration and latency of emotion responses. This can be in 
physiological, behavioural and experiential domains depending on the goals of the emotion 
regulation. In summary, the key aspects of emotion regulation are the activation of a 
regulation goal and the use of regulatory processes, which lead to the adaptation of the 
emotion’s trajectory.  
1.2  The Modal Model of Emotion  
 
 In an effort to consolidate the foundations of emotion regulation, the modal model 
contains key features of emotion that have been established across many research 
approaches (Gross, 1998). The modal model describes the interaction between situation and 
attention as well as the meaning to an individual that is contributing to emotion generation. 
These responses may occur in parallel to one another, providing an individual with 
coordinated and flexible responses to dynamic environments. 
 
 Figure 1.1 The modal model of emotion by James J Gross, 2014, Handbook of Emotion 
Regulation second edition, p. 5. Copyright 2014 by The Guildford Press.  
  
Figure 1.1 shows the modal model’s situation, attention, appraisal and response 
sequence in its basic form. This pathway begins with relevant situations that can be external or 
internal. Attention to the situation is then required before a meaningful appraisal can be 
Situation Attention Appraisal Response 
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developed. An emotional response can only be generated following this sequence of events. 
These responses can then develop into new situations and interact in parallel with one 
another. It is these constantly emerging appraisals that influence experiential, behavioural and 
neurobiological response systems (Gross, 2014). 
1.3  Process Model of Emotion Regulation 
 
 Whilst emotion regulation strategies have key features in common, they also have 
differences from one another. In the emotion regulation literature the process model of 
emotion regulation is most frequently used to plot these differences (Gross, 2002). This model 
functions as an extension to the modal model of emotion, putting different groups of emotion 
regulation strategies at different points of a temporal emotion generation scale (see Figure 
1.2).  
 Figure 1.2 A process model of emotion regulation. Reprinted from “Emotion regulation: 
Affective, cognitive, and social consequences” by James J Gross, 2002, Psychophysiology, p. 
282. Copyright 2002 by the Society for Psychophysiological Research. 
 
As shown in Figure 1.2, this process can be broadly divided into two phases, 
antecedent-focused and response-focused strategies. Antecedent strategies refer to strategies 
before the emotion has been fully generated. Response focused strategies refer to strategies 
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applied once the emotion has been generated. Within these two phases are the five main time 
points of emotion regulation strategies. The first of these is situation selection, as shown 
above as a choice between S1 and S2. In this instance situation S1 is selected. Then another 
group of emotion regulation strategies may occur to modify the situation’s emotional impact, 
where S1x denotes a situation with no room for change compared with situations with a 
reasonable potential for change (S1y, S1z). The next process is attentional deployment, which 
represents the aspect of the situation the individual will focus on. Once a situation has been 
selected, potentially modified and certain aspects attended to, there remains one other 
antecedent point that can modify emotion generation. Cognitive change represents which of 
the possible appraisals (m1, m2 or m3) will be attributed to the situation. It is this final 
meaning that then gives rise to the emotion response tendencies (experiential, behavioural 
and physiological). The final point at which emotion regulation can occur is in response 
modulation, once the emotion has been elicited and may continue to be generated. 
To examine the first step in more detail, situation selection is the process of 
approaching or avoiding places, objects or people in order to modify emotional response. 
Examples of this could include avoiding a dark alleyway late at night full of intimidating people 
or finding a specific person that you can vent feelings to. Situations can be complex and 
situation selection assumes the individual’s knowledge of likely events as well as future 
emotional responses. Situations can be chosen that may have short-term pay offs weighed 
against longer-term costs, such as an individual with social anxiety avoiding social situations at 
the risk of isolation.  
The second process is Situation modification. This does not always have clear 
boundaries from situation selection as modifications may create a new situation. Potentially, 
emotion eliciting situations will not inevitably lead to an emotional response such as the dark 
alleyway scenario. For example, we can modify the situation above by simply waiting until the 
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people in question had passed through the alleyway. An individual with social anxiety may 
choose to communicate with a person by sending an email, rather than meeting someone in 
person. As stated in Gross & Thompson (2006), efforts to directly modify the situation’s 
emotional impact constitute a powerful form of emotion regulation. 
Attentional deployment is a method of emotion regulation that does not alter the 
environment. Any given situation may have a variety of aspects and attentional deployment is 
the process involved in selecting what to focus on in order to influence emotion generation. 
The major attentional strategies highlighted by Gross & Thompson (2006) are placed loosely 
under the headings of distraction and concentration. Distraction is the focus of attention upon 
non-emotional aspects of a situation.  It can function for both external situations and internal 
focus such as invoking thoughts or memories that are inconsistent with the current emotional 
state. Distraction can also include the physical withdrawal of attention, such as closing your 
eyes or covering your ears. However, concentration draws attention to specific emotional 
aspects of a situation, which can also have an internal or external focus.  
Once a situation has been selected, potentially modified and attention set, there is 
one last step where the emotion generation may be influenced. Emotion requires a 
combination of perception and ascribed meaning. Cognitive change is where individuals 
appraise the situation to modify its emotional significance. This can be achieved by how an 
individual thinks about the situation or how individuals evaluate their ability to manage the 
situation. This is also the main point at which catastrophising (also known as magnification), 
the primary focus of this thesis, can take place. Catastrophising is the appraisal that a certain 
situation is the worst it can be or more commonly seen in retrospect as making a mountain 
out of a molehill.  
Response modulation, in contrast to the other processes, occurs after the response 
tendencies have begun. This process can refer to the modulation of physiological, experiential 
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or behavioural responding. Examples of modulating physiological responses could include 
exercise, drugs and even food. Another example of response modulation mentioned by Gross 
(1998), is expressive behaviour or expressive suppression. This has been shown to alter 
emotion experience, where suppression of emotion such as sadness and disgust has been 
found to maintain or in some cases heighten the undesired emotion.  
1.4  Problems in Definition   
 
One of the major issues with the rapidly expanding field of emotion regulation is that 
it can be used as a blanket term for a large range of behaviours that may not directly be 
considered emotion regulation. Many of these may have very small emotion regulation 
components that are better understood as consequences or side effects. Berking & 
Wupperman (2012) use an example of expressive suppression often used by Gross (e.g. Gross, 
1998; Gross, 2002; Gross, 2014) in defining the superiority of antecedent strategies (such as 
reappraisal) over response strategies (such as expressive suppression). Berking & Wupperman 
(2012) argue that individuals can suppress their expressions, often not to regulate themselves 
but to avoid the negative evaluation of others. Additionally, given that emotions will still exist 
internally when not expressed, they propose that expressive suppression should not be 
considered an emotion regulation strategy under a stricter definition. However, there is not 
yet any meaningful consensus on this in the literature, but conceptually, if expressive 
suppression is not primarily an emotion regulation strategy its use in comparison with 
reappraisal in a wide array of literature could be brought into question. 
An issue brought up by Gross et al. (2011) is how separable are emotion and emotion 
regulation. Many situations can simultaneously give rise to both emotion and emotion 
regulation (Campos, Frankel, & Camras, 2004). This has been found in brain systems where 
emotion centres are also engaged by emotion regulation (Ochsner et al., 2009). These 
problems have led some to conclude that no difference can be made (e.g. Kappas, 2011; 
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Thompson, 2011). Kappas (2011) proposed that emotions are also regulatory mechanisms and 
that considering one without the other is nonsensical. Thus, stating that emotion and emotion 
regulation research should be conducted under the backdrop of auto-regulation and 
habituation, not neutral baselines. Gross (2014) attempts to explain this problem through the 
example that someone angry at people polluting the environment may snap at their children. 
As a result of this, they become upset with themselves and curb their anger. This is an instance 
of emotions being a driving force for emotion regulation. Another example is feeling pride for 
being angry at people throwing rubbish from their cars. From Gross’ perspective this is still 
emotion regulation as it contains aspects intrinsic to emotion regulation, a valuation of the 
emotion as good or bad and a relevant goal. This goal could be to feel angry at people 
polluting the environment or to curb anger to avoid snapping at your children. 
1.5  Measuring Emotion Regulation 
 
 Self-report measures of emotion regulation have developed alongside the field and 
many have been created to suit a variety of needs (e.g. for a review see Aldao, Nolen-
Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). These measures are quick and easy to administer and 
interpret. Self-report scales are good measures of dispositional tendencies towards specific 
emotion regulation strategies, presumably capturing what participants do in different contexts 
and situations. Campbell-Sills & Barlow (2007) maintain that this focus is vital in its application 
in psychopathology. By taking a long-term view of thoughts, emotion regulation and behaviour 
patterns we can identify episodes where unwanted emotion persists and recurs over time. 
 However, despite these advantages these measures are confined by self-awareness 
(Robinson & Clore, 2002).  As well as requiring awareness and meta-cognition, these self-
report scales can be influenced by cognitive biases, mood and demand characteristics. 
Furthermore, Cole, Martin, & Dennis (2004) suggested that these measures may confound 
emotion experience with its regulation. Two examples of this are the overlap in the 
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Rumination Scale (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-hoeksema, 2003) with depressive 
symptomatology and some measures of eating disorders have emotion items (found in Aldao 
et al., 2010). This item overlap may result in inflating the relationships between emotion 
regulation and psychopathology.  
Many of these measures have been developed from prior theories such as the 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross, 1998) from the process model of emotion 
regulation and the Rumination Scale (Treynor et al., 2003) from response styles theory. Some 
were created through a mixture of theory and surrounding literature such as the Cognitive 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001) drawn from 
cognitive literature and coping theories. Other questionnaires have been developed for 
therapeutic interventions, such as the Emotion Regulation Skills Questionnaire (ERSQ;Berking 
& Znoj, 2008). Some have also been designed using clinical experience, such as the Difficulties 
in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). While these are varied and valid 
approaches to measuring emotion regulation, there are none known to the author developed 
purely to measure emotion regulation without theoretical context, with the close exceptions 
of scales like the DERS designed to better understand psychopathological associations. This is 
not a criticism of existing scales but a new approach that has not been explored and may 
reduce potential overlaps between emotion and emotion regulation measures. An example of 
this could be, developing an emotion regulation strategy questionnaire through a variety of 
relevant contexts, such as in Chapter Five. 
 While the limitations of self-report measures require the careful construction and 
interpretation of emotion regulation scales, they are still useful, if used appropriately. Self-
report measures are simply one tool that can be used to assess strategies alongside 
experimental, neural or therapeutic methodologies. While some strategies have been tested 
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in this manner, such as rumination and depression, many more remain untested (Aldao et al., 
2010). 
 Many of these studies have used observational methods by instructing individuals to 
use a specific strategy in response to a mood induction and measuring expression, emotions, 
brain activity, thoughts or physiology (such as Gross, 1998 or Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
These studies are valuable in contributing to the understanding of the short-term effects of 
emotion regulation. However, instructed emotion regulation tasks have a limited application 
to psychopathology. They do not question whether the tendency to use specific strategies is 
related to clinical diagnoses. Often, by necessity, these tasks are confined to several strategies 
at a time and vary in design making comparisons difficult (Aldao et al., 2010). 
 Self-report measures of emotion regulation remain the dominant methodology in the 
field and despite their limitations they provide useful insight into emotion regulation and its 
links with psychopathology. However, both observational and self-report methods often fail to 
capture the importance of contextually appropriate emotion regulation and its flexible 
(instead of habitual) application. This could be improved in future research through more use 
of experience sampling in the field of emotion regulation, whether through mobile 
applications (such as chapter six), diaries or another ecologically valid and longitudinal 
method. 
1.6  Emotion Regulation: Experimental Design 
 
The majority of research to date contrasts one or more specific emotion regulation 
strategies, often with a no-regulation control condition (Gross, 2015). The examination of 
‘purified’ emotion regulation strategies is important for practical and theoretical reasons and 
has yielded many insights on the unique and overarching components and consequences of 
specific forms of emotion regulation. This broadly quantitative and laboratory based approach 
is likely to continue to provide valuable insights across a broader range of strategies. 
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Additionally, with the development of new experimental paradigms and new laboratory 
contexts, it is likely that this approach will also continue to provide a deeper understanding of 
known emotion regulation strategies.  
However, as the literature gains a deeper understanding of these strategies in 
laboratory conditions other questions will and are already beginning to develop that are 
beyond the scope of these ‘purified’ experimental designs. One such question developed 
across a number of Gross’ papers (Carthy, Horesh, Apter, Edge, & Gross, 2010; Samson, 
Hardan, Podell, Phillips, & Gross, 2015; Werner, Goldin, Ball, Heimberg, & Gross, 2011) is how 
a wide variety of emotion regulation strategies may combine. Gross and others found that 
community and clinical samples reported simultaneously using a number of different forms of 
emotion regulation. Little to no research has been progressed to understand what blend of 
strategies are the most effective for certain contexts.  
But there is research and development on interventions that blend various emotion 
regulation strategies. Mindfulness interventions provide one example not directly linked to the 
emotion regulation literature, which blend several components including increased attentional 
deployment, cognitive reappraisal and decreasing suppression (Farb, Anderson, Irving, & 
Segal, 2014). Other examples explored later in this chapter include interventions developed 
from the emotion regulation literature, such as Emotion Regulation Therapy (Mennin, Fresco, 
Heimberg, & Ciesla, 2012) and Affect Regulation Training (Berking, Orth, Wupperman, Meier, 
& Caspar, 2008). Each of these interventions provides a blend of emotion regulation strategies 
deemed to be effective and adaptive and their success on clients provides valuable insight on 
how these strategies interact. This marks intervention based designs as the next most 
common experimental design for furthering the understanding of emotion regulation. For this 
design methodology to provide the most valuable information for the emotion regulation 
literature, it would be necessary to create more small and modular emotion regulation based 
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interventions to test how these strategies best blend together. Beyond furthering 
understanding, this could lay the foundations to considerably better designed therapies that 
can focus on particularly effective blends of strategies. 
1.7  Emotion Regulation in Psychopathology 
 
 Gross suggests the use of antecedent strategies from the Process Model of Emotion 
Regulation, which this is moderated by the specific context to determine how adaptive 
emotion regulation strategies are (Gross, 1998). Gross & Jazaieri (2014) add that emotion 
dysregulation can either be due to failing to engage emotion regulation when it would be 
adaptive and emotion misregulation when a strategy is engaged, which is poorly suited to the 
situation. 
An alternate approach in the field of psychopathology to define adaptability is 
assessing their relationships with other symptoms (e.g. depression). In particular, the “distress 
disorders” (David Watson, 2005), depression and anxiety, are widely viewed as the product of 
emotion regulation difficulties (Aldao et al., 2010). Also, theorists suggest that individuals 
unable to effectively manage their emotions, in tandem with daily life, will experience more 
severe and longer periods of distress. This puts these individuals at risk of developing clinical 
depression, anxiety or stress (such as Mennin, Holaway, Fresco, Moore, & Heimberg, 2007; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Similar associations have been found in other 
disorders such as alcohol abuse (Sher & Grekin, 2007) and models of eating disorders (Polivy & 
Herman, 2002). This suggests that individuals with ineffectively regulated emotions can turn to 
food or alcohol in an attempt to down regulate or avoid them. It is worth noting that emotion 
dysregulation may not be confined to failure to use appropriate strategies. For example, 
Gruber, Harvey, & Gross (2012) found that individuals suffering from bipolar disorder apply 
more ‘adaptive’ (e.g. reappraisal) emotion regulation strategies as well as more ‘maladaptive’ 
strategies (e.g. suppression) than healthy controls. They also report more conscious effortful 
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regulation despite reporting less success. To what extent this is due to failing to apply adaptive 
emotion regulation strategies regarding context or the intensity of the experience for bipolar 
patients, is not yet established. This suggests that defining emotion regulation strategies as 
adaptive or maladaptive requires a cluster of contextual cues and the individual’s 
circumstances as well as just understanding the relationships between strategies and clinical 
criteria. 
 Difficulties in emotion regulation have been associated with almost all mental 
disorders included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-5; APA 
2013). For example, depression is one of the most prevalent disorders and considered to be 
the greatest health burden in the developed world (Mathers, Fat, & Boerma, 2008). Depressed 
individuals frequently report difficulties in identifying emotions (Rude & McCarthy, 2003), 
acceptance (Campbell-Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hofmann, 2006), self-compassion (Gilbert, 2011) 
and modifying their emotions (Catanzaro & Mearns, 1999). Furthermore, depression has been 
associated with a greater use of catastrophising, rumination (repetitive thinking) and 
suppression ( Garnefski, Kommer, et al., 2002). These positively associated strategies are 
thought to be generally ineffective methods to regulate negative emotions or in developing 
adaptive responses (Berking & Wupperman, 2012). In Joormann and Stanton’s (2016) review 
they identify that depression is typically characterised by an increased use of rumination and 
less use of reappraisal. But rumination use appears to be a stable feature of depression risk, 
where reduced use of reappraisal is often only observed in individuals currently experiencing 
depression. The literature for both suppression, catastrophising and other strategies is much 
less clear cut and this could be a focus for future studies. 
 These findings suggest that emotion dysregulation has a negative impact on mental 
health. However, these results are largely cross-sectional and do not clarify if these deficits are 
the cause or effect of these disorders. Longitudinal research suggests that the use of generally 
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adaptive emotion regulation strategies can predict mental health and reduce the risk of 
depression (Kassel, Bornovalova, & Mehta, 2007). Other studies have also found that typically 
maladaptive strategies predict depressive symptoms (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Kraaij 
& Garnefski, 2012) suggesting that emotion dysregulation is a precursor to mental disorders.  
 Another methodology considering the causality between emotion regulation and 
mental health are lab studies that manipulate emotion regulation strategies and assess the 
interactions with depressive symptoms. These studies have shown that maladaptive responses 
to negative mood inductions impair recovery for those vulnerable to depression (Aldao et al., 
2010). Also, individuals suffering from depression are more likely to use maladaptive strategies 
than healthy controls (Ehring, Tuschen-Caffier, Schnülle, Fischer, & Gross, 2010).   In addition 
to this, there is evidence that depressed individuals engage in fewer adaptive strategies 
(Joormann & Stanton, 2016). This includes reappraisal (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), acceptance 
(Ehring et al., 2010) and adaptive distraction (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). 
 There is a plethora of research into emotion regulation deficits across anxiety 
disorders (Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Berking & Wupperman, 2012). Berking, Orth, 
Wupperman, Meier and Caspar (2008) investigated a non-clinical sample and found that 
emotion regulation deficits reliably predicted subsequent anxiety over a two-week period. 
Additionally, Kassel et al. (2007) found that a participant’s self-belief in their ability to cope 
with negative moods predicted reduced anxiety symptom severity over an 8-week period. 
Another non-clinical sample was able to predict anxiety symptom severity based on 
unsuccessful emotion regulation 7 months earlier (McLaughlin, Hatzenbuehler, Mennin, & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011). This also suggests that emotion regulation strategy choices are 
relatively stable over time and can be an indication of vulnerability to mental health issues. 
 Research into generalised anxiety disorder has found deficits in emotional clarity, 
understanding of emotions, acceptance and emotion management (McLaughlin, Mennin, & 
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Farach, 2007; Turk, Heimberg, Luterek, Mennin, & Fresco, 2005). However, a study by Novick-
Kline, Turk, Mennin, Hoyt, & Gallagher (2005) demonstrated that individuals with generalised 
anxiety disorder have significantly greater emotional awareness. To explain this effect, the 
researchers proposed that individuals with generalised anxiety disorder experience emotions 
with greater intensity and therefore are more likely to self-report being more aware of their 
emotions. Similarly, a study by Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & Fresco (2005) found differences in 
how emotion regulation strategies influence the development of avoidance and worry. These 
included an impaired ability for individuals with generalised anxiety disorder to soothe 
themselves when experiencing negative emotions. Furthermore, individuals with anxiety 
demonstrated a greater endorsement of catastrophic beliefs regarding the consequences of 
emotions than a control group. 
 These findings were also supported by Suveg & Zeman (2004), who investigated the 
relationship between emotion regulation in children and the development of anxiety 
disorders. The study concluded that children with anxiety disorders have difficulty dealing with 
sadness, worries and anger. Furthermore, the researcher suggested that their limited 
strategies in managing emotions coupled with a lack of confidence in being able to manage 
those emotions, are potential factors for the development of anxiety disorders.  
 There is a broad range of evidence that emotion dysregulation is associated with a 
wide array of mental disorders and that those strategies contribute to the development and 
maintenance of those disorders. Such as post-traumatic stress disorder, where symptom 
severity has been associated with a lack of emotional clarity, acceptance, and adaptive 
emotion regulation strategies (Cloitre, Miranda, Stovall-McClough, & Han, 2005; Ehring & 
Quack, 2010; Tull, Barrett, McMillan, & Roemer, 2007). In eating disorders there has been 
found to be greater avoidance, difficulty with acceptance and managing unwanted emotions 
(Corstorphine, Mountford, Tomlinson, Waller, & Meyer, 2007). More severe eating disorder 
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symptoms were also associated with greater use of rumination and suppression (Aldao et al., 
2010). Borderline personality disorder also has emotion dysregulation as a key aspect 
(Linehan, 1993). This can include a lack of emotional awareness (Leible & Snell, 2004), greater 
avoidance (Berking & Neacsiu, 2009), less success in reappraisal (Schulze et al., 2011) and less 
tolerance of distress (K L Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, & Lejuez, 2006). 
1.8 Factors of Emotion Regulation 
 
There are a range of factors that contribute to emotion dysregulation (Gross & Jazaieri, 
2014), also in addition to Gross’ modal and process models a number of frameworks for 
understanding emotion regulation have been proposed (such as: Koole, 2009; Saarni, 1999; 
Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002; Webb, Schweiger Gallo, Miles, Gollwitzer, & Sheeran, 
2012). From these theories, the three most influential factors in emotion dysregulation are 
awareness, goals and strategies. 
Awareness of the emotion and the relevant aspects of its context is helpful for engaging 
adaptive responses. But both Berking, Orth, et al. (2008) and Gross & Jazaieri (2014) observe 
that more awareness is not always better. One example of hyper-awareness becoming 
maladaptive is in panic disorder. Panic disorder is the recurrent experience of unexpected 
panic attacks, which are followed by at least one month of persistent concern and worries 
about future attacks provoking significant changes in behaviour (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Panic attacks are often characterised as a ‘faulty alarm system’ where the 
individual is hyperaware of physiological changes and appraises them catastrophically. Also, 
many individuals suffering from eating disorders demonstrate low levels of emotional 
awareness and consequently find it more difficult to engage deliberate and adaptive emotion 
regulation strategies (Corcos et al., 2000). 
Emotion regulation goals are the outcomes the individual is seeking to achieve 
regarding the specific emotion. Healthy individuals will typically weigh the short-term and 
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long-term consequences when weighing up different approaches. Failure to balance these 
concerns may result in problematic emotion regulation goals (Gross & Jazaieri, 2014). One 
example of dysfunctional emotion regulation goals are found in manic states of bipolar 
disorder, where individuals tend to report feeling euphoric and usually disinterested in 
downregulating their emotional state despite potential consequences (Gruber, Eidelman, 
Johnson, Smith, & Harvey, 2011). However, it is not clear whether this failure to downregulate 
is due to failing to conceive of the consequences or a failure to properly weigh up these 
consequences. But there is some evidence to suggest that the more manic an individual is the 
less weight they give to the adverse and long term consequences of their goals (Meyer, 
Johnson, & Winters, 2001). 
The third factor in emotion regulation are the emotion regulation strategies applied by 
the individual to achieve their goal. This can be further separated into two aspects, strategy 
selection and strategy implementation. There are a range of decisions to weigh up when 
selecting an appropriate strategy for a specific context. One is the strategy’s overall 
effectiveness, as there is a great deal of evidence suggesting that some strategies are more 
effective than others (for a meta-analysis see: Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012). Another aspect 
is the availability of resources to engage the strategy, as it is now well understood that 
different strategies may require different amounts of resource (such as cognitive demands or 
external opportunity). Therefore, even if a strategy is very effective it may not be available. For 
example, Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, & Gross (2011) found that in a community sample 
participants would choose to engage cognitive reappraisal in low-intensity emotional tasks and 
distraction in high intensity tasks. Therefore, if healthy emotion regulation selection requires 
an awareness of the efficacy of different strategies and an accurate assessment of the 
resources available, it follows that emotion dysregulation could be due to difficulties in 
weighing up one or more of these steps (Gross & Jazaieri, 2014).  
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Once a strategy has been selected as appropriate, an amount of confidence and skill is 
still required to implement it. If either of these are absent, then the strategy is likely to be 
ineffective. The two main components of emotion regulation strategy implementation are goal 
flexibility, where the emotion regulation goal may need to be adjusted as the situation 
develops, and goal shielding, which refers to prioritising the goal from competing goals. The 
inattentive/disorganised subtype of ADHD includes being easily distracted, poor 
concentration, forgetfulness and a lack of attention to detail (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Given the nature of this issue it follows that an individual with ADHD may 
have difficulties in implementing emotion regulation strategies due to difficulties in goal 
shielding (Mullin & Hinshaw, 2007). 
1.9  Emotion regulation strategies 
 
Whilst different disorders can display contrasting symptoms, there are several key 
strategies or deficits that appear across many disorders, such as rumination, suppression and 
catastrophising. Also, typically adaptive strategies are often marked by their absence, such as 
reappraisal. Recent research suggests that the grouping of these strategies into maladaptive 
and adaptive is overly simplistic and that the strategy is not only dependent on the context but 
also on the flexibility of its use (Bonanno, Papa, Lalande, Westphal, & Coifman, 2004; Mennin 
& Fresco, 2011). Although, it has also been found that despite context, some strategies, such 
as suppression, involve more cognitive load and physiological arousal, making regulation less 
effective or more draining (Gross & John, 2003).  
1.10 Catastrophising 
 
Catastrophising is one of the main focuses of this thesis. First defined by Ellis (1962) as 
focusing on how terrible a situation appears to be. This concept was later refined for 
depression and anxiety by Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery (1979), also known as magnification, as 
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dwelling on the worst perceived possible outcome of a situation. Unlike the other prolifically 
researched emotion regulation strategies discussed after this section, catastrophising has 
received most attention within the pain literature and little attention elsewhere. In regard to 
pain, catastrophising is defined as a negative exaggerated emotional and cognitive schema 
arising during anticipation or actual pain stimulation (Quartana, Campbell, & Edwards, 2009). 
In pain literature, catastrophising has been associated with lower self-efficacy (Sullivan et al., 
2001), increased pain sensitivity (Edwards, Bingham, Bathon, & Haythornthwaite, 2006), 
depression (Quartana et al., 2009) and suicide ideation (Edwards, Smith, Kudel, & 
Haythornwaite, 2006). 
Outside of research in pain, there are studies into catastrophising as a key symptom in 
panic disorder. In panic disorder, catastrophising is defined as misinterpretations of 
ambiguous mental events and physiological sensations, which maintain the disorder (Fentz et 
al., 2013). While these various definitions are highly context specific, the common theme is a 
belief driven magnification of emotion sensation during the appraisal step of the process 
model of emotion regulation. In this context, catastrophising has been associated with anxious 
arousal (Casey, Oei, Newcombe, & Kenardy, 2004), lower panic self-efficacy (Fentz et al., 
2013), and increased risk of anxiety in panic disordered individuals as well as in healthy 
controls (Berger, Fraser, Carbone, & Mcgorry, 2006). Additionally, when catastrophising is 
treated directly, reductions are associated with greater therapeutic gains in Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy (CBT; Clark, 1999). 
In anxiety and depression, there is much less research directly into catastrophising, 
despite being the origin of the modern definition. In CBT, catastrophising is tackled very 
broadly as one of many maladaptive strategies to be questioned and replaced with more 
helpful reappraisals (Beck et al., 1979). In this area much research on catastrophising, outside 
of the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 
 30 
 
2001), occurred in the early 2000’s as a cognitive error, rather than as an emotion regulation 
strategy. Studies have associated catastrophising with depression and anxiety (Garnefski, 
Kommer, et al., 2002; Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006). One study by Martin & Dahlen (2005) uses a 
multiple regression on cross-sectional data and found catastrophising to be a significant 
predictor of depression, anxiety and trait anger but not stress. However, there are no studies 
known to the author that test catastrophising as a predictor of depression, anxiety and stress 
over time in adults.  
In children, catastrophising has been shown to be predictive of depression over a six 
week period (Abela, 2001). This has also been replicated in adolescents over a 10 week period 
(Abela & Sarin, 2002). Similar relationships between catastrophising and anxiety have been 
found in children, where catastrophising was the strongest predictor of a range of measures of 
anxiety (Weems, Berman, Silverman, & Saavedra, 2001). Catastrophising was also found to be 
more prevalent in younger children (less than 12 years).  Further research has also shown 
catastrophising to be associated with sleep disturbances (Hiller, Lovato, Gradisar, Oliver, & 
Slater, 2014).  
1.11 Rumination 
 
Another common transdiagnostic response to negative affect is rumination, which is 
defined by constantly recurring thoughts, often with no new progress. In depression, this 
frequently means repetitive negativity, self-deprecating statements as well as pessimistic 
beliefs about the future (Joormann & Siemer, 2014). In response styles theory (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991), which was originally created to explain the role of rumination in depression, 
rumination is a style of thought with passive attention to depressive thoughts and their 
implications. This is predicted to be causally implicated in both the onset and maintenance of 
depression. Many studies have shown that rumination can prolong and increase negative 
mood (see meta-analysis Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Rumination has also been shown to 
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be a predictor of future depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). In experimental settings, 
rumination is often contrasted with distraction, which has demonstrated that rumination 
comparatively: increases negative cognitions; sustains negative mood; decreases problem 
solving strategies and overgeneralises autobiographical memory (Watkins & Moulds, 2005). In 
anxiety, ruminative thinking in worry has been defined as chains of negative thoughts and 
images, which are very hard to control. These represent an attempt at problem solving an 
uncertain but potentially negative outcome (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). 
This form of ruminative thinking is concerned with future potential threats and its definition is 
less precise as it extends to include catastrophising, uncertainties and risks (Watkins, 2008). 
Although, the literature is quite consistent in almost equating worry and rumination, it may be 
better defined as the potential combination of several emotion regulation strategies including 
rumination and catastrophising. 
Recent research has shown that individuals with bipolar disorder ruminate strongly 
about negative emotion, with some studies suggesting a greater prevalence than in unipolar 
depression (Kim, Yu, Lee, & Kim, 2012). A potential explanation of this effect was that 
rumination in bipolar patients may not be a strategy but instead a consequence of ineffective 
thought control. Bipolar has also been associated with positive rumination, dwelling on the 
content, consequences and causes of positive emotions (Feldman, Joorman, & Johnson, 2008). 
This appears to be a specific risk factor for bipolar disorder, where some findings show that 
individuals with depression or bipolar both ruminate in response to negative affect but only 
bipolar individuals ruminated to positive affect (Johnson, McKenzie, & McMurrich, 2008). 
Gruber, Eidelman, Johnson, Smith, and Harvey (2011) compared bipolar individuals not 
experiencing episodes of mania or depression with healthy controls, where healthy controls 
reported significantly less rumination for both positive and negative emotion. This suggests 
that rumination may not simply be a result of the presence of a manic or depressive state or a 
symptom or ineffective thought control. 
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Whilst rumination may appear to be a counter intuitive way to deal with negative 
emotion, findings have shown that depressed individuals tend to believe it can increase self-
awareness and understanding (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001). However, this belief could be a 
false impression that motivates individuals to apply it, even when it is maladaptive. But, 
Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) reported that sub-clinically depressed participants 
associated rumination with enhanced insightfulness. Later additions to response styles theory 
have also proposed two subcomponents to rumination, brooding (typically maladaptive 
rumination) and reflective pondering (looking inward to problem solve) (Treynor et al., 2003). 
This suggests that even one of the most depression associated strategies can be adaptive if 
used appropriately. When looking at depression and anxiety Watkins (2008) further proposes 
that the potential for constructive consequences from rumination may have some foundation. 
In his review, Watkins found that rumination has been implicated in: successful cognitive 
processing and recovery from upsetting and traumatic events; adaptive planning and 
preparation for the future; recovery from depression and uptake of pro-health behaviours. 
Rather than challenging current literature, these findings further support the principle that 
almost all emotion regulation strategies can be adaptive if used flexibly and in the correct 
context.  
1.12 Suppression 
 
This strategy has long been regarded as almost entirely maladaptive. Suppression is 
defined as the attempt to inhibit the effects of external cues on internal (e.g. thoughts; known 
as emotion suppression) and external states (e.g. facial expressions; known as expressive 
suppression) (Joormann & Siemer, 2014). Emotion suppression has been found to increase 
negative emotions, depressive symptoms and decrease inhibitory control (Gotlib & Joormann, 
2010). Research in clinically depressed or anxious individuals found that in response to a mood 
induction both groups reported greater use of emotion suppression than controls. This was 
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also related to greater levels of negative affect as well as increased heart rate (Campbell-Sills 
et al., 2006). This study tasked participants with a mood induction followed by instructed 
suppression or acceptance, which found that the suppression condition took longer to recover 
their mood. This suggests that suppression also interferes with emotion recovery following its 
use and after the aversive stimulus has ended. This is predicted by the process model of 
emotion regulation, that response strategies are more effortful and draining than antecedent 
strategies. A study into clinically anxious individuals using carbon dioxide enriched air to 
provoke panic symptoms also found that emotion suppression did not reduce distress (Levitt, 
Brown, Orsillo, & Barlow, 2004). Scores of suppression on the White Bear Suppression 
Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) were able to predict scores of depression over 7 weeks in 
healthy participants (Meyer & Beevers, 2004) and over 10 weeks in another sample of healthy 
participants (Luxton & Wenzlaff, 2003). Furthermore, Matheson & Anisman (2003) were able 
to predict self-reported depression scores across 6 months in healthy individuals.  
Studies in healthy subjects suggest that expressive suppression does reduce expressive 
behaviour but simultaneously increases arousal in the sympathetic nervous system, while 
failing to reduce emotion intensity (Gross & Levenson, 1993). Liverant, Brown, Barlow and 
Roemer (2008) also found that expressive suppression reduced acute emotion responses for 
depressed participants. Studies looking into brain function have also found that expressive 
suppression increases activation of emotion implicated brain regions (Goldin, McRae, Ramel, 
& Gross, 2008). In bipolar disorder, one study suggests that bipolar individuals spontaneously 
use more expressive suppression than healthy controls in response to both negative and 
positive inductions (Gruber, Harvey, & Gross, 2012) 
From the perspective of the process model of emotion regulation, both rumination 
and suppression are response focused strategies and therefore are more demanding and less 
effective than antecedent focused strategies (Gross, 2014). However, the adaptiveness of 
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either strategy is still subject to its appropriate use. Use of emotion suppression following 
exposure to traumatic scenes was found to reduce reported distress and later intrusive 
thoughts (Dunn, Billotti, Murphy, & Dalgleish, 2009).   
1.13 Reappraisal 
 
Cognitive reappraisal is the third point of the process model of emotion regulation and 
the last point of intervention before full emotion generation. It entails thinking about stimuli in 
a different way that changes the emotion or its intensity. This strategy is often only considered 
in flexible and adaptive ways, focusing on appropriately reducing negative emotion (e.g. 
Campbell-Sills, Ellard, & Barlow, 2014; Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007; Gross, 2002; Joormann & 
Siemer, 2014). This direction within the literature has shaped a great deal of the subsequent 
research. Reappraisal has been associated with a wide array of benefits such as reduced 
intensity of emotion experience (Gross, 1998), reduced startle response (Jackson, Malmstadt, 
Larson, & Davidson, 2000), greater parasympathetic tone (Aldao & Mennin, 2012), reduced 
avoidance (Wolgast, Lundh, & Viborg, 2011) and neuroimaging suggests reduced activation in 
emotion centres (e.g. the amygdala, Ochsner et al., 2009).  
In depressive disorders the tendency to interpret situations negatively is very strong. 
Therefore, altering those interpretations is a very powerful method to regulate emotion in 
depression (Joormann & Siemer, 2014). Research in depression has linked less frequent use of 
reappraisal to increased depressive symptoms ( Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006; Gotlib & Joormann, 
2010). Furthermore, reduced use of reappraisal was found in a sample diagnosed with 
depression and anxiety ( Garnefski, Legerstee, Kraaij, Van Den Kommer, & Teerds, 2002). Most 
designs investigating reappraisal have been cross-sectional, making it difficult to establish 
whether its absence is a risk factor or a symptom.  
Specifically in anxiety disorders, reappraisal has been found to reduce emotion 
intensity (Aldao & Mennin, 2012) as well in a subclinical anxious sample (Campbell-sills et al., 
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2011). Although research in the area is limited, bipolar individuals used reappraisal more than 
healthy controls in response to both positive, negative and neutral emotion (Gruber et al., 
2012). However, in bipolar individuals this may be a result of emotion regulation requiring 
more conscious effort. 
However, inflexible use of reappraisal is not beneficial in all contexts. Nezlek & 
Kuppens (2008) investigated emotions and emotion regulation daily. They found a positive 
relationship between reappraisal, positive mood and self-esteem, but no relationship between 
reappraisal and decreasing negative emotion and related negative affect. A meta-analysis by 
Aldao and Nolen-Hoeksema (2012) found that while reappraisal is negatively associated with 
anxious and depressive symptoms, it is also much less consistent than other strategies such as 
rumination and suppression. This potentially suggests its use by depressed and anxious 
individuals is not flexible and adaptive use is hard to capture in self-report questionnaires. 
 
 
1.14 Therapeutic Approaches to Emotion Regulation 
 
As recent research shows, emotion regulation has strong links with psychopathology, 
and therefore has potential as an explicit therapeutic target. While therapies that target 
emotion regulation have existed for a long time, these are not explicitly emotion regulation 
therapies and are not informed by emotion regulation research (such as Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (CBT) and Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT)). It has been suggested that in classical 
treatments such as CBT, emotion regulation is a central mechanism of change (Campbell-Sills, 
Laura Barlow, 2007). However, many of these treatments are mostly focused on improving the 
implementation and selection aspects of emotion regulation. They do not actively build on all 
of the factors involved in emotion regulation and intervene at all relevant points in emotion 
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generation and regulation (Sheppes, Suri, & Gross, 2015). However, one example of a classical 
therapy taking a step congruent with an emotion regulation perspective is in attentional bias 
modification treatment (Grafton & MacLeod, 2014). For this intervention clients with anxiety 
disorders complete a general computerised training protocol to modify their attentional biases 
to threat. This specifically targets the attention stage of the modal model and modifies the 
factors underlying emotion regulation by reducing the overrepresentation of threatening 
information.  
Two therapies developed from emotion regulation literature will be discussed in this 
chapter due to their relevance to this thesis. The first of these therapies is Affect Regulation 
Training (ART, Berking & Whitley, 2014), whose components are investigated in chapter two. 
The second is Emotion Regulation Therapy (ERT, Mennin & Fresco, 2014) as this draws from 
emotion regulation research to add directly to CBT packages. Its specific target of depression 
and anxiety comorbidity provides a great deal of overlap with the traits analysed by this thesis. 
In comparison to cross-sectional and standard longitudinal studies, therapeutic approaches 
assert practicable models and clinical insight that aid further understanding. 
1.15 Affect Regulation Training (ART)  
 
ART is a model of emotion regulation that was developed primarily by Matthias 
Berking through a synthesis of emotion regulation theories (e.g. Connor-smith, Compas, 
Wadsworth, Thomsen, & Saltzman, 2000; Gottman & Declaire, 1997; Grawe, 2004; Gross, 
1998; Larsen, 2000; Lazarus, 1991; Leahy, 2002; Saarni, 1999), as well as studies with findings 
between emotion regulation and psychopathology (such as Berking & Wupperman, 2012; 
Berking et al., 2012) and clinical experience. ART was inspired by Klaus Grawe's (2006) 
translational ideas in the development of mental health disorders. He picked up on the 
absence of transdiagnostic treatments focusing on improving emotion regulation strategies 
when ART was being developed in 2004. This training has gradually increased in popularity in 
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the German speaking parts of Europe, where it is known as Training Emotionaler Kompetenzen 
(TEK; Berking, 2010).  
At the core of ART is the model of adaptive affect regulation (Figure 1.3). This model is 
comprised of a number of key strategies that are the targets of ART. However, each of these 
ART categories are best understood as categories that contain a variety of strategies rather 
than as individual strategies in their own right. These strategies are: awareness (the conscious 
ability to be aware of and perceive emotional states); identifying and labelling (The ability to 
identify and correctly label affective states); understanding (the ability to identify relevant 
maintaining factors for current affective states); modification (the ability to modify affective 
states actively); acceptance and tolerance (the ability to accept and tolerate negative affective 
states when necessary); self-compassion (the ability to support oneself compassionately in 
distressing situations); and readiness to confront (the ability to put the previous strategies 
together as required to achieve personal goals) (Berking & Schwarz, 2014). 
 
Figure 1.3 The ART model of adaptive affect regulation. Reprinted from “Affect Regulation 
Training” by Matthias Berking & Jeanine Schwarz, 2014, Handbook of Emotion Regulation 
Second Edition, p. 532. Copyright 2014 by the Guildford Press. 
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In addition to these strategies, their interactions and the assumptions behind them, 
the ART model posits that only modification and tolerance/acceptance strategies are 
ultimately relevant to mental health. The other strategies in the model are relevant to the 
extent that they facilitate these core strategies. This was in part based upon research on 
rumination (such as Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990) and clinical observation on the behalf 
of Matthias Berking and colleagues. Through clinical observation they saw many individuals 
were able to perceive their emotion states, analyse them and work to explain them but 
without achieving any benefit from these activities. Berking & Schwarz (2014) also found 
evidence suggesting that excessive use of these non-core strategies is partly responsible for 
the maintenance of disorders. This was thought to be due to higher awareness and 
understanding alongside a lack of self-compassion or resilience making the situation less 
tolerable than just a lack of awareness. This correlates with other work discussed earlier, 
where participants found rumination gave them a deeper insight but that insight had not 
helped regulate their emotions. 
 The ART model is behind the ART program, which is an integration of principles and 
interventions from a selection of psychotherapeutic approaches to develop general emotion 
regulation strategies (Berking & Schwarz, 2014). This is targeted at individuals likely to benefit 
from being taught more adaptive regulation strategies. The first part of the programme is an 
educational introduction to emotions, their evolutionary background, purposes, risks and 
benefits as well as some of the mechanisms behind emotion processing. This leads to seven 
strategies that are initially practiced in a long version and then used in very short periods (3 
minutes to 3 seconds). These initial strategies are: muscle relaxation; breathing relaxation; 
non-judgemental awareness; acceptance and tolerance; compassionate self-support; analysing 
emotions and modifying emotions. Once practiced, the strategies are then linked together in 
the order specified above. This is practiced daily for about 20-30 minutes along with three 
short exercises (less than 3 minutes each) over the six-week period. In order to support this 
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behaviour, participants are given hand-outs, worksheets, guided audio files and prompting 
text messages. 
 Although research into the effectiveness of ART is still in its early stages, due to its 
recent development, several studies in a variety of contexts have shown promising results. 
One of these studies by Berking, Wupperman, et al. (2008) tested 289 patients from a mental 
health hospital in Germany with no diagnostic specificity. All patients received 6 weeks of CBT 
combined with additional multidisciplinary treatment as required. From this group, patients 
were randomly selected to switch four sessions of CBT per week for an abbreviated version of 
ART over a 3-week period. After six weeks of treatment, individuals who had taken part in ART 
displayed significantly larger improvement of emotion regulation strategies than the CBT only 
group. Secondly, these participants also demonstrated a significant decrease in depressive 
symptoms and negative affect as well as a marked increase in positive affect. 
 Another study by Berking, Ebert, Cuijpers, & Hofmann (2013) undertook a randomised 
control trial with a sample of 432 inpatients diagnosed with major depressive disorder (MDD). 
Again, the participants were randomly divided into two groups. One group received routine 
multicomponent CBT, which also worked to target comorbid secondary disorders. In MDD, 
participants received a minimum of one 45-minute session of individual therapy and four 45 
minute sessions of group psychotherapy per week. The second group received a combination 
of the CBT program with ART, which was modified due to organisational constraints to four 1.5 
hour sessions. This study found significant improvements when CBT was combined with ART. 
Additionally, other gains were found in acceptance and tolerance, compassionate self-support 
and modification. A non-clinical study was also carried out by Berking, Meier, & Wupperman 
(2010) on a sample of 31 volunteers from a group of 350 informed about the treatment. Prior 
to receiving ART, their emotion regulation strategies were found to be significantly lower than 
that of a control group. However, after the programme no difference remained in emotion 
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regulation strategies between groups. Some of the core elements of this model are explored 
further in Chapter Two, which challenges the assumption that all the foundation strategies 
have little clinical relevance. 
1.16 Emotion Regulation Therapy (ERT) 
 
 ERT was developed by Douglas Mennin, David Fresco and colleagues to tackle an 
increasing subgroup of individuals with high comorbidity, specifically generalised anxiety 
disorder (GAD) and depression who failed to make previous treatment improvements. This 
was based on findings such as Borkovec & Ruscio (2001) who found that only 50-60% of clients 
treated for GAD demonstrated clinically significant change. Similarly, a meta-analysis by 
Cuijpers, van Straten, Andersson, & van Oppen (2008) found that although depression 
treatment was effective, it only achieved a small effect size. Corroborating the assumptions 
behind the development of this emotion regulation focused treatment Newman, Przeworski, 
Fisher, & Borkovec (2010) found that individuals with comorbid GAD and depression did not 
gain durable treatment effects. Similar results were also found in antidepressant treatment 
outcomes where depression with comorbid anxiety proved to be the most treatment resistant 
(Farabaugh, Bitran, & Witte, 2010).  
 Mennin and Fresco proposed that there is a commonality between these disorders, in 
that they both reflect heightened emotional experience (to a greater extent than other 
conditions) such as emotionality, emotion intensity or neuroticism (such as Mennin et al., 
2005, 2007). Further evidence for this has been found in factor-analytic studies demonstrating 
that both disorders share a higher order factor for prolonged negative affect (Krueger & 
Markon, 2006; David Watson, 2005). Also, both depression and GAD share inherited factors 
relating to accentuated emotionality (Kendler, Gardner, Gatz, & Pedersen, 2006). These 
factors have also been linked to treatment resistance in otherwise effective therapies 
(Olatunji, Cisler, & Tolin, 2010). 
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 Motivation dysfunction is also proposed to be present in the distress disorders where 
individuals may undergo frequent conflicting pulls from safety-threat systems and reward 
systems (Dollard & Miller, 1950). Unlike healthy individuals, they are significantly less effective 
at resolving these conflicts in motivation. ERT draws upon Aupperle & Paulus' (2010) model of 
motivation balancing where individuals with anxiety and mood disorders struggle to resolve 
conflicting motivations. This is due to a series of potential deficits: an over-representation of 
safety-threat evaluation; an under or over-representation of approach evaluations and 
insufficient arbitration of avoidance or approach strategies. 
 Another common factor between the two distress disorders is rumination as a means 
of coping with highly emotional experiences (Watkins, 2008). For example, excessive worry is 
an emotion regulation strategy attempting to reduce distress (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 
2004). This is a similar process to depressive rumination, which is an enduring cognitive 
process, often focused upon past failures and negative self-beliefs (Watkins, 2008). Both 
processes (worry and rumination) are enduring and applied to escape or dampen 
emotionality. This often undermines constructive behavioural action and can cause individuals 
to lose out on personal growth and life fulfilling events. A profile of these ‘distress disordered’ 
individuals develops who have an excessive reliance upon these emotion regulation strategies. 
The strategies are focused upon avoiding or escaping potentially distressing situations in 
conjunction with weakened contextual learning repertoires. These three factors and their 
therapeutic targets are represented in Figure 3 below: 
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Figure 1.4 The Conceptual model of target mechanisms, change principles, and therapeutic 
processes in emotion regulation therapy. Reprinted from “Emotion Regulation Therapy” by 
Douglas S. Mennin & David M. Fresco, 2014, Handbook of Emotion Regulation Second Edition, 
p. 532. Copyright 2014 by the Guildford Press. 
 
ERT was also designed to integrate CBT principles and techniques alongside emotion 
regulation focused interventions based upon findings from the emotion regulation literature. 
Therefore, Mennin & Fresco (2014) define ERT as a theoretically derived and evidence based 
treatment expanding from a CBT foundation through targeting of mechanisms common to the 
distress disorders (such as perseverative thought, motivational emotional activation resulting 
in  narrowing learning repertoires). These simultaneously aim to normalise emotion 
generation and regulation strategies. This brief overview of ERT will focus on aspects of the 
therapy that are drawn from emotion regulation literature and focused on emotion regulation. 
Other aspects that this therapy draws upon highly (such as experiential exposure from CBT) 
will not be mentioned. 
 The first component unique to ERT is motivational awareness strategies training 
(Mennin & Fresco, 2014), which is designed to develop accurate and rapid detection of cues 
signalling motivational pulls. Previous studies have also found clear benefits linked to 
emotional and behavioural clarity (for a meta-analysis see: Lanaj, Chang, & Johnson, 2012). 
This treatment begins with psychoeducation to increase understanding of motivations and 
underlying emotions in the personally relevant context of the individual. Included within this 
education is a rationale for the benefits of observing emotions with greater clarity. An 
example of this given to clients is a musical orchestra, where the music represents the 
motivational pulls in their lives. In an ideal situation, the music is synchronised and 
harmonious. In this way, the clients are encouraged to attend to each part of the orchestra 
such that they can discern each part and its role in the overall composition. Clients then later 
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expand on this with the therapist to help them view the situation from various motivational 
stances (such as approach or avoidance) with the aim that life comprises of different 
motivations. This results in an understanding that different responses are possible depending 
on motivations and emotions. 
 Following this, clients undergo training to improve rapidity and accuracy of cue 
detection in everyday life. This is based upon earlier work by Linehan (1993), where clients are 
taught to increase their self-awareness of life situations to identify antecedents with greater 
accuracy, feelings, thoughts and behaviours that result from them. This is part of a process to 
bring dysfunctional automatic emotion regulation strategies into conscious awareness where 
responses can be better interpreted and regulated. This understanding is built through use of 
a snowball metaphor with clients (Mennin & Fresco, 2014) where a pure emotional experience 
is imagined as a pristine snowball rolling down a hill. As it descends it picks up dirt and twigs, 
becoming harder and icy (representing the unfolding of emotional experience). This informs 
the client of a temporal view of emotion regulation and how much less effort is necessary to 
handle emotions closer to their onset. The final stage of this process is the encouragement of 
clients to practice self-monitoring in the form of Catch Yourself Reacting (CYR). This begins as a 
process to identify antecedents of emotions and the emotions themselves, initially completed 
with the therapist and then encouraged to be done at home. 
 The next component unique to ERT is regulatory skills training, which is based on 
Gross’ Process Model of Emotion Regulation and related clinical as well as experimental 
literature. ERT applies several CBT intervention processes that tackle unfolding emotional 
experience from different time points. These four elaborative skills are: attending (focus, 
sustain and adaptably shift attention); allowance (the ability to openly experience and allow 
emotional experience); distancing (the ability to observe, identify and create psychological 
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perspectives from inner experiences) and reframing (an ability to alter an evaluation of an 
event to manipulate its emotional intensity). 
 Although ERT is a new therapy there are preliminary results of its efficacy, namely an 
open trial (n=19; Mennin & Fresco, 2011) and a RCT (n=60; Mennin, Fresco, Heimberg, & 
Ciesla, 2012). In both trials, participants reported high levels of satisfaction and encountered 
low levels of attrition during the treatment. This is represented in 18 of the 19-open trial and 
26 of 30 RCT participants completing the treatment. The open trial found, from both clinician 
and client reports, reductions in measures of GAD, worry, trait depressed and trait anxious 
symptoms. This mirrored self-reported improvements in quality of life with a large effect size. 
These gains were still maintained 9 months following treatment. 
 The RCT study sought to compare ERT with a modified attention control condition, 
which comprised of clients periodically speaking through telephone calls to a clinician that 
provided supportive listening. ERT clients experienced significantly less GAD severity, worry, 
trait depression and trait anxiety symptoms. This also corresponded with self-reported 
improvements in functionality and quality of life with effect sizes ranging from medium to 
large. These gains remained in effect when tested 9 months following treatment. 
 Finally, a subgroup of clients with GAD and comorbid depression (n=30) were treated 
where both clinician and self-report found significant reductions in GAD severity, worry, 
rumination, anhedonia, trait depression and anxiety.   In addition, significant improvements in 
functionality and quality of life, were comparable to the findings of the overall two trials. This 
would suggest that the comorbidity of depression did not interfere with treatment efficacy. 
However, there have not been studies to test this therapy outside of its nuanced target 
population and it is possible that some of these strategies may be successful in other contexts. 
1.17 Conclusion 
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The field of emotion regulation is still relatively new and rapidly expanding (Gross, 
2014). This contributes to a very diverse literature and many unresolved competing theories 
and models. This brief review was designed to provide a general overview of the dominant 
themes relevant to this thesis as well as emotion regulation research from a 
psychopathological perspective.  Emotion regulation is at the early stages of application to 
therapeutic intervention, with some examples already drawing strongly from existing 
literature, which are performing well. However, it has also been demonstrated that there is 
much work left to be done to better understand specific strategies and their transdiagnostic 
relationships with mental health, most notably catastrophising. In an environment where case 
complexity and comorbidity have strong impacts on treatment success rates (Weisz et al. 
2013), new and transdiagnostic measures may provide some of the necessary solutions. 
 
 
1.18 Overview of Thesis content  
 
 This thesis is comprised of seven chapters and five studies. The first study (Chapter 
Two) is a questionnaire battery that assesses a community population with a series of emotion 
regulation questionnaires to cover a broad array of emotion regulation strategies. These 
include Berking’s (2008) key components and cognitive emotion regulation strategies. These 
are then compared with indicators for depression, anxiety, stress and hypomania. These 
associations are then used to build profiles for each mental health indicator to bring out the 
emotion regulation strategies that best predict that indicator while controlling for the other 
indicators. 
 Study two (Chapter Three) is the development of a State-Trait Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire for both positive and negative affect. This questionnaire was developed from a 
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wide variety of existing measures to create a broader and less theoretically designed (more 
ecologically valid) questionnaire. The purpose was to create a questionnaire that could better 
experimentally measure emotion regulation and be comparable in any context. However, the 
questionnaire did not validate, potentially due to its ambitious scope. 
 Study three (Chapter Four) built upon strong associations found in Chapter Two 
between catastrophising and mental health indicators. This lab based study induced 
catastrophising in one group of individuals and compared mood changes with a control group. 
This study found significant differences between groups, where catastrophisers demonstrated 
higher negative and lower positive mood. This suggests that catastrophising has a causal role 
in mood change 
 Study four (Chapter Five) creates a new measure of catastrophising. This was designed 
as existing non-vignette measures are only two or four item subscales and this was limiting the 
conclusions and potential understanding that could be drawn from investigating 
catastrophising. The items were generated by participants and the questionnaire successfully 
formed a two-factor model and validated. 
 Study five (Chapter Six) builds on many of the previous studies to develop a mobile 
app based catastrophising intervention (and mirror control condition) within a community 
population. This would serve as an alternative test for the causal relationship between 
catastrophising and mood suggested in Chapter Three. This would also test the potential value 
of using catastrophising as a clinical target. The experiment found that individuals on the 
catastrophising app demonstrated lower levels of catastrophising, lower negative mood and 
higher positive mood compared to controls. 
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2 Chapter Two: Profiling Emotion Regulation Strategies Against Mental 
Health Indicators 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Examining the associations between emotion regulation strategies and mental health are a 
central theme of this thesis. This study aims to provide an overview of a wide variety of 
strategies and mental health related continuum indicators in adolescents (in the present 
study: depression, anxiety, stress and hypomania). While the majority of the existing emotion 
regulation literature has used correlation techniques across a range of questionnaire measures 
to identify these relationships; this study aims to take one step further and create emotion 
regulation profiles, which predict specific mental health indicators. The range of emotion 
regulation strategies and questionnaire measures in this area makes any fully inclusive test 
impractical (see Chapter Three for a more exhaustive list of adolescent applicable measures). 
Therefore, pre-existing measures must be selected from the literature for their potential 
relevance to these profiles. To accumulate a breadth of relevant strategies and not impose too 
great a burden on the participant, questionnaires will be selected not just by reliability but also 
by the number of subscales. The potential pool of questionnaires was also greatly reduced due 
to requiring previous testing on an adolescent population. 
Many emotion regulation questionnaires tend to focus on several strategies, the most 
notable being the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003), which has 
been cited 3012 times (according to Google Scholar, September 2015). The ERQ uses 
reappraisal and expressive suppression as classic examples of generally adaptive and 
maladaptive strategies. Gross & John (2003) found associations with positive mood 
(reappraisal r=.42; suppression r=-.33) and negative mood (reappraisal r=-.51; suppression 
r=.39). Associations were also found with depression (Beck Depression Inventory, BDI; Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) for reappraisal (r=-.23) and suppression (r=.25). 
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While this questionnaire’s dominance in the literature would suggest its inclusion, its two 
strategy specialisation limits its use. Additionally, these strategies are included in broader 
questionnaires. Applying this approach more widely reduces the questionnaire selection pool 
considerably, such as the Rumination Scale (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) or the Mindful Attention 
Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003). 
One such questionnaire also prevalent in the literature, and selected for the present 
study, is the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski, Kraaij, & 
Spinhoven, 2001). This assesses nine cognitive emotion regulation strategies and was found to 
have strong relationships with depression (e.g. self-blame r=.31 & rumination r=.44) and 
anxiety (e.g. self-blame r=.23 & rumination r=.44). One unusual finding by the original 
validation does not explain the negative correlation found in both depression and anxiety with 
catastrophising (depression r=-.21; anxiety r=-.10) once the other eight strategies had been 
partialled out (unpartialled depression r=.35; anxiety r=.26). This would suggest that 
catastrophising is generally adaptive on its own, which may be a misleading conclusion. When 
the authors partialled out the other strategies, rumination as defined by the CERQ (also 
measured by the CERQ defined by how often thoughts go round and round in your head) 
covers a cyclical element that is also present in catastrophising. Although, catastrophising is 
closer to a spiral due to the emphasis on magnification than the cyclical nature of rumination. 
The result appears to be that by controlling for rumination, catastrophising, as measured by 
the CERQ, lost a core component. A later study comparing the CERQ between control and 
clinically depressed and anxious participants found that the clinical population reported to be 
significantly more likely to catastrophise, ruminate and self-blame (Garnefski, Legerstee, 
Kraaij, Van Den Kommer, & Teerds, 2002). This study also reported unexpected results for 
their acceptance subscale, where clinically depressed and anxious participants reported using 
it significantly more. This has led to a change in the interpretation of the acceptance subscale 
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as capturing acceptance’s maladaptive as well as adaptive aspects (Garnefski et al., 2002), 
potentially explaining the frequent null results in community correlations.  
Although, little research has considered CERQ emotion regulation strategies in bipolar 
or hypomanic mood, a few have used the Hypomanic Personality scale (HPS; Eckblad & 
Chapman, 1986). For example, Green et al. (2011) found that only rumination predicted 
hypomanic personality traits in type I bipolar and only catastrophising predicted hypomanic 
traits in unaffected relatives, with no significant results in a control population, except for a 
non-significant trend in catastrophising. Comparatively, Fletcher, Parker, & Manicavasagar 
(2013) found all CERQ strategies except other-blame and acceptance were significantly 
different between controls and bipolar patients, where controls reported higher positive 
refocusing, planning, and perspective taking. Additionally, no differences were found between 
bipolar and unipolar groups. These studies appear to be opposing, however Green et al. (2011) 
used emotion regulation scores to predict clinical and healthy HPS scores, whereas Fletcher, 
Parker, & Manicavasagar (2013) compared clinical and healthy groups emotion regulation 
scores directly. So, whilst these results may simply be contradictory, this might be an effect of 
using the HPS as a measure of bipolar disorder, rather than grouping via diagnosis.  
The second measure applied by the present study is the Negative Mood Regulation 
(NMR; Catanzaro & Mearns, 1990) which is a measure of a how confident individuals feel in 
manipulating their own mood. In its validation, it was shown to be significantly related to the 
BDI (r=-.37). It was also compared against an array of 11 emotions, only showing significant 
correlation with sadness (r=.28). Kassel, Bornovalova, & Mehta (2007) found the NMR to have 
an inverse correlation with anxiety (State subscale of State-Trait Anxiety Inventory r=-.56) as 
expected and replicated its previous relationship with depressive scores (Inventory to 
Diagnose Depression r=.56). There is no work known to the researchers investigating the NMR 
in hypomania or bipolar disorder.  
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Another set of emotion regulation strategies covered in the previous chapter, are the 
ART strategies covered in Chapter One (Berking et al., 2008). The Emotion Regulation 
Strategies Questionnaire (ERSQ, Berking & Znoj, 2008) was a questionnaire measure 
developed alongside the therapy, however it has never been translated or tested outside of 
Germany. Therefore, like the ERSQ, the Affect Regulation Therapy Questionnaire (ART-Q) was 
developed on the same basis to measure the same strategies for this study. As the strategies 
have been carefully selected for the ART programme, which is a transdiagnostic treatment, we 
expect to see effects across a range of mental health indicators. 
The second core element to be investigated in this sample is differences in emotion 
regulation between older and younger adolescents. Previous studies have found that brain 
areas associated with emotion and its regulation undergo significant changes in this age range 
(see review: Casey, Jones, & Hare, 2008). These changes in volume and structure suggest they 
are being fine-tuned for adulthood, where emotion associated centres in the limbic system 
tend to develop earlier than prefrontal regions associated with emotion regulation. 
Adolescents have also been shown to react more impulsively than adults and children even 
when taking into account that adolescents are often in more risky situations than children (e.g. 
driving a car). This lag in prefrontal development has been implicated in an effect where 
adolescents are able to accurately assess risky situations but are unable to override impulses 
in emotional situations (Reyna & Farley, 2008). Gullone, Hughes, King, & Tonge (2010) used an 
adolescent and child version of the ERQ to assess emotion regulation development in early 
adolescence over a two-year period (with participants initially aged between 9-15 years) 
showing that with age, expressive suppression decreased but reappraisal remained consistent. 
However, research into many other specific strategies during adolescence remains largely 
untested. However, a review by Zimmer-Gembeck & Skinner (2011) found trends in older 
adolescents towards increased regulatory ability and emotional understanding as well as more 
flexible use of strategies. Therefore, based on previous research it might be reasonable to see 
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a mild increase in reported use of adaptive strategies and a decrease in maladaptive 
strategies. This also further refines the potential pool of questionnaires as only a few 
questionnaires have been tested on younger samples. 
 An important variable to consider when investigating emotion regulation is gender, 
where studies have found differences for certain strategies. In general, women report a 
greater use of almost all emotion regulation strategies than men, except for substance use 
(see for review: Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012). This includes typically maladaptive strategies such as 
rumination but not suppression as well as typically adaptive strategies such as reappraisal and 
acceptance. Therefore, it is expected that there should be significant differences across a wide 
range of emotion regulation strategies. This gender difference in typically maladaptive 
strategies have been shown to account for a significant proportion of diagnosed depression 
and anxiety in females compared to males (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). 
 Previous studies with the CERQ have confirmed similar patterns, finding that females 
ruminate, catastrophise and positively refocus, significantly more than males, where males 
report no greater use of any strategy (Garnefski, Teerds, Kraaij, Legerstee, & van den Kommer, 
2004). Furthermore, the study found that catastrophising, rumination and reappraisal were 
the strongest predictors of depression regardless of gender. However, various tests of the 
NMR have not found any significant gender differences (see Catanzaro & Mearns, 1990; Kassel 
et al., 2007). 
The present study was designed as an exploratory extension of previous studies, using 
a large variety of emotion regulation strategies (nine from CERQ, nine ART strategies and 
NMR) to correlate with a range of mental health indicators, depression, anxiety and 
hypomania. This data will then be used to create emotion regulation profiles for each mental 
health indicator, while controlling for the other indicators. This will expand current 
understanding beyond correlations to pinpoint which indicator each strategy influences once 
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others are controlled for. Furthermore, this may indicate the pathway that each strategy 
influences multiple indicators. For example, rumination’s correlations with anxiety and stress 
may be indirectly through its association with depression. This allows for a deeper 
understanding of how each strategy functions and how best to measure and target it. The 
extension into adolescent age range will develop understanding of how emotion regulation 
develops and indicate where developments are occurring. This study is an exploratory initial 
step into a broad but manageable combination of mental health indicators and emotion 
regulation strategies. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
 
For this study, we planned to recruit several hundred participants between the ages of 
13 to 25 to encapsulate the adolescent age range. To collect data from younger adolescents 70 
schools within Berkshire and Hampshire were contacted to take part in this study. The school 
head teachers were initially emailed and then received two follow up phone calls. Each school 
was asked to distribute letters, either by electronically or on paper, to students and their 
parents with the required website and relevant information. Out of the 70 schools that were 
contacted only one agreed to take part. To collect older adolescent participants, students 
were recruited from the University of Reading student population through the Psychology and 
Clinical Language Sciences Research Panel. 
215 adolescents were recruited from both schools and from the University Research 
Panel from 13-25 years old. Of this group 54 were male. All participants were primarily English 
speaking and white. A priori power analysis was carried out based on the 0.05 f2 cut off point 
with up to 15 predictors, which required a sample size of at least 126 to achieve adequate 
power (.80). 
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2.2.2 Design 
 
This Study used “surveygizmo.com” to produce an online questionnaire battery for 
data collection. This was designed to gather data on a variety of indicators and attributes 
relating to hypomania, depression, anxiety, impulsiveness and emotion regulation from a 
community adolescent population. It comprised of a total of 135 questions from standard 
measures with good psychometric properties, demographic questions and one questionnaire 
developed for this study. This data was collected over a period of six months (February 2013 to 
July 2013). Ethical approval for this study was obtained from the University of Reading Ethics 
Committee.  
2.2.3 Materials  
 
 The first step of this study required the participants to complete a brief set of 
questions involving gender, age, number of close friends, family and ethnicity.  This allowed us 
to index the diversity of our participants in this study (Appendix 1). 
2.2.3.1  Hypomanic Attitudes and Positive Predictions Inventory (Brief-HAPPI) 
 
The Brief-HAPPI (Mansell & Jones, 2006) is a questionnaire with items derived from a cognitive 
model proposed by (Mansell, 2007), to sample a wider range of cognitions in bipolar disorder. 
The Brief-HAPPI consists of a series of 30 statements with the instruction to make a rating to 
indicate to what extent you believe each one on a scale from 0-100%. From these 30 items 5 
are filler statements that were chosen to have no relation to bipolar disorder and 10 items 
were reversed. Post reversal, high total percentages indicate increased bipolar cognitions. 
Mansell & Jones (2006) administered this questionnaire to 56 individuals with a diagnosis of 
bipolar disorder and 39 healthy controls. The results were found to discriminate satisfactorily 
between the two groups where Brief-HAPPI scores correlated strongly with other bipolar 
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scales. Scores from the bipolar group also correlated with a depression scale which was not 
seen in the control group (Appendix 2). 
2.2.3.2  Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS-20) 
 
 The HPS-20 (Meads & Bentall, 2008) is a shortened version of the 48 item HPS 
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), that was reduced through Rasch analysis with data from 318 
participants carefully isolating items that did not fit the model. The HPS-20 comprises of 20 
statements that can be scored ‘True’ (scored 1) or ‘Not True’ (scored 0) (Appendix 3). These 
scores range from 0-20, with higher scorers indicating higher levels of hypomania. The HPS-20 
was found by Meads & Bentall (2008) to have an internal Cronbach’s alpha of .80 as well as 
correlating with the HPS at .94 (n = 299).  
2.2.3.3  Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21) 
 
The DASS-21 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is a shorter version of the DASS-42 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) with seven items chosen from each scale. The DASS-21 requires 
that participants rate the extent to which they have experienced each symptom over the past 
week on a 4-point scale (Appendix 4). The scores for each subscale are determined by 
summing all seven items of the scale. (Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998) further 
investigated the psychometric properties of the 42 and 21 item versions in clinical and 
community samples finding that the DASS-21 had strong Cronbach’s alphas for each of its 
three scales: Depression (.94), Anxiety (.87) and Stress (.91). These internal scales also 
correlated well with similar measures for those factors. In addition, clinically depressed 
participants scored significantly higher than other groups in the depression and stress scales. 
Participants with clinical levels of anxiety also scored significantly higher on the anxiety scale. 
Individuals in the community sample scored lower on all three subscales than those in clinical 
groups. 
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2.2.3.4  Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale for Children (CES-
DC) 
 
The CES-DC (Fendrich, Weissman, & Warner, 1990) was created to be used as a tool 
for screening children and adolescents for depression (Appendix 5). It is a 20 item 
questionnaire with items selected from other depression scales covering six primary symptom 
areas. Each of these items is rated on a scale from 0-3 based on the frequency of that event 
over the past week, with higher scores indicating higher symptomatology. To validate this 
scale, Fendrich, Weissman & Warner (1990) tested a sample of 220 children at high or low risk 
for major depression. They found that the scale had an alpha coefficient of .89. In addition, 
children and adolescents diagnosed with major depressive disorder scored significantly higher 
than those without, these scores also correlated strongly with DSM-III criteria.  
2.2.3.5  Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS15) 
 
The BIS15 (Spinella, 2007) is the shorter 15 item version of the 30 item BIS-11 (Patton, 
Stanford, & Barratt, 1995), which is a very widely used measure of impulsiveness (Appendix 6). 
The BIS15 consists of three subscales (attention impulsivity, motor impulsivity and non-
planning) of five items. Items are recorded on a 4 point Likert scale (1= rarely/never, 4 = 
almost always). Spinella (2007) found an overall Cronbach’s alpha of .79 (n=100) for the BIS15 
and moderate to strong relationships between subscales. 
2.2.3.6  Negative Mood Regulation (NMR) 
 
The NMR (Catanzaro & Mearns, 1987) scale was designed to measure generalised 
expectancies in negative mood regulation (Appendix 7). The NMR comprises of 30 items on a 
five point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree). Across a series of four different 
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samples Catanzaro & Mearns (1987) found that the NMR produced Cronbach’s alphas ranging 
from .86-.92. 
2.2.3.7  Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ-short) 
 
The CERQ-short (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006) is a shorter 18 item version of the 36 item 
CERQ (Garnefski, Kraaij & Spinhoven, 2002) (Appendix 8). This questionnaire was designed to 
measure nine specific cognitive emotion regulation strategies in response to threatening or 
stressful life events (Self-blame, Other-blame, Rumination, Catastrophising, Putting into 
Perspective, Positive Refocusing, Positive Reappraisal, Acceptance and Planning). In the CERQ-
short each subscale contains two items. These items are measured on a five point Likert scale 
(1= (almost) never to 5= (almost) always). Garnefski & Kraaij, (2006) found that in a sample of 
611 individuals the Cronbach’s alpha for separate subscales ranged from .68 to .81. 
2.2.3.8  Emotion Regulation Skills Questionnaire (ART-Q) 
 
The ART-Q is a questionnaire created for this study that represents the nine emotion 
regulation strategies identified by Berking et al., (2008) (Appendix 9). This questionnaire 
consists of nine questions, one for each skill, each rated on a ten-point scale to indicate how 
often they use it. To create the scale the strategies were formed into questions as directly as 
possible to maintain face validity by the addition of “when you encounter a negative situation, 
to what extent do you [skill]”. As each skill is rephrased as a question, only one question exists 
per subscale. Every question had a rating from 0-10 and as the strategies are all distinct from 
one another no reliability or factor structure testing was completed.   
2.2.4 Procedure 
 
All participants that volunteered both from the University of Reading, School of 
Psychology Research Panel and from schools were immediately directed to the survey website 
where they were first presented with an information sheet and consent form. University 
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students gave their university ID to gain course credits. Following this, the participants were 
asked a series of demographic questions, including age and gender. This then opened the 
primary section of the survey with one section for each of the questionnaires presented 
above, in the order above. 
Time taken for completion of this questionnaire battery ranged from 15-25 minutes 
depending on participant responses. Once the participant had completed the survey they 
were thanked and taken to a debrief sheet and again given contact details to ask any potential 
queries.  
2.2.5 Statistical Analyses  
 
The data was downloaded directly into a .csv file from the website Surveygizmo. The data 
was then reviewed in excel for patterned responses (such as repeating scores), excessive time 
(over an hour) and duplicates, which removed 11 participants. Reversed scored questions 
were then corrected and total scores for each questionnaire and subscale were created. This 
data was then transferred into SPSS to investigate normality. As some measures (such as DASS 
and CES-DC) were found to be non-normal as well as some emotion regulation measures (such 
as NMR) transformations were attempted, but none managed to sufficiently establish 
normality. Therefore, the data was transferred to R carry out partial spearman correlations 
between an emotion regulation questionnaire (NMR, CERQ and ART-Q) and the indicator 
measures (CES-DC, DASS, HPS, HAPPI and BIS). These tests partialled out age. All correlation 
analysis was corrected for multiple comparisons through the Bonferroni method, such a 
conservative method was used due to the exploratory nature of the results. 
The second stage of analysis divided the results into two sections based on age (17 and 
below and 18+) to compare emotion regulation strategies between groups to test for 
developmental differences. 
 58 
 
The final stage of analysis is a two-step multiple regression of mental health indicators 
that were found to have multiple correlations with emotion regulation strategies, where the 
first step applies only other indicators that correlated with that indicator and the second step 
inputs emotion regulation strategies that correlated with that indicator.  
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Sample Characteristics 
 
There were 211 valid participants in total comprising 53 males (25%) and 158 females 
(75%). The ages ranged from 13-25 with a mean of 19.21 (SD=2.49). As these questions were 
required to proceed to the next portion of the questionnaire there was no missing data. The 
mean age for females (19.20) was not significantly different from the females (19.25): t (209) = 
.12, p= .90. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Distribution of participants by age and gender 
 
 In addition to these demographic measures, participants also reported their ethnicity 
which was predominantly white (181, 86%).To capture other baseline measures participants 
were asked if they thought they came from a single parent family (yes = 34, 16%; no = 174, 
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82%; decline to respond = 3, 2%) as well as the number of close friends they had (none = 12, 
6%; one = 19, 9%; two = 43, 20%; more than two = 137, 65%). 
Table 2.1 Scale means and standard deviations for all questionnaires, excluding the CERQ and 
ART-Q. n=211 
Scale Group mean M (SD) 
Gender Mean score at 
validation for control 
group M (SD)* Female M (SD) Male M (SD) 
Brief-HAPPI 40.72 (10.24) 40.57 (9.69) 41.17 (10.24) 33.04 (8.68) 
HPS-20 ** 9.47 (3.21) 9.14 (3.31) 10.03 (3.00) 8.20 (4.30) 
DASS - Anxiety 4.90 (3.72) 5.11 (3.90) 4.28 (3.11) 1.88 (2.95) 
DASS - Stress 8.01 (4.24) 8.11 (4.28) 7.72 (4.16) 4.73 (4.20) 
CES-DC 23.73 (12.31) 24.26 (1.00) 22.17 (1.57) 12.80 (8.70) 
BIS15 31.53 (6.13) 31.47 (6.13) 31.72 (6.20) 32.60 (6.90) 
NMR 93.91 (18.24) 93.88 (17.25) 93.98 (21.11) 103.24 (16.94) 
 
*Brief-HAPPI, Mansell & Jones (2006); HPS-20, Meads & Bentall (2008); DASS, Henry & 
Crawford (2005); CES-DC, Fendrich, Weissman & Warner (1990); BIS15, Spinella (2007); NMR, 
Catanzaro & Mearns (1987). **n=211 for all scales apart from HPS where n=100 
2.3.2 Comparisons with validation scores 
 
The current sample was not found to be significantly different to the original 
validation control group scores (higher than Brief-HAPPI, t(248)=4.40, p<.001; higher than HPS-
20, t(416)=2.72,p<.001; higher than DASS–Anxiety, t(2003)=13.65; p<.001; higher than DASS-
Stress, t(259)=10.639, p<.001; higher than CES-DC, t(337)= 8.79, p<.001; lower than BIS15, 
t(384)= -2.16, p<.05; and lower than NMR, t(322)= -3.72, p<.001). Furthermore, comparisons 
with some clinical samples assessed at original validation were made where the sample scored 
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significantly lower on the Brief-HAPPI than validation bipolar participants (t (265) =2.67, 
p<.001) but no significant difference was found between the sample and participants 
diagnosed with major depressive disorder in the CES-DC validation (t (48) = 1.06, p=.29). No 
significant intra-sample gender differences were found. 
2.3.2.1 CERQ subscales 
 
 211 participants had valid data for the CERQ and the means for each subscale are 
shown with a comparison to the scores found in the validation of the CERQ-short in Table 2.2. 
Within each subscale scores could range from 2-10. There was a significant effect of gender on 
CERQ scores, F (8, 202) = 2.449, p < .05, however follow up tests revealed no significant 
differences but positive refocusing was approaching significance. All subscale scores were 
significantly higher in the sample than the CERQ-short validation study (Garnefski & Kraaij, 
2006).   
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Table 2.2 Scale means and standard deviations for the CERQ-short results found in this study 
and the original validation of the questionnaire. N=211. 
CERQ-short 
subscales 
M (SD, 
study 1) 
Gender M (SD, Garnefski & 
Kraaij, 2006) 
Female M (SD) Male M (SD)  
Self-Blame 6.74 (1.72) 6.70 (1.71) 6.85 (1.76) 4.13 (1.81) 
Other-Blame 5.63 (1.34) 6.93 (1.35) 6.89 (1.42) 3.10 (1.53) 
Acceptance 7.44 (1.70) 7.37 (1.66) 7.64 (1.83) 5.49 (2.14) 
Rumination 7.22 (1.79) 7.33 (1.72) 6.91 (1.96) 4.98 (2.04) 
Positive 
refocusing 
5.85 (1.94) 6.00 (1.94) 5.42 (1.89) 4.54 (1.94) 
Refocus on 
planning 
7.27 (1.62) 7.15 (1.53) 7.62 (1.82) 6.05 (2.12) 
Positive 
reappraisal 
7.02 (2.04) 6.95 (2.08) 7.25 (1.91) 6.23 (2.25) 
Putting into 
perspective 
6.70 (1.81) 6.66 (1.77) 6.79 (1.94) 5.85 (2.16) 
Catastrophizi
ng 
5.78 (2.07) 
5.78 (2.00) 5.77 (2.27) 
3.30 (1.64) 
 
* Sample means all significantly different to Garnefski & Kraaij (2006) means where p<.001. 
 
2.3.2.2 ART-Q subscales 
 
 211 participants had valid data for the ART-Q and the means for each subscale are 
shown in Table 2.3. Within each subscale scores could range from 1-10. Several significant 
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differences were found in scores by gender: Aware of emotions (t (77.85) = -2.16, p< .05); 
Interpret body sensations (t (209) = -1.99, p<.05) and Understand prompts of emotions (t (209) 
= 2.07, p< .05), where males only scored higher on the later subscale.    
Table 2.3 Scale means and standard deviations for the ART-Q results found in this study and 
the original validation of the questionnaire. N=211. 
    Gender 
ART-Q scales M (SD, study 1) 
Female M (SD) Male M (SD) 
Aware of emotions 7.31 (2.14) 
7.51 (2.02) * 6.72 (2.41) * 
Identify and label 
emotions 
6.74 (2.41) 6.66 (2.36) 6.98 (2.55) 
Interpret body 
sensations 
6.66 (2.41) 6.85 (2.30) * 6.09 (2.64) * 
Understand 
prompts of 
emotions 
4.51 (2.80) 4.28 (2.76) * 5.19 (2.79) * 
Self-support in 
distressing 
situations 
4.20 (2.60) 4.08 (2.57) 4.57 (2.69) 
Modify negative 
emotions 
4.16 (2.66) 4.11 (2.65) 4.30 (2.71) 
Accept emotions 5.10 (2.58) 5.05 (2.55) 5.26 (2.70) 
Resilience/tolerance 
of negative emotion 
5.62 (2.64) 5.56 (2.60) 5.79 (2.78) 
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Confront distressing 
situations to 
achieve goals 
5.61 (2.72) 5.50 (2.58) 5.92 (3.08) 
 
*significant difference between genders where p<.05 
 
2.3.3 Relationships between emotion regulation strategies and mood measures 
 
2.3.3.1 CERQ subscales 
 
 There were several significant correlations between various mood measures and the 
CERQ as shown in Table 2.4 below: 
Table 2.4 Partial Spearman correlations of the CERQ with measures of mood, impulsiveness, 
anxiety and hypomania using a Bonferroni adjusted significance level of 0.001(.05/54) where 
age is partialled out. N=211. 
CERQ subscales CES-DC HPS HAPPI DASS Anxiety DASS Stress BIS 
Self-Blame .280* .212 .174 .290 .299* .005 
Other-Blame -.002 -.157 -.060 .004 -.051 -.044 
Acceptance .163 -.031 .178 .129 .171 -.050 
Rumination .413* .207 .265* .372* .399* .108 
Positive refocusing -.208 .100 .188 -.050 -.123 .027 
Refocus on planning .005 .289 .174 .070 .016 -.085 
Positive reappraisal -.102 .139 .129 .015 -.060 -.124 
Putting into 
perspective 
-.105 .185 .093 -.100 -.142 .005 
Catastrophizing .593* .102 .239* .558* .555* .093 
 
*p<.001 
2.3.3.2 ART-Q subscales 
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There were significant correlations between the ART-Q and various measures shown 
in Table 2.5 Bellow:  
 
 
 
Table 2.5 Partial Spearman Correlations of the ART-Q with measures of mood, impulsiveness, 
anxiety and hypomania where age is partialled out using a Bonferroni adjusted significance 
level of 0.001(.05/54). N=211. 
ART-Q subscales CES-DC HPS HAPPI DASS Anxiety DASS Stress BIS 
Aware of emotions -.038 -.087 -.086 .015 -.003 -.128 
Identify and label 
emotions 
-.251* -.021 -.126 -.187 -.197 -.212 
Interpret body 
sensations 
-.005 .003 -.081 .064 -.052 -.123 
Understand prompts 
of emotions 
-.545* -.185 -.362* -.471* -.515* -.306* 
Self-support in 
distressing situations 
-.397* -.011 .000 -.258* -.384* -.101 
Modify negative 
emotions 
-.375* -.020 .000 -.316* -.376* -.084 
Accept emotions -.099 .041 -.129 -.091 -.146 .048 
Resilience/tolerance 
of negative emotion 
-.292* -.114 -.278* -.277* -.378* -.029 
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Confront distressing 
situations to achieve 
goals 
-.241* -.065 -.252* -.263* -.340* -.147* 
 
*p<.001 
2.3.3.3 NMR 
There were significant correlations between the ESRQ and various measures shown in 
Table 2.6 below.  
Table 2.6 Partial Spearman Correlations of the NMR with measures of mood, impulsiveness, 
anxiety and hypomania where age is partialled out using a Bonferroni adjusted significance 
level of 0.001(.05/6). N=211. 
 CES-DC HPS HAPPI DASS Anxiety DASS Stress BIS 
NMR -.585* -.112 -.122 -.446* -.531* -.151 
*p<.01. 
 
2.3.4 Age comparisons 
 
 Table 2.7 and 2.8 display comparisons between the age groups for each subscale of 
the CERQ and ART-Q respectively.  
Table 2.7 Means and standard deviations for the 17 and below age group as well as the 18 and 
above age group with independent t-test comparisons and effect size (r) across CERQ 
subscales. Using a Bonferroni adjusted significance level of 0.006(.05/9) no tests remained 
significant. N=211. 
CERQ subscales <17 M (SD) >18 M (SD) t r 
Self-Blame 7.07 (1.77) 6.62 (1.70) 1.66 .11 
Other-Blame 7.07 (1.50) 6.87 (1.32) 0.97 .07 
Acceptance 7.48 (1.68) 7.43 (1.71) 0.20 .01 
Rumination 7.07 (1.94) 7.27 (1.74) -0.71 .05 
Positive refocusing 5.74 (2.20) 5.89 (1.85) -0.49 .03 
Refocus on planning 7.09 (1.55) 7.32 (1.65) -0.91 .06 
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Positive reappraisal 6.76 (2.28) 7.11 (1.94) -1.11 .08 
Putting into perspective 6.50 (1.62) 6.76 (1.87) -0.90 .06 
Catastrophizing 6.31 (2.09) 5.59 (2.03) 2.24 .15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.8 Means and standard deviations for the 17 and below age group as well as the 18 and 
above age group with independent t-test comparisons and effect size (r) across ART-Q 
subscales. Using a Bonferroni adjusted significance level of 0.006(.05/9) no tests were 
significant. N=211. 
ART-Q subscales <17 M (SD) >18 M (SD) t r 
Aware of emotions 7.22 (2.28) 7.34 (2.11) -0.36 .02 
Identify and label emotions 6.43 (2.48) 6.85 (2.38) -1.11 .08 
Interpret body sensations 6.91 (2.28) 6.57 (2.45) 0.88 .06 
Understand prompts of emotions 
4.81 (2.64) 4.40 (2.84) 0.94 .06 
Self-support in distressing 
situations 3.81 (2.75) 4.33 (2.54) -1.26 .09 
Modify negative emotions 4.06 (2.84) 4.20 (2.61) -0.34 .02 
Accept emotions 5.11 (2.50) 5.10 (2.62) 0.02 .00 
Resilience/tolerance of negative 
emotion 5.87 (2.78) 5.54 (2.60) 0.80 .06 
Confront distressing situations to 
achieve goals 5.72 (2.83) 5.57 (2.68) .360 .02 
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2.3.5 Inter-correlations between indicator measures 
 
Following this analysis further Spearman correlations were conducted between 
indicator measures, as shown in Table 2.9 below: 
Table 2.9 Spearman Correlations between measures of mood, impulsiveness, anxiety and 
hypomania and hypomanic attitudes using a Bonferroni adjusted significance level of 
0.01(.05/5). N=211. 
Indicator measures CES-DC DASS Anxiety DASS Stress HAPPI HPS BIS 
CES-DC 1 .703* .749* .370* .140 .258* 
DASS Anxiety .703* 1 .686* .365* .184 .263* 
DASS Stress .749* .686* 1 .447 -.002 .234* 
HAPPI .370* .365* .447 1 .449* .311* 
HPS .140 .184 -.002 .449* 1 .392* 
BIS .258* .263* .234* 311* .392* 1 
*p<.01. 
 
2.3.6 Emotion Regulation profiles 
 
2.3.6.1 Depression 
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Below is a multiple stepwise regression to predict depression scores, using the first step to 
covary for correlated indicator scores and the second step to introduce associated emotion 
regulation strategies.  
 
 
 
Table 2.10 Multiple regression analysis predicting depression as measured by the CES-DC 
through emotion regulation strategies, controlling for variance explained by correlated 
indicator and personality factors. N=211. 
  B SE B β 
Step 1       
Constant 2.43 3.01 
 
HAPPI 0.02 0.06 .02 
BIS 0.10 0.09 .05 
DASS Anxiety 1.20 0.19 .36*** 
DASS Stress 1.41 0.18 .49*** 
Step 2       
Constant 17.87 6.48 
 
HAPPI 0.06 0.06 0.05 
BIS 0.02 0.09 .01 
DASS Anxiety 0.97 0.19 .29*** 
CERQ Self-Blame -0.33 0.31 -.05 
CERQ Rumination 0.56 0.31 .08 
CERQ Catastrophizing 0.64 0.34 .11 
ART-Q Identify and label emotions -0.09 0.23 -.02 
ART-Q Understand prompts of emotions -.62 0.21 -.14** 
ART-Q Self-support in distressing situations -0.54 0.31 -.11 
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ART-Q Modify negative emotions 0.35 0.30 .08 
ART-Q Resilience/tolerance of negative emotion -.03 0.27 -.01 
ART-Q Confront distressing situations to achieve goals 0.31 0.26 .07 
NMR -0.12 0.04 -.18** 
Note : R2 = .53 for Steph 1, ΔR2 = .16 for Step 2 (p <.001). *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
 
 
 
2.3.6.2 Anxiety 
 
Below is a multiple stepwise regression to predict anxiety scores, using the first step to covary 
for correlated indicator scores and the second step to introduce associated emotion regulation 
strategies.  
Table 2.11 Multiple regression analysis predicting relationships between anxiety as measured 
by the anxiety subscale of the DASS through emotion regulation strategies, controlling for 
variance explained by correlated indicator and personality factors. N=211. 
  B SE B β 
Step 1       
Constant -1.26 1.01 
 
HAPPI -0.00 0.02 -.01 
BIS 0.02 0.03 .03 
CESDC 0.14 0.02 .45*** 
Step 2 
   
Constant -4.18 2.37 
 
HAPPI -0.12 0.02 -.05 
BIS 0.03 0.03 .05 
CESDC  0.13 0.02 .42*** 
CERQ Self-Blame 0.16 0.11 .08 
CERQ Rumination -.09 0.11 -.04 
CERQ Catastrophizing 0.29 0.12 .16* 
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ART-Q Understand prompts of emotions -0.09 0.08 -.07 
ART-Q Self-support in distressing situations 0.25 0.11 .18* 
ART-Q Modify negative emotions -0.15 0.11 -.11 
ART-Q Resilience/tolerance of negative emotion 0.08 0.10 .06 
ART-Q Confront distressing situations to achieve goals -0.10 0.09 -.07 
NMR 0.12 0.02 .08 
Note : R2 = .51 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .05 for Step 2 (p <.001). *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
 
2.3.6.3 Stress 
 
Below is a multiple stepwise regression to predict stress scores, using the first step to covary 
for correlated indicator scores and the second step to introduce associated emotion regulation 
strategies.  
 
Table 2.12 Multiple regression analysis predicting relationships between stress as measured 
by the stress subscale of the DASS through emotion regulation strategies, controlling for 
variance explained by correlated indicator and personality factors. N=211. 
  B SE B β 
Step 1       
Constant -0.62 1.05 
 
DASS Anxiety 0.32 0.07 
   .28*** 
HAPPI 0.08 0.02 .06*** 
BIS -0.00 0.03 .04 
CESDC 0.17 0.02 .68*** 
Step 2 
   
Constant 1.11 1.05 
 
DASS Anxiety 0.28 0.07 .24*** 
HAPPI 0.07 0.02 .16** 
BIS -0.01 0.03 .01 
CESDC  0.12 0.02 .35*** 
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CERQ Self-Blame 0.08 0.11 .03 
CERQ Rumination -0.07 0.11 -.03 
CERQ Catastrophizing 0.20 0.12 .10 
ART-Q Understand prompts of emotions -0.85 0.08 -.06 
ART-Q Self-support in distressing situations -0.22 0.11 -.14* 
ART-Q Modify negative emotions 0.08 0.11 -.05 
ART-Q Resilience/tolerance of negative emotion -0.10 0.10 -.06 
ART-Q Confront distressing situations to achieve goals -0.09 0.09 .35* 
Note : R2 = .51 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .05 for Step 2 (p <.001). *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
2.3.6.4 Hypomania 
 
Below is a multiple stepwise regression to predict hypomania scores, using the first step to 
covary for correlated indicator scores and the second step to introduce associated emotion 
regulation strategies.  
 
Table 2.13 Multiple regression analysis predicting relationships between hypomanic attitudes 
as measured by the HAPPI through emotion regulation strategies, controlling for variance 
explained by correlated indicator and personality factors. N=211. 
  B SE B β 
Step 1       
Constant 22.84 3.23 
 
BIS 0.38 0.10 .24*** 
CESDC 0.20 0.07 .10 
DASS Anxiety 0.26 0.23 .24** 
Step 2 
   
Constant 21.46 5.08 
 
BIS 0.35 0.10 .22** 
CESDC 0.17 0.08 .21* 
DASS Anxiety 0.09 0.24 .03 
CERQ Rumination 0.35 0.38 .06 
CERQ Catastrophizing 0.25 0.40 .05 
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ART-Q Understand prompts of emotions -0.63 0.26 -.18* 
ART-Q Self-support in distressing situations 0.64 0.38 .17 
ART-Q Modify negative emotions 0.23 0.36 .01 
Note : R2 = .34 for Step 1, ΔR2 = .10 for Step 2 (p <.001). *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  
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2.4 Discussion 
 
Initial data analysis comparing the current sample with previous validations found an 
array of significant deviations. This was most striking in depression scores, which were not 
significantly different to a clinically depressed population. Overall, the sample displayed 
significantly more maladaptive tendencies across almost all measures. This is relatively 
consistent across each measure and therefore the data should be considered in the light that 
this sample has greater mood difficulties than normal. Due to an effect across all measures, 
this interpretation is the most satisfactory explanation of the observed trend rather than by 
noise in the dataset. Therefore, this dataset has more pronounced effects than other 
community populations.  
When validating with original measures many of the distributions in the measures 
were non-normal implying the use of the Mann Whitney U test. However, without access to 
the raw validation data to create ranks, only t-tests were possible. Furthermore, the testing 
against previous validations is subject to unequal sample sizes and even though the 
differences are rarely small, they should be treated with caution. Both factors should also be 
considered with effects of gender as predicted differences in the CERQ were not found 
(rumination, catastrophising and reappraisal), although the ART-Q found females reporting 
significantly more emotional awareness and better at interpreting physiological awareness but 
less effective at understanding what behaviours those emotions were prompting. 
From the main results, the correlations with the CERQ (Table 6) and measures of 
depression, anxiety and stress are a broad replication of previous results but in a younger 
sample (see Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006). Although, far fewer significant results were identified 
due to Bonferroni corrections, the remaining results mirror the strongest correlations in 
previous studies (rumination, self-blame and catastrophizing). The conservative nature of 
Bonferroni correction does increase the risk of false negatives (Simes, 1986) but this works to 
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the purpose of the study by identifying the most prominent associations. Despite this, it was 
expected that more emotion regulation strategies would have associations with these 
continuum measures, particularly the more commonly prescribed adaptive strategies (such as 
reappraisal), which appeared to have little to no association with the mental health measures. 
It is possible that this is because the sample had not been trained in emotion regulation 
techniques and that they are not commonly naturally occurring. Interestingly, both rumination 
and catastrophising demonstrated transdiagnostic tendencies across depression, anxiety and 
hypomanic attitudes, whereas self-blame was unique to depression post Bonferroni 
correction.  
The results from the ART-Q (Table 7) demonstrate a good replication of the 
associations that are predicted by the ART model. Following Bonferroni correction many 
effects remained significant across different continuum measures, suggesting that ART has 
selected an effective series of adaptive emotion regulation strategies for transdiagnostic 
treatment. The ART model proposes that some strategies are not directly clinically active (such 
as awareness, identifying and understanding of emotion) but facilitate strategies that are. 
Additionally, Self-compassion has a unique role within the model as a moderator for the active 
strategies but also reduce the potential short term negative effects of the other indirect 
strategies (Berking & Schwarz, 2014). Each of the clinically active strategies was found to be 
significant across a variety of continuum indicators (resilience/tolerance, modification and 
confronting difficult situations), with the notable exception of acceptance. The null results for 
acceptance were mirrored by a similar subscale in the CERQ. However, previous uses of CERQ 
have established that the acceptance subscale appears to unintentionally measure the 
maladaptive aspects of acceptance as well, which may somewhat explain the null results 
(Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001). This could be due the questions also capturing an 
inflexible and habitual accepting attitude, which would be ineffective in a variety of contexts. 
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Therefore, its performance in this measure, and others in the literature, may not be 
representative of the true significance of clinically taught and adaptive accepting attitude. 
From ART’s active strategies, a willingness to confront difficult situations to achieve 
important goals was the most transdiagnostic, appearing in all continuum indicators except for 
the HPS. This skill was anticipated to be highly correlated across all indicators as ART assumes 
this skill to be the most integral to healthy functioning, where even other clinically active 
strategies are geared to moderate it. Modification, which is a broader classification of 
reappraisal measured by the CERQ showed significant correlations specific only to depression 
and anxiety, suggesting some specificity unlike resilience and tolerance of negative emotions.  
An unexpected result from the ART-Q was the highly significant and transdiagnostic 
impact of understanding the prompts of emotions. A skill that ART considers to be a facilitator 
to the active strategies has been found by this study to have a direct association with each 
continuum indicator, except for the HPS. This could highlight that a deeper understanding of 
the functions of emotions beyond being aware of or being able to label them has its own 
important and potentially clinical role. Additionally, this is the only skill that has been reported 
significantly more by males than females and appears to be highly adaptive. Further research 
would be required to identify if this effect is consistent and if it contributes to the gender 
differences in reported depression and anxiety. 
The primary limitation from the ART-Q is the creation of a new questionnaire to 
measure it. This questionnaire was designed to measure the core ART strategies as directly as 
possible and as these strategies are entirely independent, testing through Cronbach’s alpha or 
assessing factor structure would not be relevant. This creates an unresolved issue of validity. 
Although, as the strategies are worded as clearly as possible and are not subtle, this is not 
necessarily a significant issue. 
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The NMR (Table 2.6), measuring how well an individual believes they can change their 
negative emotion, closely replicates previous research in depression and anxiety (Kassel et al., 
2007). However, the more novel investigation of its application to hypomania and impulsivity 
yielded no measurable effects. 
Throughout each of these emotion regulation measures the HPS did not perform as 
predicted, demonstrating no significant correlations with any skill. This was not expected as 
the HPS has previously been shown to correlate with depression and specifically rumination 
(Meads & Bentall, 2008). However, null results between the HPS and the CERQ have already 
been demonstrated by Green et al. (2011), which this study replicates. But the inconsistent 
findings of this study may be partially explained because there were only results for 100 
participants compared to 211 for the other measures. This limitation is due to the 
questionnaire being added to the battery half way through testing. Even though this reduced 
power would have an important role in suppressing the effects that may be present, no 
correlations with emotion regulation strategies even approached significance without 
Bonferroni correction. Furthermore, the HPS performed as anticipated by showing strong 
correlations with both the HAPPI and the BIS (Table 2.9), suggesting that the sample size 
cannot explain the scale of null results alone. This would lend to the conclusion that 
hypomanic attitudes measured by the HAPPI are more directly linked to emotion regulation. 
The second aspect of this study, to investigate the development of emotion regulation 
within an adolescent sample, found no significant difference in emotion regulation strategies 
between age groups (Table 2.7 & 2.8). Whilst this result may be a true representation of the 
population it would be premature to conclude that from this dataset. Firstly, as shown in 
Figure 2.1, the range of ages in the sample is not equally spread, but predominantly in the 
centre of the range. This data clustering around such a central point will greatly weaken inter-
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age comparisons. This was due to a poor uptake of recruitment, where one out of the 72 
schools contacted consented.  
2.4.1 Emotion Regulation Profiles 
 
The third aspect of this study was to develop separate emotion regulation profiles for 
the indicator measures using multiple regression (Table 2.10, 11, 12 & 13). These profiles were 
created to gain a greater understanding of the roles played by different emotion regulation 
strategies. The HPS and BIS were excluded from this stage of analysis due to the absence of 
previous effects to profile. The regressions were carried out in two steps. To identify what 
variance was uniquely explained by the emotion regulation strategies, the first step contained 
other indicator measures that had been shown to correlate with that indicator. One exception 
to this process was the correlation between the HAPPI and the HPS, as they have such 
significant conceptual overlap that it may mask the variance explained by other variables. The 
second step added emotion regulation strategies already found to have associations with the 
mental health indicator. The resulting effects for each emotion regulation strategy were their 
unique contributions to that indicator. 
The regression for depression (Table 2.10) found that when other correlated indicators 
(anxiety, stress, hypomanic attitudes and impulsivity) were controlled for, the CERQ strategies 
and key strategies (resilience/tolerance, modification and confronting difficult situations) from 
ART that significantly correlated with depression initially, no longer accounted for a significant 
proportion of the variance. Though unexpectedly, understanding the prompts of emotions 
maintained its significance, suggesting that a deeper understanding of one’s emotions is 
almost uniquely important in depression. It is noted that while self-compassion was associated 
with stress and anxiety, its relationship with depression evaporated once this was accounted 
for. It is possible that self-compassion works through the intrusive thoughts in stress and 
anxiety to appear to influence depression, but this requires further work to establish with 
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greater certainty. It certainly does not align with current theoretical understanding (Gilbert, 
2005). Potentially, a replication with different measures for the same indicators could also 
provide another useful perspective. 
In the anxiety profile (Table 2.11) catastrophising and self-compassion remain the only 
emotion regulation strategies that significantly explain variance beyond the depression 
measure. This suggests that catastrophising is primarily associated with anxiety and its 
transdiagnostic associations are via anxiety. While in the stress regression both self-
compassion and willingness to confront obstacles to achieve goals remained significant. Self-
compassion was found to be a key component with a unique contribution to both anxiety and 
stress. As stated by its absence in the depression profile, this suggests more research is 
needed to verify this relationship. It is intuitive that confronting difficult situations to achieve 
goals appears to originate in stress, despite being highly transdiagnostic. The two strategies 
that remained significant where self-compassion and focusing on overcoming obstacles to 
achieve goals, which are the same strategies from ART that influenced anxiety. This seems 
intuitive as stress is generally associated with specific pressures and stressors that need to be 
overcome. Also, by its definition stress is caused by getting wrapped up in the demands placed 
on the individual, external or internal, which tend to be unforgiving and uncompassionate.  
The hypomanic profile (Table 2.13) created through the HAPPI found that of the 
emotion regulation strategies that originally correlated with the measure, only understanding 
the prompts of emotions remained, with a small effect. This understanding that stretches 
beyond awareness was also found in the depression profile. Perhaps the deeper 
understanding of the prompts to emotions is the key to maintaining a balanced mood 
between depression and hypomania. 
These results suggest that while many of these indicators are transdiagnostic they may 
influence many of these indicators through another indicator. Perhaps this challenges the 
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current perspective that looks at each of these indicators (such as, depression, anxiety and 
stress) separately, when they may all be present despite only one being observed or 
diagnosed. Furthermore, based on these results it is worth considering that all distress 
disorders are better explained as varying ratios of depression anxiety and stress and not 
separate issues with high co-morbidity.  
These results highlight that many of these emotion regulation strategies are primarily 
associated with only one of the indicators, which appears to be the pathway through which 
they are significantly associated with other indicators. The potential clinical implications of this 
would be that the dominance of certain emotion regulation strategies would suggest the issue 
is the most relevant for the client to focus on. This would be especially useful in more complex 
cases where the overlap between conditions such as depression and anxiety may be difficult 
to differentiate. It also allows for more targeted treatment of specific conditions, allowing for 
a stronger focus on one specific issue. This lends itself to a more modular therapeutic 
approach. 
2.4.2 Limitations 
 
One of the limiting factors for this study were the sample, as discussed earlier the 
poor age distribution made age based comparisons impractical. Additionally, the unequal 
sample sizes between female and male participants hinders gender comparisons.  
Perhaps the most important limitation is the gap between the study’s theoretical 
scope and the confines of the methodology. This is the breadth covered by the questionnaire 
battery and its atheoretical intentions. There are a finite number of questions that can be 
presented to a participant without resulting in large attrition rates. Therefore, the study in a 
more ideal form would consider an incredible variety of emotion regulation strategies and a 
comprehensive battery of mental health indicators. Without this diversity, it is possible some 
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vital relationships that interact with the ones found, may be missed. In hindsight, it would 
have been more insightful to use a measure of stress instead of the HPS, which may have 
revealed relationships relevant to the ones found above.  
This study also depended wholly on self-report and therefore the results are 
dependent upon the limits of the participant’s introspective insight. They are also subject to 
the biases of those individuals that shape how they interpret the questionnaire items and how 
they have interpreted their experiences. For this study, these factors are difficult to avoid and 
must be accepted. Another issue commonly associated with self-report questionnaires are 
demand characteristics. It is unlikely that participants felt compelled to interpret their answers 
one way or another as no expectations were set for the experiment and there was no task. 
However, the above average maladaptive nature of the results might either suggest some bias 
by the participants or a random effect of the sample. 
2.4.3 Future Studies 
 
 As stated above, a complete set of emotion regulation strategies and mental health 
indicators for this study would present such an impractical burden on the participant, making 
any further study on this question retain that limitation. Using more incentives to attract a 
diverse range of schools into co-operating with the study would be a worthwhile replication 
alone. However, using the results of this study, abandoning the bipolar measures and using a 
stress measure would provide valuable data to cover the depression, anxiety and stress triad. 
Removing the NMR would also reduce some more of the burden on participants. While this 
would reduce the scope of the study, the additional data gained from reduced attrition rates 
would be highly valuable. Due to the exploratory and self-reflective nature of this study there 
does not seem to be practical alternatives to a questionnaire battery. The only other method 
to consider in developing this study would be to carry it out via a structured interview. While 
this is considerably more resource intensive, some of the limitations remain the same such as 
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the participant’s ability to accurately reflect on and understand their emotions. But others 
could be improved, such as ensuring that the participant understands what is being asked and 
it may ensure greater focus. This different set of limitations would provide an interesting 
contrast with the current dataset and help identify effects that may be induced by that 
methodology. 
2.4.4 Conclusion 
 
  This exploratory study has raised a series of questions and future directions, 
some of which are developed replications of previous studies. One example of this is the 
transdiagnostic nature of catastrophizing through anxiety. This has been found several times in 
the literature but has never been pursued. This finding shaped the direction of chapters four, 
five and six in searching for a greater understanding of catastrophising’s effects on mood and 
mental health indicators. Another interesting result was the prevalence of understanding the 
prompts of emotions and how deeply it can influence mood. As with many exploratory 
studies, this study raises a lot of questions and raises how much more research is still required 
in emotion regulation before we even have some established general understanding. There 
are many theories in emotion regulation and there must be considerably more work to unite 
them across so many indicators and contexts. 
 
  
 82 
 
3 Chapter Three: Developing a State-Trait Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 Where the previous chapter focused on an atheoretical approach between emotion 
regulation strategies and mental health indicators, this chapter takes an atheoretical approach 
to measurements of emotion regulation. Many of the most used emotion regulation 
questionnaires are drawn directly from a theory (e.g., ERQ, CERQ & NMR). A measure of 
emotion regulation derived from a pre-existing theory will provide an ideal platform for 
measuring that theory’s predictions and, depending on the theory, provide useful clinical 
insight. However, somewhat tautologically, these approaches are only concerned with 
measuring the strategies relevant to their theory. Whilst they often perform well in this 
regard, they do not aim to reflect the full range of emotion regulation strategies individuals 
are using. Whilst this might suggest an alternative approach with infinite items, measuring all 
possible strategies for all possible situations, there is another more feasible method. Collating 
a large pool of items from previous questionnaires and then using participant responses to 
create a measure that better reflects what strategies are most frequently applied. This would 
aim to create a tool better able to measure what strategies individuals are generally applying 
rather than observing from a specific perspective. However, this would still be subject to the 
limitations of the initial item base, so to compensate the initial pool of items must be selected 
carefully. In addition to an atheoretical approach, this emotion regulation measure had two 
other important facets.    
 A second, but equally important, approach for this study is creating a pair of related 
state trait measures of emotion regulation. This would allow a measure of how individuals 
consciously regulated a specific situation (state) and how they generally report regulating 
themselves (trait). Almost all emotion regulation measures known to the author measure the 
later. Trait scores can be consistent and therefore imply a general emotion regulation style. 
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However, such a general method sacrifices the context of that emotion regulation. Any 
strategy applied inflexibly or used habitually can be maladaptive (Mennin & Fresco, 2014). One 
of the most pertinent examples in the literature is the acceptance scale of the CERQ, 
sometimes found to be maladaptive ( Garnefski, Kommer, et al., 2002) or associated (e.g. Abdi, 
Taban, & Ghaemian, 2012; Jermann, Van der Linden, d’Acremont, & Zermatten, 2006) with 
clinical measures. A strategy such as acceptance is sensitive to context for its adaptiveness. 
Additionally, strategies generally assumed to be adaptive show weaker relationships with 
mental health than generally maladaptive strategies (e.g., ERQ and CERQ). This may be 
because a trait measure cannot distinguish between its maladaptive and adaptive use, 
resulting in more noise in generally adaptive strategy data. Therefore, a state measure of 
these strategies would potentially provide the context for more predictive adaptive and 
maladaptive emotion regulation strategies. Only two state emotion regulation questionnaires 
are known to the authors, both were adapted from the ERQ to measure suppression and 
cognitive reappraisal. One was developed by Egloff, Schmukle, Burns, & Schwerdtfeger (2006) 
and the other by Gruber, Harvey, & Gross (2012). Both versions showed adequate to good 
internal consistency and Egloff et al. (2006) found good stability over time. 
 Emotion regulation, especially in self-report measures, is often only characterised in 
response to negatively interpreted situations (such as the CERQ, DERS and NMR). This is 
partially because the way individuals regulate negative emotion has intuitive implications in 
psychopathology. However, some scholars posit that there has been a disproportionate focus 
on negative emotions (Wood & Tarrier, 2010) as positive emotions are also associated with 
psychopathology in bipolar (Gruber, Johnson, Oveis, & Keltner, 2008) and depression (Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010). Additionally, as both positive and negative emotion are considered to be 
two separate continuums it is reasonable to question whether findings for negative regulation 
are found in positive regulation (Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey, Pek, & Finkel, 2008). There are few 
measures that do focus on positive regulation such as the Responses to Positive Affect Scale 
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(Feldman, Joorman, & Johnson, 2008), which was based on the earlier revised Response Styles 
Questionnaire (RSQ; Thomas & Bentall, 2002) examining rumination and distraction. However, 
like the RPA, these are trait measures and grounded in a specific theory. 
 To take on these three important aspects, the State/Trait Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaires (STERQ) were created, where the trait measure had positive/negative 
counterparts and the state scale was not valence specific to best capture the emotion 
regulation strategies applied in that moment. Development was spread across two testing 
phases: item generation and exploratory factor analysis (phase one), and confirmatory factor 
analysis (phase two). Within these phases, positive and negative emotion had to be tested in 
two separate conditions. Furthermore, to make the questionnaire applicable to the largest age 
range, previous items were only considered from measures used in adolescent populations. 
Due to the complex design of this study, to test and then verify four questionnaires, the 
Method and Results have been restructured to maintain logical progression. The method is 
divided into two halves; Phase One contains the method for the initial testing of the 
questionnaire and Phase Two for the verification. For ease of understanding the Results 
section has been again broken down into Phase One and Two. Additionally, each of these 
phases has been further split into the positive and negative scales  
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Phase One 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
 
 Phase one for both method and result sections recruited participants from the University of 
Reading Research Panel (SONA) and some additional websites used for recruitment:  
www.twitter.com  
www.freeads.co.uk 
www.gumtree.co.uk 
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www.reddit.com/r/samplesize 
www.onlinepsychresearch.co.uk/ 
psych.hanover.edu/Research/exponnet.html  
www.facebook.com/onlinepsychologyresearch  
STERQ positive obtained data for 578 people pre-exclusions, where only 288 of these were 
included in the principal components analysis. The STERQ negative obtained data for 612 
people, and following exclusions 418 were included in the initial principal components 
analysis. Table 3.1 contains the reasons for these exclusions for both STERQ positive and 
negative. 
Table 3.1 Participants excluded from phase one.  
Reason for Participant Exclusion 
Number excluded 
STERQ Positive STERQ Negative 
Incomplete Responses 209 96 
Time to Complete > 1hr or participant reported taking break 20 18 
Time to Complete <18 minutes (positive) or <8 minutes (Negative) 46 21 
Duplicate Data (i.e. participant completed more than once) 5 - 
Two or more incorrect answers to memory questions 1 5 
Technical Difficulties 9 53 
Same response given throughout - 1 
TOTAL 290 194 
 
3.2.1.2 Design 
 
The State Trait Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (STERQ) was created and tested 
within two phases. Initial pre-testing in phase one consisted of item generation, which was 
then tested through a principal components analysis, resulting in item reduction in two studies 
separated by their valence (STERQ positive and STERQ negative). Both phases of this 
experiment were carried out alongside another Doctoral researcher, Jo Bower. 
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3.2.1.3 Measures 
3.2.1.3.1 STERQ  
 
 To attain the breadth of emotion regulation strategies planned for this study item 
generation initially focused on gathering and modifying items from pre-existing emotion 
regulation questionnaires. As one of the initial ambitions for STERQ was to create a 
questionnaire valid for use with adolescent and adult populations, scales were only selected if 
they had previously been used in adolescent populations. A 35 year review for adolescent 
measures of emotion regulation by Adrian, Zeman, & Veits (2011) was used to select many of 
the measures. Following this, the search terms “emotion regulation questionnaire”, “emotion 
regulation scale”, “affect regulation scale”, “affect regulation questionnaire”, “positive 
emotion regulation scale” and “positive emotion regulation questionnaire” were searched into 
both Google Scholar and Web of Knowledge to identify further existing measures. Due to a 
lack of state scales, only trait items were found to be later translated into state items.  
 Trait items were considered from the following questionnaires: Child Affect 
Questionnaire (factors only) (Kingery et al., 2009), Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire 
(N Garnefski et al., 2001), Childrens Emotion Management Scale (Zeman et al 2001), Cognitive 
and affective mindfulness scale (G. Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, Greeson, & Laurenceau, 2007), 
COPE Scale (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989), Difficulties in emotion regulation scale 
(Weinberg & Klonsky, 2009), Dispositional positive emotion scale (Kring, Smith, & Neale, 
1994), Early Adolescent Temperament Scale (Capaldi & Rothbart, 1992), Emotion amplification 
and reduction scale (Hamilton et al., 2009), Emotional approach to coping scale (Stanton, Kirk, 
Cameron, & Danoff-Burg, 2000), Emotion expression scale for children (Penza-Clyve & Zeman, 
2002),Emotion regulation questionnaire for children and adolescents (Gullone & Taffe, 2012), 
Emotion regulation index for children and adolescents(Zeman, Cassano, Perry-Parrish, & 
Stegall, 2006), Emotion regulation of others and self-scale (Niven, Totterdell, Stride, & Holman, 
2011), Mindful attentional awareness scale (Carlson & Brown, 2005), Negative Mood 
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Regulation Scale (Catanzaro & Mearns, 1990), Responses to Positive Affect (G. Feldman et al., 
2007) and the Response to stress questionnaire(Connor-smith et al., 2000).  
The summation of these questionnaires resulted in 491 items, which were grouped 
into categories. At this stage items were removed if the researchers believed that they were 
duplicates of other items in that category or if they failed to translate well into state items. 
This process reduced the total number of items to 368. The second extraction process 
targeted items that could only be relevant in very specific situations. Then to create the 
questionnaire for phase one testing, the items that best translated into state scales were 
selected from every category and re-worded to be suitable for both positive and negative 
scales. An additional nine of the final items that were not suitable for the state scale were 
included in the trait scale. The final scales comprised of 41 trait items and 32 state items 
(Appendix 10 & 11). 
3.2.1.3.2 Mood Induction 
 
 To test the state scales of the STERQ, participants were given either a positive or 
negative mood induction via a video clip. The positive mood induction was a 7 minute and 13 
second video clip taken from “Mr Bean”. The STERQ negative study took an excerpt from “The 
Lion King” showing the death of Mufasa, which lasted 3 minutes 21 seconds. The clips were 
chosen carefully so as not to rely on language or culture for their effect. Emotion was 
measured before and after a mood induction on a 5 point Likert scale measuring how much 
people felt on three positive emotion (happy, amused and excited) and negative emotion (sad, 
anxious and angry). These were totalled to give positive and negative scores. 
3.2.1.4 Procedure 
 
Both the positive and negative valance groups used the same procedure with different videos 
and were created and conducted through survey gizmo (www.surveygizmo.com). The 
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information provided to the participants informed them that the study was assessing their 
responses to a short video clip. If participants gave consent they were taken to the first page 
of the study to provide demographic information. Next the STERQ trait (Appendix 10) was 
completed followed by a baseline mood rating (Appendix 12). The participants then watched 
either a positive or negative mood induction and completed the mood ratings again. 
Participants then completed the STERQ state scale (Appendix 11) and answered some 
questions concerning the video clip to test compliance (Appendix 12). 
3.2.1.5 Statistical Analysis 
 
 The survey data was downloaded directly from the survey site into .csv format. From 
this format the participant checks and exclusions were made. The remaining data was then 
exported into SPSS 21 for analysis. Before STERQ analysis, the mood induction was checked by 
comparing baseline and post induction positive and negative mood totals through paired 
sample t-tests. Skew and kurtosis as well as variance were initially checked for each item. Trait 
and state data from both studies were all analysed separately through exploratory principal 
components analysis (positive trait, positive state, negative trait and negative state). The 
number of factors extracted was determined by eigenvalues greater than one and the scree 
plot. In addition to this consideration was taken to the other scales to allow for between scale 
integration. Cronbach’s alpha Reliability analysis was then conducted on the final factors for 
phase one. 
3.2.2 Phase Two 
3.2.2.1 Participants 
 
Both phases in study one recruited participants from the University of Reading Research Panel 
(SONA) and additional websites specialised for recruitment:  
www.twitter.com  
www.freeads.co.uk 
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www.gumtree.co.uk 
www.reddit.com/r/samplesize 
www.onlinepsychresearch.co.uk/ 
psych.hanover.edu/Research/exponnet.html  
www.facebook.com/onlinepsychologyresearch  
STERQ positive obtained data for 319 people pre-exclusions, where only 139 of these were 
included in the principal components analysis. The STERQ negative obtained data for 344 
people, and following exclusions 114 were included in the initial principal components 
analysis. Table 3.2 contains the reasons for these exclusions for both STERQ positive and 
negative. 
Table 3.2 Participants excluded from phase two. 
Reason for Participant Exclusion 
Number excluded 
STERQ Positive STERQ Negative 
Incomplete Responses 167 198 
Time to Complete > 44 minutes (positive) >60 minutes (negative) 8 19 
Two or more incorrect answers to memory questions 4 2 
Technical Difficulties 0 11 
Same response given throughout 1 0 
TOTAL 180 194 
 
3.2.2.2 Design 
 
To verify the refined STERQ measures another pair of positive and negative mood induction 
studies were carried out. Secondly an additional neutral induction was added to the paradigm 
to test for state sensitivity if STERQ had been verified. Finally, provided successful verification, 
it was also planned to test convergent validity with measures of depression, anxiety, stress 
and emotion regulation. Both phases of this experiment were carried out alongside another 
Doctoral researcher, Jo Bower. 
3.2.2.2.1   Mood Induction 
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Both the positive and negative studies contained two video clips each. The neutral clip for the 
positive study was 2 minutes and 4 seconds of “frozen planet” and the positive clip was a 
comedy sketch called “helping hands” from “Whose line is it anyway?” lasting 2 minutes 50 
seconds. The neutral clip for the negative study was another clip from “frozen planet” lasting 3 
minutes and 52 seconds and the negative clip was 6 minutes and 20 seconds taken from the 
beginning of “Up”. A neutral clip was selected to test for state sensitivity in different contexts. 
Emotion was measured before and after each induction on a 5-point Likert scale measuring 
how much people felt on three positive emotions (happy, amused and excited) and negative 
emotion (sad, anxious and angry). These were totalled to give positive and negative scores. 
3.2.2.2.2 Convergent Validity Measures 
 
In order to investigate relationships with depression, anxiety and stress the DASS-21 (Lovibond 
& Lovibond, 1995) (Appendix 4) was selected. To measure associations with hypomania, the 
HPS-20 was chosen (Appendix 3). Then to compare with other emotion regulation measures 
the short 18-item CERQ (Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006) (Appendix 8) and the DERS (Kim L. Gratz & 
Roemer, 2004) (Appendix 13). 
3.2.2.3 Procedure 
 
Both phase two studies were created and carried out via survey gizmo 
(www.surveygizmo.com) and used the same procedure as each other, with different video 
clips. The website initially provided participants with an information page (Appendix 14) 
followed by a consent page (Appendix 15), which informed participants the study was 
assessing responses to video clips. Once informed consent was obtained participants were 
taken to the first page of the questionnaire asking for demographic information. The first 
questionnaire to complete was the STERQ trait, positive (Appendix 16) or negative (Appendix 
17) depending on the condition. Next, participants completed baseline mood ratings for the 
neutral video clip and then mood ratings and state STERQ immediately after. In between both 
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inductions the participants were asked to complete the DERS, CERQ, DASS and HPS. Before 
watching the second mood induction clip, another baseline mood rating was completed and 
again following the induction along with the state STERQ (Appendix 18) followed by memory 
questions to test compliance (Appendix 19). 
3.2.2.4 Statistical Analysis 
 
 The data from surveygizmo was downloaded directly into .csv format, where 
participant checks and exclusions were made. The remaining data was then exported into SPSS 
21 for analysis. Initially, the neutral and main mood induction was calculated through paired 
sample t-tests. Then the STERQ items were checked for skew, kurtosis and variance. Trait and 
state data from both studies was analysed separately, initially for factor reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha) followed by structural equation modelling to confirm model fit using AMOS via SPSS 21. 
If these models were found to be reliable and pass confirmation tests, it was planned to use 
the DASS, CERQ, DERS and HPS for convergent validity with Pearson correlations. Finally, 
provided the models could be confirmed, test the state STERQ’s sensitivity to change from the 
neutral induction and the mood induction. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Phase One 
3.3.1.1 STERQ Positive 
3.3.1.1.1  Sample Characteristics 
 
 There were 279 valid participants comprising 53 males (19%) and 226 females (81%). 
Ages ranged between 16 to 65 years old (as shown in Figure 1 below) where the mean age was 
24.61 (SD=10.66). The mean age for males (M=26.77; SD=11.85) was not significantly different 
to females (M=24.35; SD=10.34): t (277) =1.49, p=.137, r=.09.  
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Figure 3.1 Distribution of participants by age and gender. N= 288. 
 
3.3.1.1.2 Mood Induction 
 
To evaluate whether the mood induction was successful, pre-mood induction ratings were 
compared with post-mood induction ratings through paired t-tests. This will confirm whether 
STERQ is being tested in the right valance and whether there was a significant mood change to 
test the scale. There was a significant increase in positive mood: t (278) =-4.62, p<.001, r=.26. 
As well as a significant decrease in negative mood: t (278) =10.33, p<.001, r=.53, which 
suggests an appropriate context for STERQ Positive. Further information is contained in Table 
3.3 below: 
Table 3.3 means and standard deviations of pre- and post-mood induction scores. N=288. 
 Pre-mood induction M (SD) Post-mood induction M (SD) 
Positive mood 4.91 (2.90) 5.63 (2.82) 
Negative mood 2.28 (2.36) 1.13 (1.70) 
 
3.3.1.1.3 Item Variance  
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 All items from both trait and state positive contained responses across the full five-
point scale. 
3.3.1.1.4 Exploratory Principal Components Analysis 
 
Trait positive items were then entered a principal component analysis (PCA). A promax 
rotation was applied since it was assumed that underlying factors may be related, in part due 
to the atheoretical approach. Initial analysis supported this data’s sample size suitability for 
PCA with a Keiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) value of .860, which is considered ‘great’ (Hutcheson & 
Sofroniou, 1999). Additionally, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was highly significant (p < .001) also 
confirming the data’s suitability for PCA. The number of factors selected from the initial factor 
analysis is usually based on the inflection point of the scree plot (Figure 3.2), which suggests a 
four-factor solution. However, the alternative method of using factors with eigenvalues 
greater than one suggests a ten-factor solution. The inflection point at four factors is generally 
more reliable (Costello & Osborne, 2005), although due to later integration with other scales 
the full 10 factor solution was used to allow for increased flexibility. The four-factor solution 
indicates 45% of the variance is explained where the 10-factor solution explains 62% (see 
Appendix 20) and the pattern matrix depicting factor structure is presented in Appendix 21.  
The same PCA was then applied to the state positive items, finding a KMO value of 
.793, which is considered ‘good’ (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999) and Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity was highly significant (p<.001). A six-factor solution was indicated by the point of 
inflection on the scree chart (Figure 3.3) explaining 54% of the variance where the eigenvalue 
solution indicated an eight-factor solution explaining 60% of the variance (see Appendix 22). 
The eigenvalue solution was again selected to allow for more flexibility during integration. The 
pattern matrix of factor structure is presented in Appendix 23. 
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Figure 3.2 A scree plot displaying the eigenvalues for differing numbers of factors for the trait 
positive scale. N=288. 
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Figure 3.3 A scree plot displaying the eigenvalues for differing numbers of factors for the state 
positive scale. N=288. 
3.3.1.2 STERQ Negative 
3.3.1.2.1  Sample Characteristics 
 
There were 417 valid participants comprising 82 males (20%) and 335 females (80%). 
Ages ranged between 16 to 69 years old (as shown in Figure 3.4 below) where the mean age 
was 21.90 (SD=7.73). The mean age for males (M=21.22; SD=6.04) was not significantly 
different to females (M=22.07; SD=8.09): t (413) =-0.88, p=.379, r=.04.  
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Figure 3.4 Distribution of participants by age and gender. N=418. 
 
3.3.1.2.2 Mood Induction 
 
To evaluate whether the mood induction was successful pre-mood induction ratings 
were compared with post-mood induction ratings through paired t-tests. This will ensure 
whether STERQ is being tested against a meaningful mood change. There was a significant 
increase in positive mood: t (414) =21.74, p<.001, r=.73. As well as a significant decrease in 
negative mood: t (414) =-14.94, p<.001, r=.59. Further information is contained in Table 3.4 
below: 
Table 3.4 means and standard deviations of pre- and post-mood induction scores. N=418. 
 Pre-mood induction M (SD) Post-mood induction M (SD) 
Positive mood 4.54 (2.90) 1.68 (2.13) 
Negative mood 2.74 (2.58) 4.67 (2.82) 
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3.3.1.2.3  Item Variance  
 
 All items from both trait and state negative contained responses across the full five-
point scale. 
3.3.1.2.4 Exploratory Principal Components Analysis 
 
Trait negative items were entered a PCA with promax rotation with the same process 
applied above for positive trait and state results. Initial analysis supported this data’s sample 
size suitability for PCA with a KMO value of .872, which is considered ‘great’ (Hutcheson & 
Sofroniou, 1999) and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was highly significant (p<.001). The scree plot 
(Figure 3.5) inflection point suggests a three-factor solution, which only explains 38% of the 
variance where eigenvalues suggest a ten-factor solution suggesting 58% of the variance is 
explained (see Appendix 24) and the pattern matrix depicting factor structure is presented in 
Appendix 25. Again, for flexibility the eigenvalue ten factor solution was selected for its 
greater number of factors. 
The PCA was then repeated for state negative items, finding a ‘great’ KMO value of 
.867 and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity was highly significant (p<.001). An approximately five 
factor solution was suggested by the inflection point of the scree chart (Figure 3.6) explaining 
52% of the variance where eigenvalues greater than one suggested a seven-factor solution 
(see Appendix 26) and the pattern matrix of the factor structure is presented in Appendix 27. 
Again, the seven-factor solution was chosen for greater flexibility during integration. 
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Figure 3.5 A scree plot displaying the eigenvalues for differing numbers of factors for the trait 
negative scale. N=418. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 A scree plot displaying the eigenvalues for differing numbers of factors for the state 
negative scale. N=418. 
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3.3.1.3 STERQ Integration  
 
Initially, the factors from each analysis were labelled and their validity tested through 
Cronbach’s alpha (trait positive, Appendix 28; state positive, Appendix 29; trait negative, 
Appendix 30; state negative, Appendix 31). The factors from the four initial exploratory factor 
analyses were given labels to represent each factor. Factors with the same labels across 
questionnaires were matched and items from those factors items were selected based on two 
prerequisites, reliability and whether they appeared across measures in all identically labelled 
factors. This method was chosen to maintain maximum reliability and inter-questionnaire 
consistency. Furthermore, while this involves four factor analyses, the positive and negative 
state subscales will be merged for it to not be valence specific. This requires more compromise 
as both state factor analyses need to be symmetrical. The selected items in the remaining 
factors were then checked through Cronbach’s Alpha, as shown below: 
Table 3.5 Reliability and inter-item correlations for Trait Positive Factors Post Item Reduction. 
N=288. 
Subscale Items Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) 
Inter-item 
correlation  
(r min- r max) 
Avoidance I want to avoid the situation by trying to escape 
I think about ways in which I can change the experience 
I avoid the experience because I know it will be emotional 
.744 .441-.586 
Emotion 
Focus 
My feelings were out of control 
My feelings made it difficult to concentrate 
It is difficult for me to make sense of what I am feeling, whilst I am 
feeling it 
.637 .273-.460 
Harnessing I could use my feelings about the experience to my advantage 
I can hold on to the emotions I felt in the situation 
I feel that something good will come of it 
.679 .372-.478 
Mindfulness I experience emotion but am not aware of it until sometime later 
I do not generally pay much attention to how I feel 
.470 .309 
Reappraisal I seek out information related to the event to understand or 
change how I am feeling 
I analyse the experience to try to understand why I feel the way I 
did 
I change the way I think about the experience to alter how I am 
feeling 
.711 .436-.476 
Suppression I control my feelings by not showing them 
I try to hide how I was feeling 
It is easy for me to show my feelings 
.799 .521-.650 
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Table 3.6 Reliability for State Positive Factors Post item Reduction. N=288. 
Subscale Items Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) 
Inter-item correlation 
(r min- r max) 
Avoidance I wanted to avoid the situation by closing my eyes or 
looking away 
The situation had such an effect I wished it would just 
go away 
.679 .527 
Emotion 
Focus 
I felt like my emotions were out of control 
My feelings make it difficult to concentrate 
It was difficult for me to make sense of my feelings at 
the time 
.416 .167-.206 
Harnessing I felt like I could use what I was feeling to my 
advantage 
I tried to see the funny side of the situation 
I could hold on to the feelings evoked by the situation 
I felt something good would come of the situation 
.722 .328-.500 
 
Mindfulness I was aware of my feelings 
I could accept my feelings about the situation 
I was aware of my feelings 
.681 .321-.490 
Reappraisal I changed the way I thought about the situation to 
alter how I was feeling 
I reminded myself that I was not part of the situation 
I reminded myself that the situation was not real 
.706 .296-.609 
Resilience I was able to manage the emotions I was feeling 
I could accept my feelings about the situation 
I felt like the situation would not last 
I felt like I could stay calm and not be affected by the 
situation 
.574 .157-.415 
Rumination 
 
My feelings made it hard to focus on other things 
I felt like the same things were going round and round 
in my head 
It was difficult to get the situation out of my mind 
.781 .379-.759 
Suppression I controlled my feelings by not showing them 
I tried to hide what I was feeling  
.607 .502 
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Table 3.7 Reliability for Trait Negative Factors Post item Reduction. N=418. 
Subscale Items Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) 
Inter-item 
correlation (r min- r 
max) 
Avoidance I want to avoid the situation by trying to escape 
The situation had such a big impact on me I 
wished it would just go away 
I avoid the experience because I know it will be 
emotional 
.714 .441-.483 
Emotion 
Focus 
My feelings were out of control 
My feelings made it difficult to concentrate 
It is difficult for me to make sense of what I am 
feeling, whilst I am feeling it 
.683 .319-.506 
Intrusion It is difficult to get the experience out of my mind 
I feel like the same things were going round and 
round in my head 
.669 .503 
Mindfulness I experience emotion but am not aware of it until 
sometime later 
I do not generally pay much attention to how I 
feel 
.316 .188 
Reappraisal I seek out information related to the event to 
understand or change how I am feeling 
I analyse the experience to try to understand why 
I feel the way I did 
I change the way I think about the experience to 
alter how I am feeling 
.629 .308-.451 
Resilience I could use my feelings about the experience to 
my advantage 
I can stay calm and not be affected by the 
situation 
When I know in advance about the experience, I 
can choose to stay calm 
I feel like this is not going to last 
It was easy to manage what I was feeling 
.614 .214-.408 
Suppression 
 
I control my feelings by not showing them 
It is easy for me to show my feelings 
I try to hide how I was feeling 
.718 .410-.486 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.8 Reliability for State Negative Factors Post item Reduction. N=418. 
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Subscale Items Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) 
Inter-item 
correlation (r min- r 
max) 
Avoidance The situation had such an effect I wished it would 
just go away 
I wanted to avoid the situation by closing my eyes 
or looking away 
.699 .538 
Emotion 
Focus 
It was difficult for me to make sense of my 
feelings at the time 
I felt like my emotions were out of control 
My feelings make it difficult to concentrate 
.749 .442-.601 
Harnessing I tried to see the funny side of the situation 
I felt like I could use what I was feeling to my 
advantage 
I could hold on to the feelings evoked by the 
situation 
I felt something good would come of the 
situation 
.399 .003-.272 
Mindfulness I paid attention to my feelings  
I was aware of my feelings 
I could accept my feelings about the situation 
.658 .327-.373 
Reappraisal I reminded myself that I was not part of the 
situation 
I reminded myself that the situation was not real 
I changed the way I thought about the situation 
to alter how I was feeling 
.689 .388-.508 
Resilience I could accept my feelings about the situation 
I felt like I could stay calm and not be affected by 
the situation 
I was able to manage the emotions I was feeling 
I felt like the situation would not last 
.617 .207-.494 
Rumination 
 
I felt like the same things were going round and 
round in my head 
My feelings made it hard to focus on other things 
It was difficult to get the situation out of my mind 
.864 .574-.846 
Suppression I controlled my feelings by not showing them 
I tried to hide what I was feeling 
.738 .589 
 
While the some of the subscales achieved acceptable levels greater than .7, many 
more were found at the .6 level. This is often considered to be questionable reliability, 
however this could be partly due to a lack of items in the subscale rather than a genuine lack 
of reliability (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). Therefore, these borderline cases were maintained to 
be validated on their performance in the second phase of this study. Additionally, some 
subscales demonstrated unacceptable Cronbach’s alpha, such as trait mindfulness in both 
positive and negative subscales (.470 and .316 respectively). This is because this subscale was 
artificially created to mirror the state subscales as an item that should have been in the trait 
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questionnaire, which was in the state scale, was omitted. Therefore, phase 2 will retest this 
subscale with the additional item.  
The second source of reliability issues below .6 are created by the compromise of 
keeping identical scales between state positive and negative. This is because some emotion 
regulation subscales appear to be valence specific, which are emotion focus (state positive 
alpha=.416), resilience (state positive alpha=.574) and harnessing (state negative alpha=.399). 
A result of this will be that it is likely these subscales will only be reliable when testing either 
positive or negative valences and will need to be interpreted more carefully. 
3.3.2 Phase Two 
3.3.2.1 Positive 
3.3.2.1.1 Sample Characteristics 
 
 There were 139 valid participants comprising 22 males (16%) and 117 females (84%). 
Ages ranged between 17 to 65 years old (as shown in Figure 3.7 below) where the mean age 
was 24.09 (SD=9.84). The mean age for males (M=30.32; SD=14.16) was significantly different 
to females where equal variances were not assumed (M=22.91; SD=9.37): t(23.83)=2.375, 
p=.026, r=.44.  
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Figure 3.7 Distribution of participants by age and gender. N=139. 
3.3.2.1.2 Mood Induction 
 
To evaluate whether the mood induction was successful pre-mood induction ratings 
were compared with post-mood induction ratings through paired t-tests. This was done for 
both the neutral video and positive video. For the neutral video, there was a significant 
increase in positive mood (t (138) =12.315, p<.001, r=.72) and a significant decrease in 
negative mood (t (138) =6.313, p<.001, r=.47). For the positive video, there was a significant 
increase in positive mood: (t (138) =10.383, p<.001, r=.66). As well as a significant decrease in 
negative mood: (t (138) =5.465, p<.001, r=.42). Additionally, the positive baseline for the 
neutral induction was not significantly different to the positive induction baseline (t (138) =-
.980, p=N.S, r=.08) but baseline for the positive video was significantly lower than the neutral 
induction (t (138) =3.198, p<.01, r=.26). Further information is contained in Table 3.9 below: 
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Table 3.9 means and standard deviations of pre- and post-mood induction scores. N=139. 
 Pre-neutral 
induction M (SD) 
Post-neutral 
induction M (SD) 
Pre-positive 
induction M 
(SD) 
Post-positive 
induction M 
(SD) 
Positive 
mood 
1.30 (0.89) 2.04 (0.89) 1.35 (0.84) 2.00 (0.91) 
Negative 
mood 
0.65 (0.76) 0.37 (0.55) 0.53 (0.66) 0.28 (0.53) 
 
3.3.2.1.3 Item Variance  
 
 All items from both trait and state positive contained responses across the full five-
point scale. 
3.3.2.1.4 Trait Subscale reliability 
 
The confirmatory factor analysis and reliability statistics were calculated using the 
positive mood induction video, as the neutral video was only included to detect the SERQ’s 
sensitivity to change. Reliability was calculated through Cronbach’s alpha to test the subscales 
identified in the first phase, shown in Table 8 below. Whilst most subscales demonstrated an 
acceptable level of reliability (>.6), both mindfulness and harnessing failed to do so. There 
were also some items that failed to meet acceptable inter-item correlations (>.5). 
Table 3.10 Reliability for Trait Positive Factors. N=139. 
Subscale Items Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) 
Inter-item 
correlation  
(r min- r max) 
Avoidance I want to avoid the situation by trying to escape 
I think about ways in which I can change the experience 
I avoid the experience because I know it will be emotional 
.814 .612-.710 
Emotion 
Focus 
My feelings were out of control 
My feelings made it difficult to concentrate 
It is difficult for me to make sense of what I am feeling, whilst I am 
feeling it 
.650 .342-.583 
Harnessing I could use my feelings about the experience to my advantage 
I can hold on to the emotions I felt in the situation 
I feel that something good will come of it 
.585 .290-.473 
Mindfulness I experience emotion but am not aware of it until sometime later 
I do not generally pay much attention to how I feel 
I generally accept my feelings about the situation 
.567 .277-.442 
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Reappraisal I seek out information related to the event to understand or 
change how I am feeling 
I analyse the experience to try to understand why I feel the way I 
did 
I change the way I think about the experience to alter how I am 
feeling 
.691 .410 -.586 
Suppression I control my feelings by not showing them 
I try to hide how I was feeling 
It is easy for me to show my feelings 
.685 .362-.617 
 
3.3.2.1.5 Trait Confirmatory factor analysis 
 
A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to investigate how well the six-factor model 
fitted to the data. Chi-square tests of the model were found to be highly significant 
(χ2(124, n = 139) = 322.79, p < .001), which can indicate a poor model fit, however this can also 
be a result of a large sample size. However, the competitive fit index (CFI) was well below the 
acceptable range (>.9; Byrne, 1994) at .76. Due to the failure of this model to suitably fit the 
data no further analysis of convergent validity would be meaningful. 
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Figure 3.8 Structural equation model of the trait positive items and factors. N=139. 
3.3.2.1.6 State Subscale reliability 
 
The confirmatory factor analysis and reliability statistics were calculated using the 
positive mood induction video, as the neutral video was only included to detect the SERQ’s 
sensitivity to change. Reliability was calculated through Cronbach’s alpha to test the subscales 
identified in the first phase, shown in Table 3.11 below. Whilst most subscales demonstrated 
an acceptable level of reliability (>.6), resilience failed to do so. There were also three factors 
containing items that failed to meet acceptable inter-item correlations (>.5). 
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Table 3.11 Reliability for State Positive Factors. N=139. 
Subscale Items Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) 
Inter-item correlation 
(r min- r max) 
Avoidance I wanted to avoid the situation by closing my eyes or 
looking away 
The situation had such an effect I wished it would just 
go away 
.787 .686 
Emotion 
Focus 
I felt like my emotions were out of control 
My feelings make it difficult to concentrate 
It was difficult for me to make sense of my feelings at 
the time 
.717 .435-653 
Harnessing I felt like I could use what I was feeling to my 
advantage 
I tried to see the funny side of the situation 
I could hold on to the feelings evoked by the situation 
I felt something good would come of the situation 
.790 .536-.687 
 
Mindfulness I was aware of my feelings 
I could accept my feelings about the situation 
I was aware of my feelings 
.698 .427-.641 
Reappraisal I changed the way I thought about the situation to 
alter how I was feeling 
I reminded myself that I was not part of the situation 
I reminded myself that the situation was not real 
.719 .505-.577 
Resilience I was able to manage the emotions I was feeling 
I could accept my feelings about the situation 
I felt like the situation would not last 
I felt like I could stay calm and not be affected by the 
situation 
.418 .130-.326 
Rumination 
 
My feelings made it hard to focus on other things 
I felt like the same things were going round and round 
in my head 
It was difficult to get the situation out of my mind 
.734 .469-.634 
Suppression I controlled my feelings by not showing them 
I tried to hide what I was feeling  
.789 .654 
 
3.3.2.1.7 State confirmatory factor analysis 
 
A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to investigate how well the eight-factor state 
model fitted to the data. Chi-square tests of the model were found to be highly significant 
(χ2(213, n = 139) = 496.76, p < .001), which can indicate a poor model fit, however this can also 
be a result of a larger sample size. However, the competitive fit index (CFI) was well below the 
acceptable range (>.9; Byrne, 1994) at .81. Due to the failure of this model to suitably fit the 
data no further analysis of convergent validity or state sensitivity to change would be 
meaningful. 
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Figure 3.9 Structural equation model of the state positive items and factors. N=139. 
 
3.3.2.2 Negative 
3.3.2.2.1 Sample Characteristics 
 
 There were 114 valid participants comprising 20 males (18%) and 94 females (82%). 
Ages ranged between 17 to 65 years old (as shown in Figure 3.10 below) where the mean age 
was 23.25 (SD=8.65). The mean age for males (M=2.60; SD=10.92) was not significantly 
different to females where equal variances were not assumed (M=22.53; SD=7,97): t (23.49) =-
1.579, p=N.S, r=.31.  
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Figure 3.10 Distribution of participants by age and gender. N=114. 
 
3.3.2.2.2 Mood Induction 
 
To evaluate whether the mood induction was successful pre-mood induction ratings were 
compared with post-mood induction ratings through paired t-tests. This was done for both the 
neutral video and negative video. For the neutral video there was no significant change in 
positive mood (t (113) =.675, p=N.S, r=.06) and no significant change in negative mood (t (113) 
=1.444, p=N.S, r=.13). For the negative video, there was no significant decrease in positive 
mood: (t (113) =1.224, p=N.S, r=.11). But did significantly increase negative mood: (t (113) 
=4.399, p<.001, r=.38). Additionally, the positive baseline for the neutral induction was 
significantly different to the negative induction positive baseline (t (113) =7.408, p<.001, r=.57) 
but the negative mood baselines were not significantly different (t(113)=0.867, p=N.S, r=.08). 
Further information is contained in Table 3.12 below: 
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Table 3.12 means and standard deviations of pre- and post-mood induction scores. N=114. 
 Pre-neutral 
induction M (SD) 
Post-neutral 
induction M (SD) 
Pre-negative 
induction M 
(SD) 
Post-negative 
induction M 
(SD) 
Positive 
mood 
1.26 (0.98) 1.30 (0.96) 0.83 (0.90) 0.73 (0.87) 
Negative 
mood 
0.76 (0.83) 0.67 (0.72) 0.71 (0.87) 1.09 (0.77) 
 
3.3.2.2.3 Item Variance  
 
 All items from both trait and state positive contained responses across the full five 
point scale. 
3.3.2.2.4 Trait Subscale reliability 
 
The confirmatory factor analysis and reliability statistics were calculated using the 
negative mood induction video. Reliability was calculated through Cronbach’s alpha to test the 
subscales identified in the first phase, shown in Table 11 below. Whilst most subscales 
demonstrated an acceptable level of reliability (>.6), mindfulness failed to do so. Also, only 
two factors contained no items that failed to meet acceptable inter-item correlations (>.5). 
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Table 3.13 Reliability for Trait Negative Factors. N=114. 
Subscale Items Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) 
Inter-item 
correlation (r min- r 
max) 
Avoidance I want to avoid the situation by trying to escape 
The situation had such a big impact on me I 
wished it would just go away 
I avoid the experience because I know it will be 
emotional 
.830 .612-.759 
Emotion 
Focus 
My feelings were out of control 
My feelings made it difficult to concentrate 
It is difficult for me to make sense of what I am 
feeling, whilst I am feeling it 
.717 .475-.611 
Intrusion It is difficult to get the experience out of my mind 
I feel like the same things were going round and 
round in my head 
.813 .686 
Mindfulness I  experience emotion but am not aware of it until 
sometime later 
I do not generally pay much attention to how I 
feel 
.305 .120-.220 
Reappraisal I seek out information related to the event to 
understand or change how I am feeling 
I analyse the experience to try to understand why 
I feel the way I did 
I change the way I think about the experience to 
alter how I am feeling 
.683 .333-.604 
Resilience I could use my feelings about the experience to 
my advantage 
I can stay calm and not be affected by the 
situation 
When I know in advance about the experience, I 
can choose to stay calm 
I feel like this is not going to last 
It was easy to manage what I was feeling 
.656 .098-.643 
Suppression 
 
I control my feelings by not showing them 
It is easy for me to show my feelings 
I try to hide how I was feeling 
.715 .315-.679 
 
3.3.2.2.5 Trait Confirmatory factor analysis 
 
A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to investigate how well the seven factor model 
fitted to the data. Chi-square tests of the model were found to be highly significant 
(χ2(197, n = 114) = 418.05, p < .001), which can indicate a poor model fit, however this can also 
be a result of a large sample size. However, the competitive fit index (CFI) was well below the 
acceptable range (>.9; Byrne, 1994) at .79. Due to the failure of this model to suitably fit the 
data no further analysis of convergent validity would be meaningful. 
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Figure 3.11 Structural equation model of the trait negative items and factors. N=114. 
 
3.3.2.2.6 State Subscale reliability 
 
The confirmatory factor analysis and reliability statistics were calculated using the 
positive mood induction video, as the neutral video was only included to detect the SERQ’s 
sensitivity to change. Reliability was calculated through Cronbach’s alpha to test the subscales 
identified in the first phase, shown in Table 12 below. Whilst all subscales demonstrated an 
acceptable level of reliability (>.6) there were also four factors that failed to meet acceptable 
inter-item correlations (>.5). 
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Table 3.14 Reliability for State Negative Factors. N=114. 
Subscale Items Cronbach’s 
Alpha (α) 
Inter-item 
correlation (r min- r 
max) 
Avoidance The situation had such an effect I wished it would 
just go away 
I wanted to avoid the situation by closing my eyes 
or looking away 
.715 .562 
Emotion 
Focus 
It was difficult for me to make sense of my 
feelings at the time 
I felt like my emotions were out of control 
My feelings make it difficult to concentrate 
.629 .320-.528 
Harnessing I tried to see the funny side of the situation 
I felt like I could use what I was feeling to my 
advantage 
I could hold on to the feelings evoked by the 
situation 
I felt something good would come of the 
situation 
.636 .270-.529 
Mindfulness I paid attention to my feelings  
I was aware of my feelings 
I could accept my feelings about the situation 
.793 .592-.687 
Reappraisal I reminded myself that I was not part of the 
situation 
I reminded myself that the situation was not real 
I changed the way I thought about the situation 
to alter how I was feeling 
.664 .322-.630 
Resilience I could accept my feelings about the situation 
I felt like I could stay calm and not be affected by 
the situation 
I was able to manage the emotions I was feeling 
I felt like the situation would not last 
.674 .381-.502 
Rumination 
 
I felt like the same things were going round and 
round in my head 
My feelings made it hard to focus on other things 
It was difficult to get the situation out of my mind 
.796 .551-.709 
Suppression I controlled my feelings by not showing them 
I tried to hide what I was feeling 
.816 .694 
 
3.3.2.2.7 State Confirmatory factor analysis 
 
A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to investigate how well the seven factor model 
fitted to the data. Chi-square tests of the model were found to be highly significant 
(χ2(209, n = 114) = 442.54, p < .001), which can indicate a poor model fit, however this can also 
be a result of a large sample size. However, the competitive fit index (CFI) was well below the 
acceptable range (>.9; Byrne, 1994) at .78. Due to the failure of this model to suitably fit the 
data no further analysis of convergent validity or state sensitivity to change would be 
meaningful. 
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Figure 3.12 Structural equation model of the state negative items and factors. N=114. 
 
3.3.2.2.8 Results Summary 
 
 As a result of confirmatory testing, each model was found to be inadequate (trait 
positive CFI=.76; state positive CFI=.81; trait negative CFI=.79; state negative CFI=.78), in 
addition to this only the state negative confirmation found each factor to have at least 
acceptable reliability. No scale was found to have all acceptable inter-item correlations. With 
these considerations any further analysis of these models would not be meaningful and 
therefore they will not be conducted. 
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3.4 Discussion 
 
 These studies aimed to create a set of questionnaires to fit three gaps within the 
literature, an atheoretical approach, state/trait measure and inclusive of positive emotion. 
While phase one was successful, phase two failed to validate, halting its development.  There 
are many potential contributing factors to this result. These may not be confined to the design 
or testing process of the study, but potentially they might have contributed to its underlying 
approach.  
While an atheoretical approach is novel and would be experimentally valuable, it is at 
great risk of disorderly data. This risk comes from the base items, where many of the items 
could easily group with other items making factor structure vulnerable to, rather than flexible 
with, context. Many of the items were also too distinct from each other, questioning subscale 
face validity. These two issues may seem opposite to one another. However, emotion 
regulation strategies tend to be somewhat related, even when conceptually distinct. In 
hindsight, two methods could be applied to attend to this issue. The first would be distinct 
groups of items created in item generation, which was attempted to a limited degree. 
However, this was not originally pursued to avoid undermining the atheoretical aspect. A 
second approach applied in the data analysis of phase one would have been a strict controlling 
for collinearity between items as this underlying collinearity was most likely responsible for 
unreproducible factors.  
 Another major issue in phase two’s failure to replicate were the sacrifices in reliability 
made by the ambitious demands of (broadly) symmetrical state/trait and positive/negative 
scales. To make these scales symmetrical, mathematically ideal factor sizes and structures 
suggested by the scree plot were overruled by less conservative eigenvalues. This was a 
necessary part of the design, so that the strategies would have 4 equivalents for potential 
translation across scales. Without this demand, the factor structures may have been 
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considerably more reliable. Again, in hindsight, it is questionable that even symmetrical scales, 
while providing ‘face symmetry’, may not be symmetrical in function as positive and negative 
emotion are conceptually distinct (Fredrickson et al., 2008). Therefore, a future development 
from the same pool of items could prioritise symmetry within positive state/trait and negative 
state/trait separately. This would minimise reliability compromises and maintain translational 
ability between state and trait scales. However, this minimisation still has potential issues. 
Previous state/trait inventories, such as the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Speilberger, 1983) 
found that items functioned differently between state and trait, resulting in different item sets 
for each measure. This limitation was not explored by Speilberger and understanding why 
these differences between state and trait can occur is an area that needs more exploring. It is 
possible that generalisation focuses on reactions to general temperament instead of specific 
reactions, where emotion regulation may act differently.   
Both samples were recruited and tested online, many of these were undergraduate 
students. However, the population was demographically varied with the majority from phase 
one from the UK (~80%) and in phase two the majority were from the USA (~ 65%). While this 
would be a strength of a successfully validated study, it may actually be a potential cause of 
the unreliable factor structure. 
Another limitation of the study, though perhaps not contributing to the result of phase 
two, was the mood induction situations. STERQ was designed to potentially assess emotion 
regulation in a variety of contexts beyond video clip based mood induction. Although the 
study was already tackling many different aspects, it was only used in one positive/negative 
context. Therefore, if the STERQ had validated, it would have seen future verification within 
other contexts such as experience sampling (such as chapter 6) and other emotions. However, 
the mood inductions were broadly successful with good effect sizes with the one exception 
that the neutral video clips were found to be generally positive. The positivity of the neutral 
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video clips is not a major limitation of this study as they were used to test sensitivity to 
change, which relied upon the confirmation of factor structure. 
3.4.1 Future Studies 
 
 There are several ways that this methodology could inform or be carried into future 
studies. The main issue behind many of the limitations of this study is its atheoretical breadth. 
Trying to account for state and trait while simultaneously accounting for positive and negative 
emotion spreads the questionnaire very thinly. In addition, the necessity of symmetry across 
scales weakens reliability further. If this experiment were to be repeated, it is likely to be most 
effective to remove either positive or negative emotion. This is because STERQ was designed 
to be an experimental tool and a state/trait comparison will probably be more frequently 
experimentally useful than a cross valence measure. On the other hand, a cross valence 
measure would still be useful due to the sparse number of existing measures that can cover 
both positive and negative emotion. This straight replication without one dimension will 
increase the reliability of the scales identified in the exploratory analysis. 
 Another way that this approach could be replicated to better effect would be to focus 
on a particular emotion regulation strategy that is well known to be relevant in positive and 
negative situations. For example, suppression has been shown to have strong impacts in both 
negative (e.g. ERQ; Gross, 1998) and positive emotion (e.g. Gruber, Harvey, & Gross, 2012). 
Items would be sourced from a variety of emotion regulation questionnaires that cover 
suppression, such as the positive and negative versions of the suppression ERQ scale. If 
necessary, additional items could be created by participants asked to describe ways they have 
suppressed their emotion and how they might describe suppression. This measure of 
state/trait, positive and negative emotion suppression would provide potential for a 
considerably deeper understanding of the strategy that cannot yet be measured. The depth 
that could be reached by applying a STERQ approach to one emotion regulation strategy also 
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highlights the potential value of the original STERQ as well as demonstrating how it became 
overstretched by the demands placed upon the methodology. 
3.4.2 Conclusion 
 
 In general, the initial exploratory analysis of phase one lacked the strict regulation it 
needed to become a fully functioning questionnaire. This should have been controlled by 
identifying collinearity as well as both internal reliability and intra subscale correlations to 
question or exclude subscales. This may have led to a more stable questionnaire, still able to 
retain some of its ambitious goals, potentially at the cost of inter-questionnaire symmetry.  
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4  Chapter Four: Inducing Catastrophising 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 The second chapter of this thesis found associations between catastrophising and 
depression, anxiety and stress. This chapter will build on this understanding by manipulating 
catastrophising and measuring mood in a laboratory setting. If participants are instructed to 
catastrophise and mood decreases; this would support the hypothesis that catastrophising has 
a causal effect on mood. Supporting the wider assumption that catastrophising’s associations 
with depression, anxiety and stress are through its effect on mood, highlighting it as a 
psychopathological risk factor. Catastrophising was defined by Ellis (1962, p. 442) as focusing 
on how terrible a situation appears to be. This concept was later refined by Beck, Rush, Shaw, 
& Emery (1979, p.425) as a cognitive error in anxiety and depression, where catastrophising 
was dwelling on the worst possible outcome of a situation. This was also posited by Abramson, 
Metalsky, & Alloy (1989) as a specific risk factor for depression. However, there are a limited 
range of studies investigating depression, anxiety and stress with catastrophising (e.g. Abela, 
2001; Hiller, Lovato, Gradisar, Oliver, & Slater, 2014; Noëssl, Francis, Williams-Outerbridge, & 
Fung, 2012).  
 Current research on catastrophising in anxiety and depression is largely focused into 
two domains. One is childhood and adolescence, where catastrophising is treated as a 
cognitive error and a key risk factor for depression (Abramson et al., 1989) by Abela (2001). 
Using this theory both Abela (2001) and Abela & Sarin (2002) were able to use catastrophising 
scores to predict depression over six and ten week periods respectively. Developmental 
researchers have also found catastrophising to be a strong predictor for a range of anxiety 
measures in cross-sectional studies (Legerstee, Garnefski, Jellesma, Verhulst, & Utens, 2010; 
Watts & Weems, 2006; Weems et al., 2001). Studies have also cross-sectionally analysed 
depression and anxiety with catastrophising simultaneously (Verduin & Kendall, 2010; Zahn-
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Waxler, Klimes-Dougan, & Slattery, 2000).  Taking these relationships one step further to 
understand the association between catastrophising and depression Noël et al. (2012) also 
controlled for anxiety scores. These measures were taken at three developmental time points 
(8-9, 10-11 and 12-13 years old) and found that only in the youngest age group (8-9 years) 
depression explained significantly more variance than catastrophising after controlling for 
anxiety (7%). Garnefski, Legerstee, Kraaij, Van Den Kommer, & Teerds (2002) found 
differences between adolescents and adults, where adults tend to catastrophise significantly 
more and their catastrophising scores are much more closely linked with depression and 
anxiety. However, this effect was not unique to catastrophising as adults reported a greater 
use of all CERQ emotion regulation strategies but catastrophising showed the strongest 
association with depression and anxiety.  
 Another domain of research focusing on catastrophising is in the context of pain, an 
area primarily consolidated by Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik (1995). These domains are discussed 
separately not just due to general difference in age focus and context, but also because there 
is a one-way interaction from pain catastrophising literature to emotion regulation literature. 
While some emotion regulation studies may make brief mentions of the literature (e.g.  
Garnefski et al., 2002), there is little attempt in to bring concepts from pain across to non-pain 
depression and anxiety. 
 In cross-sectional pain studies, catastrophising has shown associations with 
depression (e.g. Richardson et al., 2009; Roth, Lowery, & Hamill, 2004; Sullivan & D’Eon, 1990). 
Catastrophising has also been shown to predict depression (Turner, Jensen, & Romano, 2000). 
Although age has also been shown as a factor, where older people with chronic pain are 
significantly less likely to become depressed than younger people with chronic pain (B. M. 
Wood et al., 2010). However, studies have still found catastrophising to be a significant 
predictor of pain, depression and disability in older adults (Corran, Gibson, Farrell, & Helme, 
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1994; López-López, Montorio, Izal, & Velasco, 2008). A recent study by Wood, Nicholas, Blyth, 
Asghari, & Gibson (2013) developed these relationships further and found catastrophising to 
be a significant mediator from pain to depression. However, a conceptual issue with this 
approach is that mediation analysis requires a causal relationship from reported levels of 
chronic pain to catastrophising (predictor to mediator, for mediation model see: Hayes, 2013). 
In this model the proposed relationship is directly opposite to pain literature and theory, 
where catastrophising is thought to predict pain experience (Sullivan et al., 1995). Therefore, a 
more conceptually meaningful analysis into catastrophising’s role would be a mediation 
analysis; where pain experience’s relationship with depression is mediated by catastrophising, 
removing a backwards predictor to mediator relationship, where a partial mediation may be 
most likely. Where catastrophising could lead to depression through pain as well as directly.  
While this remains an area for future research, it is outside of the scope of this thesis. 
However, it demonstrates the more developed approach to catastrophising in pain literature. 
From the perspective of emotion regulation, pain research considers the context or 
antecedant of catastrophising in its analysis (pain), which other areas do not. This difference in 
understanding is also demonstrated in laboratory studies. There are no studies known to the 
author to test catastrophising through a non-pain or panic based mood induction to identify 
their effects on mood. Where cross-sectional studies can reveal associations and longitudinal 
studies provide some predicitive validity, measuring the effect of catastrophising during a 
relevant task greatly contributes to establishing causality. Therefore, the primary aim of this 
chapter is to expand upon the results for catastrophising found in chapter one and in previous 
literature by developing a case for catastrophising’s causal role in mood change. Previous pain 
based mood inductions commonly use a stressor, such as the cold pressor task (e.g. van den 
Hout et al., 2000) or electric shock (e.g. Sullivan et al., 1995) to create a pain context. To 
inform the design of a study that follows up on results found in Chapter Two, in pain literature 
there are often two groups differing in instruction. A catastrophising group to think the worst 
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and focus on how terrible the situation is and a control group who do not (such as: Severeijns, 
Van Den Hout, & Vlaeyen, 2005). Transferring this to a depressed or anxious context is 
conceptually difficult due to the tremendous potential variation within these areas, compared 
to pain’s specificity. However, this experiment will test if catastrophising in response to video 
clips of unpleasant life events will lower positive mood and increase negative mood as has 
been shown in pain contexts (for a meta-analysis see: Alabas, Tashani, Tabasam, & Johnson, 
2012).  
To create a situation best suited to measuring only the effect of catastrophising, the 
procedure, instructions and video content must be carefully constructed. First, the procedure 
must avoid creating demand characteristics on affect scores. This can be achieved through 
initially instructing participants that this task is measuring cognition and memory and that 
instructions require the participants to pay close attention to the clips and their content. This 
is then measured at the end of the procedure by asking for their interpretation of the 
experiment’s purpose. As well as creating false demand characteristics the instructions for 
both groups will require participants to imagine that they are the individuals who experienced 
the events being discussed. Therefore the mood induced effect of both groups is similarly 
constrained by individual differences in empathy. The instructions will also have to be as 
similar as is feasible to demand the same level of attention from the participant. Finally, the 
video clips must be chosen carefully to elicit as little an emotion response as possible if viewed 
without instruction. This will best capture the effect of just catastrophising, rather than 
conflating its effect with the mood of the video. This requirement led the author to use video 
clips of individuals explaining difficult situations of their lives, which could be catastrophised 
about but not containing overtly emotional content.  
The primary hypothesis of this study has two compoents, one for positive and one for 
negative mood. The negative affect PANAS scores will increase significantly more in the 
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catastrophising condition than the control condition and the positive affect PANAS scores will 
decrease significantly more in the catastrophising condition than the control condition. 
Therefore, we hypothesise that following mood induction the catastrophising group will have 
significantly lower positive and higher negative mood compared to the control group. Positive 
mood is also used as a measure of the effect of catastrophising as it is a strategy that has 
previously been associated with lower positive as well as higher negative mood (Severeijns, 
Van Den Hout, & Vlaeyen, 2005). A secondary hypothesis of this study is to replicate the 
correlations found between CERQ and DASS that originally informed the design of this study. A 
large correlation is anticipated between catastrophising and DASS measures. 
 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
 
 Participants were undergraduates recruited through the University of Reading 
SONAsystem and received course credit for participation. There were 64 participants 
comprising of 6 males (9%) and 58 (91%) females. Ages ranged from 16 to 57 where the mean 
age was 21.22 (SD=6.84). The mean age for males was 26.00 (SD=6.22) and females 20.72 
(SD=5.36), this was not found to be a significant difference, where t (5.13) =.843, p=.437, 
r=.349. Group selection was randomised using a random number generator. 
4.2.2 Design 
 
 This study used “surveygizmo.com” to produce the experiment that would be 
conducted in a laboratory setting. The study has two independent groups, a concentration and 
a catastrophising condition. These groups only differed in instructions on how to view the 
video clip, where mood was measured (via PANAS) before and immediately afterwards to 
detect group differences.   
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4.2.3 Measures 
4.2.3.1  Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
 
The PANAS’ (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) (Appendix 33) positive and negative 
affect subscales both consist of 10 items. The questions were developed from a PCA of Zevon 
and Tellegen’s (1982) checklist of emotions. The PANAS asks respondents how much they feel 
a specific emotion on five point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (very 
much). This can be used over a number of different time frames but in the current study the 
timeframe ‘at the present moment’ was used. While Watson, Clark, & Tellegen (1988) verified 
the positive and negative factor structure of the PANAS, they did not conduct Cronbach’s 
alpha reliabilities. A later validation by Crawford & Henry (2004) found .89 and .85 Cronbach’s 
alpha scores for the positive and negative affect scales respectively.  
4.2.3.2  Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ) 
 
 For a review of the CERQ-short and its subscales, see chapter two. However, this study 
uses the four item catastrophising subscale from the full CERQ (Appendix 8). The CERQ 
catastrophising subscale was generated a priori and based upon clinical intuition as well as its 
definition (Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001). This is different to the other CERQ subscales 
that were partially generated from previous coping measures. The four item catastrophising 
subscale failed to load on the first confirmatory factor analysis but upon item revision loaded 
in a second confirmatory analysis. The scale was found to have an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha 
reliability (.72). A later re-test by Garnefski & Kraaij (2006) found a similar alpha at .79 for the 
catastrophising subscale. The CERQ is measured on a five point Likert scale from 1 (almost 
never) to 5 (almost always). 
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4.2.3.3  Depression, Anxiety and Stress (DASS-21) 
 
For a review of the DASS-21 and its subscales, see chapter two (Appendix 4). The 
DASS-21 consists of 21 items, each scored from 0 (Did not apply to me at all) to 3 (Applied to 
me very much, or most of the time). Each subscale (depression, anxiety and stress) contains 
seven items that can be added to make final subscale scores. 
4.2.3.4  Video Clips  
 
 Three video clips were used in this study for the participants to either watch or 
catastrophise over. These clips were carefully selected from Youtube to depict scenes that the 
experimenters thought would not significantly impact mood directly, i.e. if watched with no 
other instruction. They also had to depict scenes that could be catastrophised about if the 
participant imagined themselves in the scene. The clips were created as approximately three 
minute segments from the links below. Each of these segments were timed to follow the 
individual’s story of events and not the following positive recovery. These clips were piloted on 
five individuals and there was no reported mood change. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ei5oy8D3ct8  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hum06iLODwk  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWsYIoLZHYI#t=33 
 
4.2.4 Procedure 
 
 Participants were randomly grouped into either the catastrophising or control 
condition using a random number generator. The information provided explained that the 
study was looking into ‘cognitive processing and memory’. Once participants had provided 
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informed consent (Appendix 32 & 34) they were taken to the first page of the experiment that 
asked for demographic information (Appendix 35). Following this, participants of both groups 
completed the CERQ (Appendix 8) as well as the DASS (Appendix 4). Then immediately before 
watching the three videos the participants of both groups completed a baseline mood scale 
(PANAS, Appendix 33).  
 The control condition was provided with instructions to read (Appendix 3), which 
simply instruct participants to pay close attention to the three clips. The catastrophising 
condition’s instructions (Appendix 36) instruct participants to pay close attention to the videos 
and to catastrophise (i.e. thinking the worst that could happen in the situation). The three clips 
were used in both groups and the order of the clips was counterbalanced. Between each video 
clip the participants of both groups were given 30 seconds to write out what they were 
thinking during the clip (Appendix 37). 
 Immediately following the video clips, participants were asked to complete the 
PANAS. Once completed the participants were debriefed on the true nature of the study and 
given a standard sources of support leaflet (Appendix 38). 
4.2.5 Statistical Analysis 
 
 Initially, the PANAS scores for both groups combined and separate were checked for 
normality through z-scored skewness and kurtosis. Then data from both groups was combined 
to check for an overall mood induction result. The pre and post positive PANAS scores were 
compared using a paired t-test. However, as the negative PANAS scores were found to be non-
normal, one repeated sample Wilcoxon test was used. In order to test for between group 
affect differences two ANCOVAs were conducted. Before hypotheses one and two were tested 
the baseline positive and negative scores were compared between groups to check for 
significant differences. As negative scores were found to be non-normal a Mann-Whitney test 
was applied instead of a between groups t-test. 
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To test both elements of hypothesis one, between groups ANCOVAs used post-induction 
scores as the dependent variable and pre-induction as the covariate. However, as negative 
scores were non-normally distributed and failed all transformations, bootstrapping was 
applied with 1000 samples (as suggested by Field, 2013). 
For the secondary hypothesis spearman correlations were conducted as the CERQ 
catastrophising subscale and the DASS subscales were found to have non-normal skewness 
and kurtosis. 
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Normality Checks 
 
 PANAS scores were checked for normality for each group as well as both groups 
combined. The skewness and kurtosis scores shown in Table 4.1 below have been converted 
into z-scores. These conversions were made by dividing the kurtosis or skewness score by its 
standard error. Therefore, all scores above 1.96 or below -1.96 are considered non-normal. 
Table 4.1 Z-scored kurtosis and skewness for PANAS. N=64. 
 Collapsed Groups Catastrophising 
Condition 
Control Condition 
 Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis Skewness Kurtosis 
Baseline 
Positive 
0.013 -0.966 -0.630 -0.815 0.588 -0.121 
Post 
Positive 
1.864 -0.314 0.892 -0.038 1.730 -0.593 
Baseline 
Negative 
7.321* 11.234* 2.445* 0.279 5.605* 7.718* 
Post 
Negative 
3.017* 0.917 1.201 -0.455 3.462* 3.844* 
* non-normal score 
In addition to checking for z-scored skewness and kurtosis, normality was assessed 
through the Shapiro-Wilk method, where significant results (p<.05) are considered non-
normal. These checks replicated non-normality findings in z-scored skewness and kurtosis. This 
can be found in Table 4.2 below: 
Table 4.2 Tests of normality on PANAS scores using Shapiro-Wilk method. N=64. 
 Condition Statistic Df 
Baseline Positive Control .984 34 
Catastrophising .973 30 
Post Positive Score  Control .955 34 
Catastrophising .976 30 
Baseline Negative Control .735** 34 
Catastrophising .851** 30 
Post Negative score  Control .885* 34 
Catastrophising .957 30 
* significant at p<.05 ** significant at p<.001 
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4.3.2 Mood Induction 
 
To evaluate whether there was an overall mood induction, pre-mood induction ratings 
were compared with post-mood induction ratings taken from PANAS scores. A paired t-test 
found there was a significant decrease in positive mood: t(63) = 5.28, p<.001, r=.749. A 
Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks Test was conducted and found that a significant decrease in negative 
mood, Z=1,581, p<.001. Further information is contained in Table 1 below: 
Table 4.3 Average (mean and median) and range (standard deviation and interquartile range) 
of pre- and post-mood induction scores. N=64 
 Baseline Average (range) Post-mood induction 
Average (range) 
Positive mood Mean = 27.20 (SD =7.47) Mean = 23.73 (SD =7.37) 
Negative mood Median = 12 (IQR = 4) Median = 16 (IQR = 6) 
 
 
4.3.3 Baseline Mood Condition Comparison 
 
 Baseline mood measured by positive and negative PANAS scores, and tested through 
an independent t-test, showed no significant differences between conditions in positive mood 
baseline t(62)=1.17, p=.245, r=.147. There were also no significant differences between 
negative mood baseline as found by a Mann-Whitney test U= 534, p= .737.  
Table 4.4: Average (mean and median) and range (standard deviation and interquartile range) 
of baseline mood scores between conditions. N=64 
 Control Baseline Average 
(range) 
Catastrophising Baseline 
Average (range) 
Positive mood Mean = 26.18 (SD = 7.38) Mean = 28.37 (SD = 7.53) 
Negative mood Median = 12(IQR = 4) Median = 12 (IQR = 4) 
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4.3.4 Catastrophising and Mood Change 
 
Two ANCOVAs were carried out to compare differences between groups for both positive and 
negative post PANAS scores using baseline scores as a covariate. Initial tests of normality 
found that only negative PANAS scores were non-normal. As transformations failed to 
establish normality, bootstrapping was applied with 1000 samples (as suggested by Field, 
2013). For negative emotion scores the covariate, baseline negative score, was significantly 
related F(1,61)=24.69, p<.001, r=.29. There was also a significant effect of condition, where 
the catastrophizing group reported significantly higher post negative mood F(1,61)=7.91, 
p<.01, d=0.71 (see Figure 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1 Baseline and post negative mood scores between groups. N=64. 
 
For positive emotion scores the covariate, baseline positive score, was significantly related to 
post positive scores, F(1,61)=94.23, p<.001, r=.61. There was also a significant effect of group, 
where the catastrophising condition reported a significantly lower positive mood, 
F(1,61)=7.91, p<.01, partial d=0.71 (see Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.2 Baseline and post positive mood scores between groups. N=64 
 
4.3.5 CERQ Catastrophising and DASS subscales 
 
The CERQ catastrophising subscale and DASS subscales were checked for normality 
through their normalised skewness, kurtosis scores as well as Shapiro-Wilk scores (see Table 
4.5 below). As the data was found to be non-normal, Spearman correlations were conducted 
for DASS subscales against CERQ Catastrophising (Depression, r=.613 where p< 0.001; Anxiety, 
r=.487 where p< 0.001; Stress, r=.554 where p< 0.001). 
Table 4.4 Z-scored kurtosis and skewness for DASS subscales and CERQ catastrophising. N=64. 
 Skewness Kurtosis Shapiro Wilk 
CERQ Catastrophising 1.76 1.07 .908* 
DASS Depression 6.39 5.88 .751* 
DASS Anxiety 4.86 2.98 .822* 
DASS Stress 3.04 0.39 .915* 
* significant at p<.001 
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4.3.6 Post Experimental Questions and Task Compliance 
 
 None of the participants were able to correctly guess the purpose of the study. Over 
90% assumed it was a memory task rather than a mood task. Additionally, all participants 
recorded themselves as catastrophising over various aspects during each clip, suggesting task 
compliance. 
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4.4 Discussion 
 
 This study instructed participants to use one of two strategies (catastrophising or 
control) to identify differences in self-reported mood scores following instruction over the 
course of three video clips. Significantly greater negative affect PANAS scores were found in 
the catastrophising condition post-induction, supporting the first hypothesis. Additionally, 
significantly lower positive affect PANAS scores were found in the catastrophising condition 
post-induction, supporting the second half of the first hypothesis. This tested the larger 
assumption that catastrophising induces lower mood. This assumption was developed from 
previous findings in Chapter One, which found strong associations between catastrophising 
and depression, anxiety and stress. This was replicated in this study, which again found strong 
associations with these three mental health indicators. These associations had also been 
found in previous literature (e.g. Garnefski et al., 2001). Studies have also used catastrophising 
to successfully predict depression scores after six and ten week periods (Abela, 2001; Abela & 
Sarin, 2002). While these results suggest that catastrophising is responsible for low mood, this 
methodology was not conclusive alone. Therefore, to triangulate catastrophising’s causal role 
in low mood this experimental manipulation was conducted. The moderate effect sizes 
between groups for both positive and negative affect (d>.5) suggest that catastrophising does 
cause lower mood.  
  This contributes to the current understanding of catastrophising in the context of low 
mood (i.e. depression, anxiety and stress) which further highlights its potential as a target for 
psychotherapeutic intervention. Currently catastrophising is either not targeted by current 
emotion regulation therapies (such as ART, ERT) or is indirectly targeted as a cognitive error 
through therapies, such as CBT. One approach that does directly target catastrophising is 
Metacognitive Therapy for Anxiety and Depression. This approach towards treating 
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catastrophising through the use of probabilities was used as one task for the University of 
Reading: Catastrophising App (UoR:C; see Chapter Six, Measures).  
 Furthermore, this study also contributes to emotion regulation literature by bringing a 
deeper and wider understanding of these implications. Currently, the majority of the literature 
focuses on several main strategies including: suppression and reappraisal (e.g. Gross, 2002); 
and rumination and distraction (e.g. Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). 
Mindfulness approaches have also generated interest in acceptance (e.g. Liverant, Brown, 
Barlow, & Roemer, 2008). However, research into catastrophising has remained relatively 
superficial, despite its repeated clinical implications in previous studies. This study is just one 
step towards a more thorough understanding.  
While this experimental manipulation is novel within this area of the catastrophising 
literature, the experimental manipulation of catastrophising in pain contexts is not (e.g. 
Sullivan et al., 1995). In the context of non-pain related depression and anxiety, this study 
suggests that catastrophic interpretations can directly change an individual’s mood in the 
short term (<10 minutes).  Rather than the previous associations with anxiety and depression 
scores in non-experimental cross-sectional studies (e.g. Chapter Two, Hiller, Lovato, Gradisar, 
Oliver, & Slater, 2014; Noël, Francis, Williams-Outerbridge, & Fung, 2012).  
 Due to the limited literature in catastrophising and very limited research into 
catastrophising’s experimental effects, this study is an initial step into this area. One limitation 
resulting from this aim is the paradigm created to test catastrophising. The novelty of this 
catastrophising context meant that we did not know the potential effect size being measured. 
Previous studies into catastrophising found medium to large effects between CERQ’s 
catastrophising subscale and depression or anxiety (e.g. Chapter Two and Garnefski, Kraaij, & 
Spinhoven, 2001). Previous pain studies, such as Severeijns, Van Den Hout, & Vlaeyen (2005) 
also found a medium to small effect size in their experimental testing of pain catastrophising. 
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However, this study found only a small effect size. This could be somewhat addressed in future 
studies through the same paradigm with a larger sample size, to test the effect’s reliability. 
However, the paradigm could also be improved. Video clips were chosen because they are 
frequently found to be very effective mood inducers (Westermann, Spies, Stahl & Hesse, 
1996). A variety of counterbalanced clips were also chosen to include at least one relatable 
scenario to most participants. Yet while both groups were required to empathise with the 
storytellers in each clip to make the groups more comparable, the overall effect sizes were 
restricted to the empathy of each participant. Therefore, a more effective design might be to 
reproduce a very similar study using a presentation task instead. Where both groups are 
required to present some information to a small group and one group is required to generate 
catastrophic interpretations. 
 Another method that could be applied to either the video clip or presentation task is 
using an active alternative as well as, or instead of, a control group. This is a common method 
applied in emotion regulation, where studies investigating the effectiveness of reappraisal 
often contrast with expressive suppression (e.g. Gross, 1998). Studies into rumination also use 
distraction as an adaptive alternative (e.g. Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, 2008). Catastrophising 
experiments could apply minimisation as a generally adaptive alternative, which we would 
predict to result in a larger difference and effect size. While these methods tend to find more 
pronounced differences, a control group is still required to identify which of the two 
alternatives is responsible for the majority of the mood change. Therefore, it is not a complete 
solution but the difference between two active strategies may provide more ecological validity 
than comparing the mood difference between a catastrophiser and an individual not actively 
regulating emotion.  
 These future studies aim to either increase reliability or further triangulate 
catastrophising’s relationship with mood through a similar approach. Chapter Six continues 
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this theme with an inverted premise by instead treating catastrophising and measuring the 
effect of its treatment on mood.  
 A limitation of this study is the use of self-report measures of mood and the contents 
of those measures. Self-report measures of mood are highly dependent on an individual’s 
awareness and understanding. Furthermore, the measure of mood, PANAS, represents a very 
general set of emotions that may not best represent the emotions being manipulated by this 
task. The use of this measure over a measure specific to this study may also be responsible for 
a lower effect size than expected. Finally, as the most important aspect of this experiment, the 
individual catastrophising, is not visible to the experimenter we assume task compliance. This 
study did attempt to control for task compliance by requiring participants to explain how they 
catastrophised in each clip and all participants appeared to do so. Finally, no participants were 
able to correctly guess the purpose of the study and almost all thought it was a cognitive and 
memory task. 
4.4.1 Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, this study is a first step into investigating catastrophising’s causal role in 
mood change. This study replicated previous findings in a pain context (Severeijns, Van Den 
Hout, & Vlaeyen, 2005) and follows previous cross-sectional studies associating 
catastrophising with depression and anxiety (e.g. chapter two and Garnefski, Kraaij, & 
Spinhoven, 2001). However, this area is sparse in research and more studies are required to 
replicate this study as well as improve its design in different contexts. Furthermore, more 
testing in contexts with greater personal relevance to the participant (such as presentation 
tasks) will increase our breadth of understanding of this effect. 
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5 Chapter Five: Developing the Catastrophising Questionnaire (CQ) 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 Questionnaire based assessments of catastrophising are confined to three measures, 
the Pain Catastrophising Scale (PCS; Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik, 1995); the Cognitive Emotion 
Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001) and the Cognitive 
Errors Questionnaire (CEQ; Lefebvre, 1981). However, in both the CERQ and CEQ 
catastrophising is just one subscale. Each of these questionnaires was also developed for 
different purposes. The CEQ directly applies Beck’s (1979) cognitive errors to better 
understand the onset or maintenance of depression but the CERQ applied previous coping and 
early emotion regulation literature to better research emotion regulation concepts in a broad 
array of traits (such as depression and anxiety). The PCS was developed to facilitate research 
on how catastrophising impacts pain experience, specifically with regard to chronic pain and 
its psychotherapeutic treatment. 
 The PCS defines catastrophising as an “exaggerated negative mental set brought to 
bear during actual or anticipated painful experience” (Sullivan et al., 2001). While this 
definition is highly specific in context and only focused on negative emotion, the PCS is a broad 
scale. Out of the three questionnaires reviewed, this definition appears to be the closest to 
Beck’s (1979) emphasis on magnification. The scale has been reliably split into three factors, 
rumination, magnification and helplessness (for child version see: Crombez et al., 2003; For 
adult version see: Sullivan et al., 1995). Of the 13 items only three belong to the magnification 
factor. While catastrophising can reasonably have both ruminative and hopeless elements, the 
breadth of these elements dominates the questionnaire. Rumination is distinct from 
catastrophising because it is cyclical thought, rather than catastrophising, which better 
represents a spiral due to its magnification component. Similarly, hopelessness can involve 
magnification but does not require it and hopelessness necessitates a maladaptive 
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acceptance, which catastrophising does not. In sum, only four items (3, 4, 6 and 13) indicate an 
exaggeration of a negative state, which does not fully align with the magnification factor (6, 7 
and 13). However, some other items could represent catastrophising depending on the 
context of the thought process (such as in response to a paper cut but not a car accident). This 
suggests that the PCS may be better explained as measuring maladaptive reactions to pain, 
rather than specifically catastrophising. When creating the CERQ, Garnefski, Kraaij, & 
Spinhoven (2001) reviewed previous questionnaires with catastrophising items (including the 
PCS), they claimed “none of the coping measures we consulted, however, include items 
referring to catastrophic thoughts.” This is a stronger opinion than we propose, as some PCS 
items do specify magnification. 
The CERQ alternately defines catastrophising as thoughts that explicitly emphasise the 
terror of an experience (Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001). This different definition may 
help to explain their stance on the PCS. The standard version of the CERQ contains a 4 item 
catastrophising subscale. Upon initial validation, this subscale demonstrated acceptable 
validity (Cronbach’s alpha = .72), which was replicated by Garnefski & Kraaij (2006) when 
creating the short 2-item subscale (Cronbach’s alpha =.79; short version Cronbach’s alpha 
=.81). While the CERQ’s catastrophising items reflect the author’s definition, they are 
insensitive to specific contexts but strong at generalising.  
 While the CEQ was created from Beck’s (1979) cognitive errors in depression, two 
versions were initially created, a CEQ for general life experiences and a CEQ for chronic low 
back pain (LBP CEQ) (Lefebvre, 1981). During validation Lefebvre (1981) found no significant 
difference in cognitive errors between depressed individuals and depressed individuals with 
chronic pain. However, at initial validation, each group (depressed/no pain; depressed/pain; 
non-depressed/no pain; non-depressed/pain) contained no more than 30 participants. This is 
significantly less than required for modern questionnaire development, where at least 7-10 
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participants are suggested per item (Field, 2009). The CEQ used 24 items for around 30 
participants. A later German translation validation by Pössel (2008) used 796 participants and 
found that the initial factor structure bordered on acceptable model of fit (CFI=.794, where >.8 
is considered acceptable (Hu & Bentler, 1999)).  
Unlike the PCS or CERQ, the CEQ measures cognitive errors through a vignette (several 
sentences describing a scenario) based questionnaire followed by potential interpretations. 
The CEQ treats catastrophising as anticipation or interpretation of an event as a catastrophe 
and the subscale contains six items. A vignette based approach is typical method to measure 
cognitive bias, as biases require specific context. However, when measuring catastrophising 
from an emotion regulation perspective, both the PCS and CERQ focus more generally on how 
often they may have specific thoughts in response to negative situations or pain (rather than 
vignettes). While this approach is at the cost of context, it also theoretically allows much 
greater generalisation and is less susceptible to specific triggers.   
 The aim of this study is to create a new catastrophising questionnaire, measuring 
catastrophising from an emotion regulation perspective. To develop from previous methods 
this questionnaire will aim to value both context and generalisation. The purpose behind this 
aim is to create a more robust, comprehensive and effective questionnaire specialised in 
catastrophising that tends to be normally distributed. This measure was then used in Chapter 
Six to measure catastrophising better than in previous Chapters. To achieve this, we created 
items from groups of situations and catastrophic thoughts participants commonly reported. 
Additionally, to make a catastrophising definition as accessible as possible to laymen, it was 
defined as generally assuming or seeing the worst. These items also contain examples given by 
participants to demonstrate catastrophising over general pessimism. To verify the creation of 
this questionnaire, it was correlated with the CERQ catastrophising and DASS subscales. 
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5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
 
 This study initially collected data from 75 people in the item generation phase to reach 
a natural saturation point. In the first questionnaire testing phase 143 people were recruited 
to ensure there were at least 10 participants per item (Field, 2009). Three participants were 
excluded due to no variety in responses and no participant took more than half an hour to 
complete the questionnaire, which was another exclusionary measure. In the second phase 
there were no exclusions and data was collected from 100 people. Participants from both 
phases were required to be over 16 and have a good understanding of English to participate. 
As each step of this study was conducted online through www.surveygizmo.com, participants 
were recruited through a series of websites: 
twitter.com/surveygizmo 
www.facebook.com/surveygizmo 
www.reddit.com/r/samplesize 
www.onlinepsychresearch.co.uk 
psych.hanover.edu/Research/expnnet.html 
 
5.2.2 Design 
 
 The Catastrophising Questionnaire (CQ) was created and validated in three testing 
phases (item generation, competing model testing and validation). Items were generated 
through a brief two item questionnaire where participants gave examples of how they 
catastrophised and in what context they commonly catastrophised. These responses were 
then grouped into themes and reduced into a 13 item questionnaire to best fit the data. In the 
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second phase this questionnaire was tested using competing factor models to select the best 
fit. In the final validation phase, the most successful two factor model was tested for fit and 
compared with other measures of emotion regulation as well as measures of depression, 
anxiety and stress for validity. 
5.2.3 Measures 
5.2.3.1  CQ – Item Generation 
 
 Due to a lack of previous trait based measures for catastrophising within the context 
of emotion regulation items were instead adapted from a small sample of the population. Due 
to the highly contextual nature of emotion regulation as well as the unique internal elements 
of catastrophising this was approached from two perspectives. Participants were initially 
presented with a definition of catastrophising and asked to provide three examples of 
situations that often was preceded by or resulted in catastrophic thinking to capture the 
contextual aspect of catastrophising (Appendix 39). Then, to identify the internal elements of 
catastrophising, participants were asked to provide three examples of thoughts they had when 
they catastrophised. Once the experimenter felt these responses had reached saturation 
(n=75) they were grouped into themes for each question. These themes were then combined 
across responses to both questions (if they were found to match) and formed into items. To 
make the items more specific and understandable three of the examples given for each theme 
were used as examples within the question (Appendix 40). Items could be rated from 0 (not at 
all) to 10 (all of the time). 
5.2.4  Convergent Validity 
 
 For both competing model testing and model validity testing other measures were 
also selected to test for convergent validity. The CERQ was chosen for its reliable four item 
catastrophising scale and its regular use within this thesis as a measure of catastrophising. The 
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DASS was also selected to test for expected correlations with depression, anxiety and stress, 
as well as for potential discriminate validity between CQ subscales. 
5.2.5 Procedure 
5.2.5.1  Item Generation 
 
Participants were initially taken to a page on www.surveygizmo.com providing 
information on the nature of the study and provide consent. Participants were also given an 
email address for further inquiry. Following this, participants were provided with a definition 
of catastrophising and two questions to complete (Appendix 39). Once this was completed, 
the participants were shown a debrief sheet and thanked for taking part. 
5.2.5.2  Competing Models and Validation 
 
 Participants were initially taken to a page on www.surveygizmo.com providing 
information on the nature of the study and provide consent. Participants were also given an 
email address for further inquiry. The first page of the study presented the questionnaire 
(Appendix 40). The second page contained the catastrophising scale of the CERQ and the final 
study page contained the DASS. Once completed the participants were shown a debrief sheet 
and thanked for taking part. 
5.2.6  Statistical Analysis 
 
The Data from the initial questionnaire was downloaded from surveygizmo directly 
into .csv format, where participant checks and exclusions were made for incomplete 
responses, time taken and the same response throughout. The remaining data was exported 
into SPSS 21 to check for item skew, kurtosis and variance. Once found to be normally 
distributed, an exploratory factor analysis was carried out to identify the factor structure for 
competing models using eigenvalues greater than one and the scree plot. The identified 
models were then checked for reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) and entered as structural equation 
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models in AMOS SPSS 21. For the validation stage, following participant checks, items were 
again checked for skew, kurtosis and variance. The factors were then checked for reliability 
and tested through structural equation modelling. To assess convergent validity, Pearson’s 
correlations were carried out between CQ total score; CQ subscales; CERQ catastrophising 
subscale; DASS distress score and DASS subscale scores. To measure divergent validity partial 
Pearson’s correlations were carried out for each CQ subscale with the other measures, 
controlling for the other CQ subscale. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Item generation 
 
 Participant responses were listed for both questions and then coded into themes 
(Situations, Appendix 41 & Thoughts, Appendix 42). These themes were then combined across 
both questions and formulated into items, using three of the participant responses as 
examples for each new item. The identified themes were health, achievement, control, 
embarrassment, rhetorical, self-criticism, organisation, helpless, safety, social, finance, 
confrontation and personal. 
5.3.2 Competing models 
5.3.2.1 Item checks 
 
 All items in the CQ elicited responses across the full range of the 10-point scale 
suggesting good item variance and sensitivity, with the mean score for each item between 4-5. 
Normalised Item skew was found to be within an acceptable range (<2, Fabrigar et al., 1999) 
for all items except for personal (2.64) although skew >3 is considered unacceptable. All  items 
were found to have acceptable normalised kurtosis (<7 Fabrigar et al., 1999) indicating no 
severe departures from normality (Appendix 43).  
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5.3.2.2  Identification of Competing Models 
 
 All CQ items were entered into a principal components analysis (PCA) with promax 
rotation to account for anticipated relationships between factors. Initial analysis supported 
the data’s sample size suitability for PCA where Keiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) = .880, which is 
considered ‘great’ (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Additionally, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity 
was highly significant (p<.001) further indicating suitability for PCA. To select the number of 
models to be tested against each other, eigenvalues greater than one suggested both one and 
two factor solutions were acceptable (Appendix 44) where a two factor solution accounted for 
approximately 10% more of the variance (52%). The factor structure for the two factor 
solution is also found in Appendix 45. To prepare the two factor model for competing model 
testing, items with loadings greater than .25 in both subscales were excluded. This led to the 
removal of items 3 (achievement), 8 (embarrassment) and 13 (helpless). 
5.3.2.3  One Factor Model  
 
 Reliability was calculated through Cronbach’s alpha (.885), which was within the 
acceptable range (.7-.9, Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). No item exclusions were found to improve 
this result (Appendix 46). Inter-item correlation was acceptable (>.5) for all items except 
question 4 (confrontation, .440). 
 Structural equation modelling was carried out (see Figure 5.1) and initial Chi-square 
tests of the model were found to be highly significant (χ2(65, n = 143) = 184.119, p < .001), 
which can indicate poor model fit, though this effect is directly exacerbated by sample size. 
The comparative fit index (CFI) for the one factor model was found to be below the acceptable 
range (>.8 Hu & Bentler, 1999) at .779. 
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Figure 5.1 Structural equation model of the one factor model. N=143 
 
5.3.2.4 Two Factor Model 
 
The two subscales were named by the items they contained, the three-item subscale 
was named ‘Health and Safety’ and the bigger subscale named ‘General’.  Reliability was 
calculated through Cronbach’s alpha (Health & Safety, .820; General, .814), where both were 
found to be within the acceptable range (.7-.9, Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). No item exclusions 
were found to improve this result for the General subscale (Appendix 47). Although, the 
Health and Safety subscale could be improved by the removal of question 5 (Control), which 
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was then removed. Inter-item correlation was acceptable (>.5) for all items in the Health and 
Safety subscale but two items on the General subscale were below (.467 & .456) (Appendix 
47). 
 Structural equation modelling was carried out (see Figure 5.2) and initial Chi-square 
tests of the model were not significant (χ2(26, n = 143) = 34.940, p = .113), which indicates a 
good model fit despite the large sample size. The comparative fit index (CFI) for the two factor 
model was found to be above the acceptable range and demonstrated good model fit (good 
>.95 Hu & Bentler, 1999) at .973. This strongly suggests the superiority of a two factor model 
solution. 
 
Figure 5.2 Structural equation model of the two factor model. N=143 
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5.3.3 Two Factor Validation 
5.3.3.1 Item Checks 
 
All items in the CQ elicited responses across the full range of the 10 point scale 
suggesting good item variance and sensitivity, with the mean score for each item at 
approximately 4. Item skew was found to be within an acceptable range (<2, Fabrigar et al., 
1999) for all items. All  items were found to have acceptable kurtosis (<7 Fabrigar et al., 1999) 
indicating no severe departures from normality (Appendix 48). There were 100 participants. 
5.3.3.2  Reliability and Structural Equation Modelling 
 
Reliability was calculated through Cronbach’s alpha (Health & Safety, .820; General, 
.832), where both were found to be within the acceptable range (.7-.9, Tavakol & Dennick, 
2011). No item exclusions were found to improve this result for the General or Health and 
Safety subscale (Appendix 49). Inter-item correlation was acceptable (>.5) for all items in the 
Health and Safety subscale but one item on the General subscale was just below (.460) 
(Appendix 49). 
 Structural equation modelling was carried out (see Figure 2) and initial Chi-square 
tests of the model was significant (χ2(26, n = 100) = 46.600, p <.05), which can indicate a poor 
model fit, but is highly sensitive to sample size. The CFI for the two factor model was found to 
be above the acceptable range (>.8) and just below good (>.95) at .941, which validates the 
two factor model. 
5.3.3.3 Convergent and Divergent Validity 
 
Alongside completing the CQ in both the competing models and validation phase 
participants completed the 4 item CERQ subscale for catastrophising and the 21 item DASS (n= 
244). Both CQ subscales were shown to have good correlations with the CERQ subscale 
(Health and Safety, .456; General, .475). All measures of catastrophising were found to be 
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significantly correlated with DASS subscales, where the General subscale showed the strongest 
correlations. For further analysis on the two subscales for divergent validity both CQ subscales 
were correlated with the other variables whilst partialing out the other subscale (Table 2), 
showing that whilst Health and Safety retains some correlation with the CERQ catastrophising 
scale, it only independently maintains a small correlation with anxiety. 
Table 5.1 Pearson Correlations of the CQ (and its subscales) with other scales (n=243) 
 CQ  
Total 
CQ  
Health 
& 
Safety 
CQ  
General 
CERQ 
Catastro
phising 
DASS  
Depression 
DASS 
Anxiety 
DASS 
Stress 
DASS  
Total 
Distress 
CQ  Total 1 .722 .968 .521 .568 .494 .558 .617 
CQ  Health 
& Safety 
.722 1 .526 .456 .356 .372 .328 .386 
CQ  
General 
.968 .526 1 .475 .570 .472 .565 .617 
CERQ  
Catastroph
ising 
.521 .456 .475 1 .406 .383 .341 .422 
All correlations significant at <.001 
Table 5.2 Pearson Partial Correlations of the CQ subscales with other scales (n=243) 
 Partial 
for 
CERQ 
Catastrophising 
DASS  
Depression 
DASS 
Anxiety 
DASS 
Stress 
DASS  
Total 
Distress 
CQ Health 
& Safety 
CQ 
General 
.273** .079 .145* .054 .099 
CQ 
General 
CQ 
Health & 
Safety 
.316** .481** .349** .488** .529** 
** <.001, *<.05 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
 This study generated, tested and verified a two-factor questionnaire measuring 
catastrophising, where one two-item factor measured health and safety and the other items 
clustered together in a general factor. The two-factor model showed good to acceptable 
model fit and a normal distribution in both phases. Inter-item reliability and correlation were 
also acceptable in both validation and confirmation stages.  
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 The total CQ scores demonstrated a large correlation (>.5; Cohen, 1988) with the 
CERQ’s catastrophising subscale, suggesting construct validity beyond the face validity of the 
items. Convergent validity was also found between the CQ with the DASS subscales and total 
scores, where each correlation was large, except for anxiety, which bordered on a large 
correlation. Also, for the same participants the CERQ found only medium correlation sizes with 
DASS subscales (>.3; Cohen, 1988). This demonstrates a higher sensitivity in the CQ to mental 
health indicators, without any symptomatic overlap between the CQ and DASS. 
 The two CQ subscales were significantly correlated with all measures of the DASS. 
However, when the correlations were carried out for both subscales partialling out the other 
subscale, they demonstrated discriminant validity. The general subscale was reduced to 
moderate correlation sizes with all subscales but maintained a large correlation with the total 
DASS distress score. However, the health and safety subscale had only one small correlation 
with DASS subscales (where anxiety was >.1; Cohen, 1988). This suggests that catastrophising 
about a health and safety issue is less maladaptive in a normal population compared to 
general catastrophising. It is possible that catastrophising about health and safety issues may 
have some adaptive aspects in anticipating threats that may be within the individual’s locus of 
control. This would make its use more likely to be adaptive and working as evolutionarily 
intended (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). Alternatively, the immediacy of health and safety issues 
may reduce their impact in long-term mood, resulting in less association with trait measures of 
depression, anxiety and stress. This may mean that catastrophising regardless of context is 
equally distressing but health and safety issues lack a long-term component. This could be 
tested experimentally by creating relevant health and safety issues and measuring their direct 
impact on mood. If health and safety catastrophising has a similar effect on mood to a general 
catastrophising group, this would support the hypothesis that catastrophising in both contexts 
is equally distressing. Therefore, the absent association between catastrophising with 
depression, stress and to some extent anxiety may be due to differences in duration. Further 
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study could also test for catastrophising in hypomania, which may find a relationship more 
conclusively than the CERQ subscale in chapter two.  
 The items for the CQ were created by grouping catastrophising examples given by 
participants in the first phase into themes. This data was collected until a saturation point had 
been reached. As this data was collected from a variety of websites from the United States and 
the United Kingdom, we predict that this questionnaire should demonstrate reliability in both 
populations. The items and examples were also chosen to represent a range of examples to 
avoid cultural specificity. However, if choosing to apply this questionnaire to a different 
culture it would need to be validated again, and if it failed validation, a repeat of phase one 
may better highlight themes or examples relevant to that population. 
 A potential limitation of this questionnaire is that participants may interpret the items 
to represent general pessimism rather than catastrophising. Although the focus of each item 
on the worst that could happen and the given examples should reduce any tendency towards 
general pessimism. The primary difference between pessimism and catastrophising is that 
while pessimism is expecting something negative, catastrophising is expecting the worst. The 
definition used by the questionnaire also best resembles Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery's (1979) 
definition as a cognitive error dwelling on the worst possible outcome. 
 A second limitation of this study, shared by other catastrophising questionnaires is its 
specificity on the negative aspects of magnification. Further examination of this questionnaire 
into hypomania in bipolar disorder could untangle the relationship between positive 
magnification and catastrophising. As there is no questionnaire known to the author that 
directly measures magnification in hypomania or mania, one could be created with the same 
methodology as this questionnaire, except with a positive emotion focus and using individuals 
with high scoring hypomania or diagnosed with bipolar disorder. It would be intuitive to 
predict that individuals with bipolar who tend to magnify in one direction would tend to do it 
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in the reverse. This is because emotion regulation strategies can become maladaptive when 
generalised across many contexts (Gross, 1998) so individuals diagnosed with bipolar would be 
more likely to generalise this strategy inappropriately. This study could also a take a 
community population to identify if this relationship is also present there. However, Chapter 
Two’s results regarding hypomania would suggest that this is not the case. If this stands up to 
replication, then bipolar patients would be identifiable by a generalised use of magnification. 
5.4.1 Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, the CQ has demonstrated its validity and subscale reliability ready for 
use in Chapter Six. One of the key aims of this questionnaire was to keep context as relevant 
as in the PCS. We feel that we have maintained this by keeping the items context specific to 
cover the range of catastrophising reported by a representative sample of the population. This 
simultaneously maintains the strength of the generalisation of how individuals catastrophise 
that the CERQ subscale demonstrates, but in greater depth than a four item subscale.  
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6 Chapter Six: A Catastrophising Intervention 
6.1 Introduction  
 
 The second chapter of this thesis found significant correlations between 
catastrophising and depression, anxiety and stress. This result replicated previous findings in 
the literature (e.g. Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001; Garnefski & Kraaij, 2007; Garnefski, 
Legerstee, Kraaij, Van Den Kommer, & Teerds, 2002). Chapter five generated, tested and 
validated a new self-report measure of catastrophising for the present chapter and further 
replicated significant relationships between catastrophising and depression, anxiety and 
stress. In Chapter Four, actively catastrophising was found to reduce positive emotion and 
increase negative emotion in an experimental setting, suggesting a causal relationship 
between catastrophising and emotion experience. This result replicated similar results in pain 
research, but with a smaller effect size (such as: Severeijns, Van Den Hout, & Vlaeyen, 2005; 
Sullivan & D’Eon, 1990). The current study continues to test the causal relationship 
catastrophising has on mood, this time through a smart phone intervention. This was done by 
training individuals in strategies to counter catastrophising could reduce catastrophising and 
consequently increase positive emotion as well as decrease negative emotion. This will build 
upon the evidence in this thesis towards the proposal that catastrophising is closely related to 
negative emotional states. Furthermore, it will highlight this area for future clinical interest. 
 The majority of current psychotherapeutic treatments have emotion regulation as a 
key component, as emotion dysregulation is central to many mental disorders (DSM-5; APA 
2013). While therapies such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1979) or Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993) at their core teach more 
adaptive emotion regulation strategies, they were not developed from the emotion regulation 
literature. Instead these therapies were developed from prior theories that have many 
consequences for emotion regulation. Affect Regulation Training (ART; Berking et al., 2008), 
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outlined in Chapter One, is one of the two main emotion regulation therapies that was directly 
developed from the emotion regulation literature. While the ART model is provided through 
intensive group sessions, its module based approach to emotion regulation provides a simple 
and clear structure building from awareness and understanding to more complex strategies 
such as reappraisal and confronting challenges to meet goals (Berking & Whitley, 2014).  
The ART programme is an intensive six week training regimen, which requires practice 
of the whole ART sequence for approximately 20-30 minutes per day. Furthermore, in their 
own time clients are required to engage in at least three exercises lasting from three seconds 
to three minutes. Clients also receive homework, handouts, an information booklet, audio files 
and 140 text messages to prompt activity or provide information during the training (Berking 
& Whitley, 2014). The ART structure of specific skill focused modules contrasts with the other 
primarily emotion regulation based intervention, Emotion Regulation Therapy (ERT; Mennin & 
Fresco, 2014). ERT was designed as an addition to a normal CBT programme for comorbid 
depression and anxiety. In addition to completing a CBT course, ERT clients attend extra 
sessions to cover: the motivational mechanisms behind behaviour; different regulation 
methods and their emotional consequences in context. Both of these treatments are relatively 
intensive and train a variety of emotion regulation strategies during these sessions, where this 
study aims to teach exclusively on catastrophising and its prevention. Therefore, a low 
intensity approach would better fit the requirements for this intervention than the structures 
applied by current emotion regulation treatments. Conceptually, this study is investigating at 
the scale of a module rather than a fully rounded intervention. 
6.1.1 Interventions as Smartphone Applications 
 
In recent years many low intensity interventions have begun to use technology as a 
delivery method (Comer, 2015). Psychological interventions carried out on these devices, 
which include text message as well as application based interventions, are often described as 
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‘mHealth’ or ‘eHealth’. mHealth has been defined by Kay, Santos, & Takane (2011) as the use 
of mobile and wireless methods to attain health objectives. These are widely available to the 
population. In the first quarter of 2015 66% of British citizens owned a smartphone, where 
90% fall within the 16-34 years of age (Ofcom, 2015). Regarding mHealth, there has been a 
wide discussion in the literature regarding empirical testing in technology-enhanced services 
(e.g. Jones et al., 2013; Proudfoot et al., 2010; Ritterband, Thorndike, Cox, Kovatchev, & 
Gonder-Frederick, 2009). However, ongoing developments in mHealth appear to have little 
regard for these conceptual foundations (Jones et al., 2014).  
Many of these applications rely on core aspects of a variety of effective practices, 
often including features such as mood tracking, scheduling pleasant activities and social 
strategies training (for more examples see: Luxton, McCann, Bush, Mishkind, & Reger, 2011). 
However, both Luxton et al., (2011) and Jones et al., (2014) suggest that many developers did 
not fully comprehend the conceptual underpinnings of these strategies in a mental health 
context, or the probable real life challenges clients will face. An example used by Jones et al., 
(2014) is Behavioural Parent Training (BPT), which is a common approach for disruptive 
behaviour disorders in children (Chorpita et al., 2011) that has been made digital. One 
component if this training is a ‘time-out’ strategy to create effective consequences for child 
problem behaviours. This approach deals with challenging behaviour by removing both 
positive and negative attention to change the parent-child relationship, which results in 
changed child behaviour. Many mobile applications have been created for parents to use. 
However, their primary role is often tracking time-out time and how long the child should 
remain in time-out, based on age. Yet research has found that this does not match the actual 
challenges of parents, where a child may refuse to go to time-out or escalates problem 
behaviour while in time-out (Jones et al., 2013). This behaviour often elicits attention from the 
parent, continuing the problem the intervention is supposed to prevent. These specific and 
individualised issues can easily be lost when just translating core concepts to mobile 
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platforms. Therefore, when bringing an emotion regulation intervention onto a mobile 
platform, it is a high priority to ensure that its content matches its purpose and it functions as 
intended in context. Additionally, if an intervention is streamlined for smartphone application 
delivery, it can be at the cost of key complexity. 
Although many studies have been conducted using text messaging or basic reminders 
to assist with therapeutic delivery, such as ART, relatively few have experimentally tested 
smartphone applications beyond pilot studies or feasibility work (Jones et al., 2014). One pilot 
study by Rizvi, Dimeff, Skutch, Carroll, & Linehan (2011) developed a DBT coach for women 
with comorbid borderline personality and substance use disorders (n=22). Progress in DBT is 
contingent on the client’s ability to generalise DBT skills to everyday life. So the DBT coach was 
developed as a feedback tool for in-vivo skill use and development. The coach also provided 
help during crisis to avoid dysfunctional behaviour. When activated the DBT coach asked 
participants to identify the negative emotion they were currently experiencing and if they 
wished to change the emotion. If the participant responded ‘yes’ they would be directed to a 
list of emotion specific opposite action behaviours (for example not shouting at someone 
when angry but walking away). If the participant selected ‘no’ the participant was directed to 
create a list of pros and cons for changing the emotion. They also had the option of 
calling/ringing the therapist if the pros and cons list was not helpful. Participants used the DBT 
coach an average of 15 times over an average of 13 days. The study found that the use of the 
application was associated with decreased emotion intensity, decreased substance urges and 
decreased distress. Two notable strengths of this application compared to the BPT applications 
mentioned previously, are its adaptability to the client’s needs and the aims of the application 
match the intervention’s conceptual foundations. However, this application was designed to 
be in parallel with ongoing DBT treatment, rather than the standalone approach intended by 
this intervention. This allowed the DBT coach to be highly specific and functional, where a 
standalone app should provide some measure of psychoeducation. This should convey its 
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purpose and emphasise its proper use, whilst considering context to compensate for the 
absence of an interactive therapist.  
 An example of an application that can be used as a standalone or in conjunction with 
therapy is the PTSD Coach. For a therapeutic application it has seen wide scale use (as of 
November 2013, 130,000 downloads, see Kuhn et al., 2014). It was developed by the Veteran 
Association’s National Center for PTSD-Dissemination and Training Division (see 
www.ptsd.va.gov/public/pages/PTSDcoach.asp). The application was created through input 
from PTSD patients in focus groups (n=78) and clinical staff (n=5). The application contains 
four components: Learn, Self-Assessment, Manage Symptoms and Find Support. The Learn 
section provides psychoeducation about PTSD, frequently asked questions and various 
treatment options with what to expect. Self-Assessment includes a PTSD checklist with 
feedback, which can be completed multiple times to see progress on a line graph. The Manage 
Symptoms section provides tools to help cope with acute PTSD symptoms. Where the user can 
select their problem, rate their distress and are taken to a relevant CBT-based coping tool. 
Finally, the Find Support option offers users crisis lines and select supportive friends from their 
contact lists. Although the application is based on effective scientific constructs and is 
widespread, the only clinical testing of it has been by Kuhn et al., (2014) on a sample of 45 
participants. Unlike many mHealth applications this application has a considered structure, 
which is well derived from the literature. Therefore, the structure of the application and their 
delivery of psychoeducation was used to inform this study’s intervention.   
This introduction is only intended to give a brief summary on the current state of 
smartphone interventions. A very large number of intervention applications have been 
created. Many of these are based on clinically effective strategies but only a handful have 
been experimentally tested (Jones et al., 2014). This clear absence of the scientific process in 
many applications can be expected from a delivery method that is in its first decade. Both 
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psychological and medical disciplines will take time to create scientifically rigorous 
applications, resulting in the domination of untested applications in the early market. One risk 
is that untested applications may not work and cause a loss of confidence in this delivery 
method. However, more importantly, the complete lack of universal standards of care or 
ethical considerations in the current market is concerning. These applications target 
vulnerable people searching for help or to better understand themselves and these people 
should be protected. Ideally, an existing or new scientific body could create a set of scientific 
and ethical standards that applications could apply for to demonstrate their safety and 
effectiveness to customers. 
6.1.2 Aim 
 
 The aim of this study is to investigate whether individuals who are trained to 
adaptively reduce and counter catastrophising will be less likely to catastrophise compared to 
a control group. But primarily, if the intervention successfully reduces catastrophising, the 
study will observe whether a reduction in catastrophising behaviours and thinking will improve 
their mood. Both groups will use a mobile platform that has been specifically designed for the 
current study.  
 This application has been structured using a similar design to the PTSD coach. 
However, instead of being divided into four sections, this application is divided into five major 
sections. These are elaborated on in the Measures section of the Method. The first section 
provides information about the application and psychoeducation. The second section contains 
the four main tasks (goals, accepting catastrophising, using probabilities and what if 
scenarios). The third section contains notifications from the app. The fourth section contains a 
graph charting daily mood progress (negative and positive) and the final section contains the 
questionnaires (PANAS, CQ, DASS & final questions).  
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The first hypothesis is that catastrophising scores measured through the CQ can be 
significantly reduced through the training in this application compared to the control group. 
While the techniques applied in this application are drawn from existing therapies, their direct 
effect on catastrophising has not been tested. Additionally, the techniques have been tailored 
to this study to specifically target catastrophising. The second hypothesis is conditional on the 
first, which is provided that catastrophising is reduced, this application will improve symptoms 
associated with catastrophising (depression, anxiety and stress) compared to the control 
group. This is because earlier studies in this thesis have linked catastrophising with these traits 
and we predict that they are, to some extent, caused by catastrophising. Finally, we 
hypothesise that provided catastrophising is reduced, this application will improve overall 
mood compared to the control condition (decrease negative and increase positive PANAS 
scores) as previously demonstrated in reverse in Chapter Four.    
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
 
 This study recruited 107 participants, both from the University of Reading 
Research Panel (SONA) and from a list of websites for recruitment online, which are listed 
below. The application did not collect data on age or gender. 22 participants dropped out of 
the study and 27 were excluded for not completing all the questionnaires or duplicated 
usernames. From the remaining 58 (51 from the University of Reading) participants there were 
31 in the experimental condition and 27 in the control group. To achieve a medium effect size 
(0.3) with a power of 0.8 an a priori power analysis was conducted, which found that a total 
sample size of 62 participants were necessary. 
www.twitter.com  
www.reddit.com/r/samplesize 
www.onlinepsychresearch.co.uk/ 
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psych.hanover.edu/Research/exponnet.html  
www.facebook.com/onlinepsychologyresearch  
 
6.2.2 Design 
 
This study had two groups, the catastrophising group received treatment through the 
application and the control group also received the application, which also provided the 
psychoeducation. However, instead of teaching therapeutic strategies, participants were 
required to download and play mobile games to ensure that both groups are required to 
spend similar amounts of time on the application. Participants were assigned into the control 
or catastrophising group using a random number generator hidden in the application. This 
meant that neither the experimenter or the participant knew which group they had been 
placed in. The dependant variable to measure between group differences of catastrophising in 
hypothesis one was the Catastrophising Questionnaire (CQ) developed in Chapter Five. For 
hypothesis two the dependent variable to measure differences between groups was the 
Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21). In hypothesis three, between group mood 
comparisons were recorded through the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS). 
 
6.2.3 Materials and Apparatus  
6.2.3.1 Catastrophising Questionnaire (CQ) 
 
The CQ was developed in Chapter Five and consists of nine items, each can be scored 
from 0 (not at all) to 10 (all of the time) (Appendix 45). The final result of the CQ is the sum of 
these scores. The CQ has two identified subscales, Health and Safety (two items) and General 
(seven items), which can be totalled for subscale scores. See Chapter Five for more 
information. 
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6.2.3.2  Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21) 
 
For a review of the DASS-21 and its subscales, see chapter two. The DASS-21 consists 
of 21 items, each scored from 0 (Did not apply to me at all) to 3 (Applied to me very much, or 
most of the time). Each subscale (depression, anxiety and stress) contains seven items that can 
be added to make final subscale scores. See Chapter Two for more information (Appendix 4). 
6.2.3.3  Positive And Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) 
 
For a review of the PANAS, see chapter four. The PANAS consists of 20 items, each 
scored on a Likert scale from 1 (Very slightly or Not at all) to 5 (Extremely). The PANAS is 
comprised of two subscales, positive and negative, each the sum of 10 items. For this 
experiment the instructions for the PANAS were changed from “Indicate to what extent you 
feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment” to “Indicate to what extent you have 
felt this way today.” See Chapter Four for more information (Appendix 33). 
6.2.3.4  University of Reading: Catastrophising App (UoR:C) 
 
 The UoR:C was developed by the experimenter with assistance from FIZIX studios 
(http://www.fizixstudios.com/) and was only compatible with iTouch, iPhone and iPad 
software. One priority in the creation of the UoR:C was participant’s data security and ease of 
data collection. Therefore, the application was delivered differently to previous therapeutic 
applications. To achieve this the UoR:C firstly requires an account with a password to reach its 
content. Secondly, no passwords, or data beyond application structure, is stored within the 
UoR:C app but instead stored in a secure private server (http://reading.fizixstudios.com/). This 
method allowed for one application to be used for both the control and catastrophising 
conditions. As all content was drawn from the server, a new user would be assigned to a 
condition based on a random number generator within the server. This also meant that the 
experimenter had access to all of the data and had full control of the application during the 
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study. Another consequence of this design choice is that any cloud based system requires 
internet access to use. 
A more advanced module based structure of the PTSD coach (Kuhn et al., 2014) was 
developed for the UoR:C. The modules of the UoR:C were also required to be focused on 
catastrophising, so approaches were adapted from a variety of therapeutic sources (as 
discussed below). The final structure, which was identical for both conditions, consisted of five 
main sections, shown in Figure 6.1 below (for full application content see Appendix 50): 
 
Figure 6.1 Main menu of the UoR:C, where !’s mark items to be completed by the user 
  
 Introduction: The introduction section shown in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 was the 
same across both conditions. The only exception to this was some content within “About This 
App”, which introduced the appropriate control or experimental condition (see Appendix 50 
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for all Introduction content). The following two sections “What are emotions and how do they 
work?” were psychoeducation following a similar structure to ART (Berking & Whitley, 2014) 
but considerably more brief. In section one, there is a lay explanation of the underpinnings of 
emotion in the hypothalamus, amygdala, prefrontal cortex and hippocampus. Section two 
covers the evolutionary approach to emotion, explaining how many emotions can be adaptive 
in the right context. This aims to retrain individuals from seeing emotions as positive or 
negative to tools that need to be used appropriately to be adaptive. The final section was not 
directly drawn from pre-existing literature but gives a lay explanation of what catastrophising 
is, to give participants the foundations to take future steps in tackling it. See the Procedure for 
how many days into the intervention each section becomes available.   
Figure 6.2 Below is the Introduction screen and 
below right are the four subsections. All are 
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the same across groups, except for some details in 1 About This App.  
 
 
 Tasks: The Tasks section shown in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.3 were different between 
both conditions. Figure 6.3 shows the catastrophising condition, for each section the controls 
had four subtitles labelled tasks 1-4. Each contained a brief instruction to follow a provided 
URL and download a game to play for around 10-15 minutes a day until the next task (see 
Appendix 50 for text and game URLs). In the catastrophising condition the first section begins 
unlocked. “Developing Goals” was adapted from ART (Berking & Whitley, 2014) so participants 
will have a measurable, personally important and attainable goal to work towards. 
Additionally, the goal is to be stated in the positive (attaining something, such as becoming 
calm or happy) rather than negative (removing something, such as becoming less angry or less 
sad. Positive goals have been found to be effective and more effective than negative goals 
(Impett et al., 2010). Furthermore, the participant must set a time to be reminded of their goal 
each day. Therefore, instead of focusing on reducing catastrophising, participants focused on 
the positive consequences of reduced catastrophising as their goal. 
 The second task, “Acceptance” in this form was also developed from ART, with a 
catastrophising lens (Berking & Whitley, 2014). This exercise teaches participants to become 
more aware of their tendencies to catastrophise and provides the foundation for later tasks. 
The task requires the participant to use imagery to accept and distance themselves from their 
unwanted emotions and catastrophic thoughts. The third task “Using Probabilities” is derived 
from a task in Metacognitive Therapy for Anxiety and Depression (Wells, 2009) for reducing 
catastrophising. This section teaches participants how to calculate probabilities that their 
catastrophic beliefs might come true as a way to overcome the temptation to catastrophise. 
The final task unlocked is the “What If” task developed from CBT (Beck et al., 1979) where 
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participants are instructed to work out what might happen if the worst (catastrophic) 
consequences did happen and work out a plan B if it did happen. This aims to teach individuals 
to see their situation more objectively, therefore reducing negative emotion experience. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Below is the Tasks screen and below right are the four subsections for the 
catastrophising condition. For the control condition see Appendix 50.  
 
Reminders, Progress & Questionnaires: Reminders, as shown in Figure 6.1 and Appendix 50 are 
a list of outstanding activities (introduction reading, tasks or questionnaires). Progress shown 
in Figure 6.1 and in Figure 6.4 show the user’s daily PANAS positive and negative affect scores 
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throughout the intervention. This was designed to give the user instantaneous feedback on 
their progress. The final section, Questionnaires, contains all the measures described in the 
above section, which were activated on the relevant days (see Procedure). 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Example data on Progress graph of positive and negative affect PANAS scores. 
 
6.2.4 Procedure 
 
This experiment was conducted through the application that could be 
accessed/downloaded only by using an iTouch, iPhone or iPad already owned by the 
participants the application could be downloaded for free from the iStore (from 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/university-reading-catastrophising/id1000831997?mt=8). 
Consent was provided through the sign up process of the application. When signing up, the 
participants were randomly allocated to either the control or active condition by a random 
number generator in the server. The participants were unaware of this randomised process 
and the group they were assigned to until the conclusion of study. Both the control and 
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experimental groups had a 14 day duration with new information or tasks unlocking as the 
days progressed.  
On day one participants in both groups were able to read the ‘About this App’ section 
to gain a greater understanding of its purpose and how best to use it. Both groups also 
unlocked the first page of psychoeducation on emotion titled ‘What are emotions and how do 
they work? Day 1’. Both groups also had the first task unlocked for day one. The experimental 
condition unlocked the ‘Developing Goals’ whereas the control group unlocked their first 
game to play for 10-15 minutes each day. On day two both groups unlocked the ‘What are 
emotions and how do they work? Day 2’. Then the final page of psychoeducation unlocked on 
day three which was titled ‘What is catastrophising and magnification?’ 
 Following this, new tasks were unlocked for both groups on days four, eight and 
twelve. For the control group, each new task was a new game to play for at least 10 minutes 
each day until the next task unlocked. For the experimental group the following tasks were on 
days four; task titled ‘Accepting Catastrophising’; day eight task titled ‘Using Probabilities’ and 
day twelve task titled ‘What if?’. 
 In parallel to the psychoeducation and tasks, participants completed a range of 
questionnaire measures on specific days. The PANAS was completed on each day in the 
evening. Both the DASS and the Catastrophising Questionnaire were completed on day one, 
seven and fourteen following completion of the PANAS. On the final day participants were 
asked to complete some additional questions on how they experienced the app and were 
debriefed with appropriate support information (Appendix X). However, these final questions 
did not appear for the participants, which was not known until the experiment had concluded.  
6.2.5 Statistical Analysis 
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 The data collected from each participant was securely stored on a private server 
(http://reading.fizixstudios.com/) where it could be downloaded directly into .csv format. The 
data from both groups was separated and checked for missing data as well as non-compliance 
(repetitive responses). Total positive and negative PANAS scores were calculated for each day. 
Total and sub-scale scores were calculated for both CQ and DASS at each interval. The data 
was then exported into SPSS 21 to check normality through z-scored skewness and kurtosis in 
PANAS totals, CQ totals and DASS totals. Baselines for each measure (PANAS, DASS and CQ) 
were also tested for differences between groups by independent t-tests. 
 The first hypothesis, that the catastrophising intervention will reduce reported levels 
of catastrophising more than the control group. This was tested by a between group 2x3 
ANOVA of baseline, week one and week two CQ totals. Subsequently, contrasts were 
conducted for both conditions. 
 The second hypothesis, that a reduction in catastrophising would reduce depressive, 
anxious and stress symptoms were tested by a series of between group 2x3 ANOVAs for 
baseline, week one and week two DASS subscale scores. All ANOVAs for the first and second 
hypotheses proceeded by a between group t-test of week two scores. This post-hoc test was 
carried out if there was a significant interaction. This enables the understanding of whether 
any difference between groups was a product of the intervention. 
 The third hypothesis is that a reduction in catastrophising would increase positive 
mood and decrease negative mood. This is assessed through a pair of 2x14 ANOVAs. These are 
between groups and across all 14 time points for both positive and negative emotion. 
  
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Normality Checks 
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 Skewness and Kurtosis scores were calculated for a range of variables. The between-
group daily positive and negative PANAS means (see Appendix 54). The PANAS scores were 
broadly normal, however 10 of 56 were not. Compared to transformed data, this ratio of 
normal to non-normal was the best possible ratio of normal to non-normal scores. 
Additionally, all of the non-normal scores were relatively small, not beyond 3 or -3 z-scored. 
The weekly total and subscale CQ scores (baseline, week one and week two) and finally DASS 
subscale scores (baseline, week one and week two) all shown in Table 6.1 below. To prepare 
the non-normal DASS scores for ANOVA, the results were transformed. Both the square root 
and logarithmic transformations failed but reciprocal transformation was successful, as shown 
in Table 6.2. These conversions to z scores were made by dividing the kurtosis or skewness 
score by its standard error. 
Table 6.1 Z-scored kurtosis and skewness for CQ (total and both subscales) and DASS 
(subscales only). All z-scores between -1.96 and 1.96 are considered normal. N=58. 
Measure Skewness  Kurtosis Measure Skewness Kurtosis 
CQ – 
Baseline 
total  
-0.03 -1.05 DASS – 
Baseline 
Depression 
5.62* 5.42* 
CQ – 
Baseline 
Health and 
Safety  
0.41 -1.63 DASS – 
Baseline 
Anxiety 
4.70* 3.51* 
CQ – 
Baseline 
General  
0.23 -1.25 DASS – 
Baseline 
Stress 
2.70* 0.63 
CQ – Week 
1 total  
0.31 -0.78 DASS – 
Week 1 
Depression 
4.46* 3.17* 
CQ – Week 
1 Health 
and Safety 
0.69 -1.49 DASS – 
Week 1 
Anxiety 
4.318* 1.83 
CQ – Week 
1 General 
0.48 -0.98 DASS – 
Week 1 
Stress 
2.72* -0.52 
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CQ – Week 
2 total 
0.89 -0.73 DASS – 
Week 2 
Depression 
2.89* 0.16 
CQ – Week 
2 Health 
and Safety 
1.95 0.73 DASS – 
Week 2 
Anxiety 
8.74* 1.83 
CQ – Week 
2 General 
0.85 -1.03 DASS – 
Week 2 
Stress 
3.05* -0.52 
*indicates non-normal distribution 
 
Table 6.2 Z-scored kurtosis and skewness for DASS following reciprocal transformation 
(subscales only). n=58. 
Measure Skewness  Kurtosis Measure Skewness Kurtosis 
DASS – 
Baseline 
Depression 
1.07 -1.27 DASS – 
Week 1 
Stress 
0.10 -1.84 
DASS – 
Baseline 
Anxiety 
-0.18 -1.71 DASS – 
Week 2 
Depression 
0.73 -1.05 
DASS – 
Baseline 
Stress 
1.43 -1.38 DASS – 
Week 2 
Anxiety 
-1.45 -0.24 
DASS – 
Week 1 
Depression 
-0.87 -1.62 DASS – 
Week 2 
Stress 
-0.06 -1.62 
DASS – 
Week 1 
Anxiety 
-1.35 -1.72  
 
6.3.2 Impact of UoR:C on Catastrophising 
6.3.2.1 Baseline Tests 
 
Three between group baseline (day one) t-tests were conducted for total CQ, Health and 
Safety CQ and General CQ scales. No significant difference in baselines was found. Total CQ: 
t(55) = -.774, p=.442. Health and Safety: t(55) = -.673, p=.504. General: t(55) =-.901, p=.372. 
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6.3.2.2 CQ Total Scores between Groups over Time 
 
The data was analysed using a mixed-measures ANOVA, with a within-subjects factor of time 
(baseline, week one and week two) and between-subject factor of group (condition and 
control) (see Figure 6.5). Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not 
been violated. The main effect of time was significant, F(2, 110) = 12.59, p < .001, η2= .186. 
However, the main effect of group was an insignificant trend, F(2, 110) = 3.95, p = .052, η2= 
.067. The interaction of time and group was significant where, F(2, 110) = 3.74, p < .05, η2= 
.064. A post-hoc between groups t-test for week two scores found a significant difference 
where, t(55)= -3.45, p<.001, d=0.90. 
 
Figure 6.5 Total CQ scores by group and time. N=58. 
 
6.3.2.3 CQ Health & Safety Scores Between Groups over Time 
 
The data was analysed using a mixed-measures ANOVA, with a within-subjects factor of time 
(baseline, week one and week two) and between-subject factor of group (condition and 
control) (see Figure 6.6). Mauchly’s test was significant at p=.041. The main effect of time was 
significant, F(1.80, 98.99) = 5.48, p < .01, η2= .091. However, the main effect of group was non-
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significant, F(1, 55) = 3.79, p = .057, η2= .064. The interaction of time and group was also non-
significant, F(1.80, 98.99) = 1.01, p = .362, η2= .018.  
 
Figure 6.6 CQ Health & Safety scores by group and time. N=58. 
 
6.3.2.4 CQ General Scores Between Groups over Time 
 
The data was analysed using a mixed-measures ANOVA, with a within-subjects factor of time 
(baseline, week one and week two) and between-subject factor of group (condition and 
control) (see Figure 6.7). Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had not 
been violated. The main effect of time was significant; F(2, 110) = 11.88, p < .001, η2= .178. 
However, the main effect of group was an not significant, F(1, 55) = 3.51, p = .066, η2= .060. 
The interaction of time and group was significant where, F(2, 110) = 3.82, p < .05, η2= .065. A 
post-hoc between groups t-test for week two scores found a significant difference where, 
t(55)= -3.41, p<.001, d=0.89.  
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Figure 6.7 CQ General scores by group and time. N=58. 
 
6.3.3 Impact of UoR:C on Depression, Anxiety & Stress Symptoms 
6.3.3.1 Baseline Tests 
 
Three between group baseline (day one) t-tests were conducted for each DASS subscale. No 
significant difference in baselines were found. Depression: t(55) = -1.03, p=.307. Anxiety: t(55) 
= 1.28, p=.206. Stress: t(55) =-1.84, p=.072. 
6.3.3.2 DASS Depression Scores Between Groups over Time 
 
The data was analysed using a mixed-measures ANOVA, with a within-subjects factor of time 
(baseline, week one and week two) and between-subject factor of group (condition and 
control) (see Figure 6.8). Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been 
violated (p<.02), so Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied. The main effect of time was 
not significant, F(1.76, 96.95) = 1.66, p= .198, η2= .029. However, the main effect of group was 
significant, F(1, 55) = 5.10, p<.05, η2= .085. The interaction of time and group was significant 
where, F(2, 110) = 8.71, p < .01, η2= .137. A post-hoc between groups t-test for week two 
scores found a significant difference where, t(55)= -3.79, p<.001, d=1.00. 
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Figure 6.8 DASS depression scores by group and time following reciprocal transformation (y-
axis), where higher scores indicate a lower initial DASS score. N=58. 
 
6.3.3.3 DASS Anxiety Scores Between Groups over Time 
 
The data was analysed using a mixed-measures ANOVA, with a within-subjects factor of time 
(baseline, week one and week two) and between-subject factor of group (condition and 
control) (see Figure 6.9). Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been 
met. The main effect of time was significant, F(2, 110) = 3.12, p<.05, η2= .054. However, the 
main effect of group was not significant, F(1, 55) = 0.25, p=.621, η2= .004. The interaction of 
time and group was significant where, F(2, 110) = 4.23, p < .05, η2= .071. A post-hoc between 
groups t-test for week two scores found no significant difference where, t(33.24)= -1.89, 
p=.085. 
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
.20
Baseline Week One Week Two
Treatment
Control
 177 
 
 
Figure 6.9 DASS anxiety scores by group and time following reciprocal transformation, where 
higher scores indicate a lower initial DASS score. N=58. 
 
6.3.4 DASS Stress Scores Between Groups over Time 
 
The data was analysed using a mixed-measures ANOVA, with a within-subjects factor of time 
(baseline, week one and week two) and between-subject factor of group (condition and 
control) (see Figure 6.10). Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been 
met. The main effect of time was significant, F(2, 110) = 5.37, p<.01, η2= .089. However, the 
main effect of group was not significant, F(1, 55) = 0.50, p=.485, η2= .009. The interaction of 
time and group was significant where, F(2, 110) = 7.67, p < .001, η2= .122. A post-hoc between 
groups t-test for week two scores found a significant difference where, t(38.46)= -3.07, p<.01, 
d=0.84. 
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Figure 6.10 DASS stress scores by group and time following reciprocal transformation, where 
higher scores indicate a lower initial DASS score. N=58. 
 
6.3.5 Impact of UoR:C on Mood 
 
The PANAS positive data was analysed using a mixed-measures ANOVA, with a within-subjects 
factor of time (each of the 14 days) and between-subject factor of group (condition and 
control) (see Figure 6.11). Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been 
met. The main effect of time was not significant, F(13,728) = 1.17, p=.300, η2= .020. However, 
the main effect of group was significant, F(1, 56) = 47.13, p<.001, η2= .457. The interaction of 
time and group was also significant where, F(13, 728) = 3.28, p < .001, η2= .0.55.  
 
.00
.04
.08
.12
.16
Baseline Week One Week Two
Treatment
Control
0.
4.5
9.
13.5
18.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Condition
Control
 179 
 
Figure 6.11 Mean positive PANAS scores per day. N=58. 
 
The PANAS negative data was analysed using a mixed-measures ANOVA, with a within-
subjects factor of time (each of the 14 days) and between-subject factor of group (condition 
and control) (see Figure 6.11). Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had 
been met. The main effect of time was significant, F(13,728) = 2.78, p<.01, η2= .047. The main 
effect of group was also significant where, F(1, 56) = 10.47, p<.01, η2= .157. The interaction of 
time and group significant where, F(13, 728) = 5.37, p < .001, η2= .087.  
 
 
Figure 6.12 Mean negative PANAS scores per day. N=58. 
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6.4 Discussion 
 
 The UoR:C was created to test whether a community sample, trained to reduce and 
prevent catastrophising, would experience reduced levels of catastrophising, increased mood 
and less distress than a control group. The interaction between time and group established 
the effectiveness of the treatment between groups and over time. There was a significant 
interaction between groups and over time for total catastrophizing scores. The post-hoc tests 
for CQ total scores demonstrated a significant difference between groups at week two. These 
results support the first hypothesis, that the application would reduce the rate of 
catastrophising. Once the CQ was broken down into its two subscales, the General 
Catastrophising subscale retained a significant interaction. However, the Health and Safety 
subscale did not. This difference validates the original distinction made between subscales in 
Chapter Five. It also suggests that the application targeted General Catastrophising.  
 As the first hypothesis was confirmed (the UoR:C would significantly reduce 
catastrophising), further analysis into distress and mood was conducted. The interactions for 
each subscale (depression, anxiety and stress) were significant. However, the post-hoc tests at 
week 2 were only significant for depression and stress, not anxiety. These results indicate that 
training individuals in ways to dealing with catastrophising reduced general distress. Causality 
can be strongly indicated but not explicitly proven by self-reported scores that do not perfectly 
represent ‘true’ values. However, the results suggest that the application did cause a general 
reduction in depression, anxiety and stress scores as predicted. A measurable impact of the 
application at week two for depression and stress but anxiety was not expected. As there was 
a significant interaction for all three subscales, it would appear that the application had a 
smaller impact on anxiety scores. However, at this stage it is not possible to decipher if this is 
due to peculiarities in the sample, specificity of the application or a feature in the relationship 
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between anxiety, depression and stress concerning catastrophising. To ensure that this non-
significance is worth consideration, it should first be replicated by a future study. 
The third hypothesis, that the intervention would increase positive mood and 
decrease negative mood was upheld. Interestingly, the between group main effect for positive 
mood is very pronounced. However, for negative mood, participants in the condition only 
narrowly outperformed their control counterparts. Additionally, positive mood appears to be 
considerably more stable over time than negative mood. This suggests that the effect for 
positive mood will be easier to replicate and more indicative of a true effect. In the Broaden 
and Build Theory proposed by Fredrickson (2004) negative emotions are specific action 
tendencies, as they prime specific behaviours (e.g. escape, expel or attack). In threatening 
situations, these specific action tendencies narrow thought-action repertoires to promote 
quick and decisive action. Therefore, negative emotions are reactionary and specific. However, 
positive emotions rarely occur in threatening situations, which means that positive emotions 
do not need to narrow an individual’s thought-action repertoire for quick and decisive action. 
Instead positive emotions increase an individual’s thought-action repertoire, such as 
encouraging play and curiosity. The consequence of this is that positive emotions frequently 
build upon one another, whereas negative emotions are more situation specific. This effect is 
one possible explanation of the highly variable daily negative emotion, compared to the 
relatively stable positive emotion scores. 
6.4.1 Limitations 
 
While this study sought to develop upon previous interventions developed as mobile 
applications, it is not without limitations. One such limitation is the absence of data on how 
frequently individuals accessed the application. This includes, which aspects were most 
frequently accessed. While this is unlikely to invalidate the results of the study, it is likely to be 
its largest weakness for two reasons. Firstly, beyond completing questionnaires, it is unknown 
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whether participants read or applied any of the information or tasks provided. This may have 
had a dampening effect on the strength of the findings, particularly in distinguishing between 
groups. As undergraduates, completing the application for course credit, may have sought to 
do the minimum. However, it is equally likely that as participants knew the application was 
collecting data, they engaged with the application to ensure course credit. This problem 
cannot be answered, except that in future studies some measure of use would prevent it 
occurring again. This also reveals the potential of technology, if fully exploited. 
A second issue to arise is if the application was engaged in constructively, there is no 
record of what aspects individuals found most helpful. The application was designed to 
measure this as part of the exit questionnaire. But due to technical limitations these questions 
did not appear, and this did not come to the attention of the experimenter until the 
completion of the study. As a consequence, it is difficult to bring these results back to the 
wider literature in regards of what is the best way to tackle catastrophising. This application 
drew various aspects from a variety of interventions and theories. But without self-report 
measures on what was useful (and not useful) it is not possible to relate the findings to specific 
literature. However, this did not undermine the main aim, which was a test of whether 
catastrophising training is beneficial. 
The sample of the study was confined in two ways. The majority of participants that 
completed the study were undergraduates and the application was limited to Apple devices. 
As shown in Chapter Two, the undergraduate population demonstrated abnormally high levels 
of depression. Secondly, Apple users tend to represent higher socioeconomic status. For 
example, during December 2013 Android users spent an average of $48.10 per order 
compared to $93.94 by Apple users (Yarow, 2013). The sample for this experiment was 
restricted to Apple users due to time constraints. This is because Android applications have no 
standardisation (such as screen size) and consequently require more testing. However, a 
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future study could build on this application and include Android and Windows users as well. A 
simpler method of widening the sample would be to allow considerably more time for the 
experiment to be downloaded by a greater number of the public until they form a pre-
specified proportion of the sample.   
Another restriction imposed by the design of this study is the absence of any measure 
of long-term change for the participants. It is impossible to determine if the improvements 
demonstrated by the condition group are enduring. As the concept, has now been tested, 
future studies could simply prompt users (who still have the application installed) after one 
and then six months to complete the DASS and CQ measures. Based on the findings of the 
current study it could be predicted that after one month and six months the effects will be 
maintained but somewhat reduced over time. However, there is likely to be a high dropout 
rate, based upon the rate within the sample and from users uninstalling the application.  
While the aim of this experiment was to test the potential of catastrophising in a 
therapeutic setting, it is also testing the potential effectiveness of application-based 
treatment. This study intended to develop upon the weaknesses of previous application based 
interventions. Potentially, these lessons facilitated UoR:C’s effectiveness. And in reflection I 
make some key recommendations, which could further benefit future therapeutic 
interventions. Applications are unlike standard psychological experiments or psychological 
interventions. As with almost all psychology experiments UoR:C was designed from a 
psychology first perspective, where the concept was developed and the technology followed it 
like a script. This one-way influence had two repercussions. Firstly, the programming lacked 
ambition, as it was simply following a pre-set structure. However, if the technological aspect 
was explored for its own sake, and allowed to build upon the theory, its potential would 
drastically increase. Secondly, in a psychology first perspective the implication is that one is 
designed followed by the other. This results in poor project management issues never 
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normally encountered or considered in developing psychological tools. These include a variety 
technical issues that were not foreseen and a lack of product testing due to the mind-set of 
following a concrete programming script. Both results in delays and a less effective product. 
Any application based psychological intervention should have their theory and programing 
developed in tandem. From a software industry perspective, this would be using an agile 
project management style, where the application is gradually developed and continuously 
tested over different phases (alpha, beta and release). This flexibility should never 
compromise psychological validity, but focus on exploiting it. 
6.4.2 Future Study 
 
Once these limitations can be accounted for, a future study could be more ambitious 
and include a third group. This condition would be another generally maladaptive emotion 
regulation strategy. The most prudent choices would be either rumination or suppression, due 
to the considerable research interest in those areas that could inform the application. Just as 
the control and catastrophising conditions functioned through the same application, so would 
the additional condition. The UoR:C was designed with a rigid structure, but whose 
components are easily edited. This will ensure that the new condition will not significantly 
differ in structure. Beyond replicating this study’s results, it would aim to establish the relative 
impacts made by focusing on catastrophising and another maladaptive strategy. To do this an 
additional emotion regulation measure for the new condition will also be required to be used 
for each group. As a secondary benefit, this would test a key assumption made by this study, 
that the catastrophising training is catastrophising specific. From a somewhat simplistic 
perspective, we would hypothesise that if the catastrophising training is specific, then there 
should be no measurable effect on other emotion regulation strategies. However, provided 
that any emotion regulation intervention is sufficiently successful in improving an individual’s 
mood there is likely to be some impact on other maladaptive strategies as they will not be 
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applied as frequently as a coping mechanism if the treatment for catastrophising was 
successful. Additionally, when comparing two strategies such as rumination and 
catastrophising there may be an interaction where the treatment for either could be 
simultaneously tackling the cyclical component present in both catastrophising and rumination 
or it could even be incidental. For example, an individual with a better mood from the reduced 
impact of catastrophising may be more resilient to negative situations (Tugade, Fredrickson & 
Barrett, 2004) and less likely to employ suppression. Therefore, if either intervention is 
successful and specific it is still likely to have a small but potentially measurable effect on 
other emotion regulation measures. However, if the effect is the same or larger on a different 
emotion regulation scale the treatment is unlikely to be specific.  
Taking this plan to a future vision, further studies could add treatments for many more 
commonly maladaptive strategies. Once developed, an application could be created that 
started with a series of questionnaires, one for each emotion regulation strategy as generated 
in Chapter Five. This would then generate a course based on the previous interventions to 
cover all the relevant modules for each emotion regulation strategy they scored highly in. 
6.4.3 Conclusion 
 
This application is an early step in many respects. There are a limited number of 
mental health applications available through this medium and a very small number of 
psychologically grounded emotion regulation applications. The lack of experience in dealing 
with this medium, both individually and across the discipline, goes some way in explaining the 
issues discussed above. While the UoR:C had a variety of limitations, participants in the 
catastrophising condition reported significantly better moods and lower catastrophising than 
the control condition. This provides some idea of the scale of the benefits this medium can 
have on therapeutic interventions. It also drastically increases the reach of informed 
psychological treatments to those that need them in a way that is highly cost effective. This 
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study also demonstrates the potential of an emotion regulation focus to therapeutic 
interventions. Many therapeutic approaches indirectly tackle emotion regulation but do not 
apply specific methods for specific emotion regulation issues, if it even considers emotion 
regulation to begin with.  
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7 Chapter Seven: General Discussion 
7.1 The origin of this thesis 
 
While catastrophising features in four of five of the experimental chapters in this 
thesis, it is central to only three. The first two experimental chapters (chapters two and three) 
instead focused on using an atheoretical approach towards a broad range of emotion 
regulation strategies. The second chapter began by using a questionnaire battery containing a 
wide range of emotion regulation strategies and relevant mental health indicators. This data 
was used to create a series of emotion regulation profiles to predict depression, anxiety and 
hypomania. This experiment expanded on previous literature that largely focused on 
establishing correlations between emotion regulation strategies and mental health (N 
Garnefski et al., 2001). One unexpected finding was when creating emotion regulation 
profiles, many of the previously significant correlations with emotion regulation strategies 
were explained better by the variance with other mental health indicators. One of the 
exceptions to this was catastrophising. 
 Chapter three took a similarly atheoretical approach to emotion regulation, instead to 
construct a questionnaire. The items from this questionnaire were developed from a range of 
existing measures. This varied list was then tested in a community population to identify 
naturally occurring subscales. The aim of this study was to create a questionnaire to capture 
the breadth of emotion regulation by using naturally occurring variation instead of specific 
theories. However, this questionnaire failed to replicate its subscale structure. In reflection, 
this was likely due to the ambitious nature of the project. An atheoretical questionnaire 
seeking to scope emotion regulation in its true breadth would require a phenomenal number 
of items. Additionally, it would require a considerably higher sample size to account for the 
variation. It is possible that such broad measures are not suited to questionnaire design 
without becoming so long they are overbearing. Despite STERQ’s many challenges I learned a 
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tremendous amount from the study and it was the fundamental learning experience that 
allowed the creation of the CQ in chapter five.  
Another theme that was common across the first two studies was adolescent development. 
One of the original aims of the first study was to map development in emotion regulation 
across adolescence. However, due to recruitment challenges the age distribution in the 
sample made any age based analysis impractical. The second study, STERQ, aimed to create a 
questionnaire that would be valid across all age groups from adolescent to adult. This meant 
that if the questionnaire had replicated its structure, further validation would have explored 
an adolescent sample.   
7.2 Understanding catastrophizing 
 
The bulk of this thesis explores catastrophising through its relationships with 
depression, anxiety, stress and mood. This was done through a cluster of approaches to 
triangulate how catastrophising interacts with these variables. The second chapter used a 
cross-sectional analysis and found catastrophising was correlated with depression, anxiety, 
stress and hypomania. Research into these findings revealed they were not unique, but 
previously identified within the literature (e.g. Garnefski et al., 2001). Despite this, 
catastrophising had not been selected for further investigation within the field of emotion 
regulation. An understandable lapse of a field barely two decades old, if this was an obscure 
emotion regulation strategy. However, catastrophising is one of the key thought errors 
outlined in CBT (Beck et al., 1979). Additionally, catastrophising is also highly considered in the 
pain literature, where its associations with health outcomes are widely known (established by 
Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik, 1995). Consequently, the understanding of catastrophising from an 
emotion regulation perspective was limited to a combination of understanding based on 
correlations and clinical intuition. Intuition suggested that catastrophising’s correlations with 
depressive and anxious symptoms were explained by catastrophising’s causal impact on mood. 
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This was built upon by the second approach in chapter four. This study instructed 
participants to catastrophise and compared their mood to a control group. As predicted, the 
participants who catastrophised reported lower mood (lower positive and higher negative) 
than their pre-test baseline and to the post-test control group. While this appears to confirm a 
causal relationship of catastrophising on mood, there are caveats. One such caveat, drawn 
from intuition, is that the incitement of a negative mood would also make an individual more 
likely to catastrophise. This introduces a mutual causality that is equally likely to be present in 
all traditionally maladaptive emotion regulation strategies. A scientific understanding of the 
strength of this relationship of mood to catastrophising is, yet, unknown. This study was also 
limited to its impact on mood, and not its effect on the symptoms: depression, anxiety and 
stress. To test this relationship with a similar design, participants would be required to 
catastrophise over considerably greater periods of time to record meaningful trait changes.  
To progress understanding of the relationship between catastrophising and DASS 
symptoms and mood, Chapter Six sought to reduce, rather than increase, catastrophising 
practiced by its participants. These changes were then monitored over a two-week period. 
This approach confirmed our predictions and supported the proposed causal relationship from 
catastrophizing to low mood and DASS symptoms. However, it had its own caveats and unique 
opportunities. One caveat was that the training could have been generalised across 
maladaptive tendencies to improve other emotion regulation strategies. Therefore, if the 
training works, but is not specific, the results could still be similar to those found in Chapter 
Six. Or if the training was generalised across different maladaptive strategies the effect found 
in Chapter Six could be inflated. Additionally, it is likely that a positive mood brought about by 
tackling catastrophising would make other maladaptive strategies less likely to occur, thus 
reducing them indirectly. This is an inevitable issue in unpicking the individual effects of any 
emotion regulation strategy longitudinally or ecologically as they are deeply intertwined 
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through mood, emotion and situation. A unique opportunity from this approach was an insight 
into the clinical potential of catastrophising reduction, which is discussed later.  
While each of these studies have individual aims and implications explored in the 
discussions of each chapter, taken together they contribute to triangulating how 
catastrophising interacts with mental health. The next step towards a more complete 
understanding is moving from correlation to causation. Chapter Four found that 
catastrophising resulted in a lower mood than a watching condition. This identifies one causal 
link, but alone it only implies that catastrophising can cause a low mood, not necessarily pose 
a risk to mental health. Study Six found that training individuals not to catastrophise improved 
mood more than those in a control condition. This reaffirms that catastrophising does have a 
causal role in mood. This is an important link and it strongly implies that catastrophising has a 
role in mental health. However, it is not a direct link. Further studies would be required to 
identify how catastrophising influences mental health. This relationship could be directly from 
catastrophising to mental health. But based on the results of this thesis and the literature it is 
likely that catastrophising’s influence on mental health is mediated through its effect on 
mood.  
Another link that remains unexplored is the potential for causality is the impact of 
mood on catastrophising that could also explain some of the relationships found in this thesis. 
Emotion regulation strategies can generate or enhance emotion but they are more commonly 
known as a response or regulation to mood and emotion. Therefore, it follows that an induced 
negative or even a positive mood would promote catastrophising in individuals that tend to 
use it. This cyclical propensity is another area to explore to increase our understanding of 
catastrophising but also to control for when testing for causality. 
Bringing these relationships into the bigger picture requires understanding the 
strengths of all of the potentially bi-directional relationships as shown in Figure 7.1 below. This 
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can be conducted in two ways depending on overall objectives. Either a specific mental health 
trait could be selected such as depression, or a general distress score. If a specific trait is 
selected, other relevant traits should be used as covariates to better isolate specific links. This 
can also be visualised as a series of individual causal relationships to be tested separately, or 
taken as one mediation model. The evidence in this thesis suggests that catastrophising 
directly impacts mood, which would appear to be the likely path for catastrophising to 
influence mental health traits. Therefore, a full or partial mediation is likely. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Proposed mediated model for catastrophising’s effect on mental health indicators 
 
This model is intuitive as catastrophising is an emotion regulation strategy, making its 
influence on mental health likely to be due to its impact on mood. The direct relationship from 
catastrophising to a mental health indicator however may vary between anxiety and 
depression. Intuitively catastrophising may have greatest impact on depression through its 
impact on mood. However, in anxiety it is possible that as well as the mediation through 
mood, the thought process itself may have a direct effect on anxious indicators. Research to 
identify these relationships will significantly tighten understanding of how catastrophising 
influences mental health. It may also inform further understanding of other emotion 
regulation strategies, which could replace catastrophising in the above figure. Understanding 
Catastrophising 
Mood 
Mental Health Indicator 
Covariates 
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to what extent these relationships are unique between catastrophising and mental health or 
generalizable to other maladaptive or even adaptive strategies.  
The proposed model in Figure 7.1 captures the core aspects of emotion regulation at a 
different level to Gross’ (1998) process model of emotion regulation. In this case the proposed 
model seeks to test some of the key assumptions made by the process model. The process 
model assumes that emotion regulation strategies are only relevant to mental health to the 
degree that they can deliver emotions and that there is no direct relationship between a 
strategy and mental health indicators (a full mediation in Figure 7.1). The modal model also 
assumes that this relationship is only altered by what stage the strategy is enacted in the 
model (for example at the appraisal stage or once the emotion has been generated. The 
challenge of the model in Figure 7.1 is when focusing on such fundamentals, tautology must 
be avoided. Keeping the strategy, mood and mental health separate requires that the 
definition and measure used for each does not overlap the others. Testing this model could 
either confirm the current assumptions highlighted in the modal model (that emotion 
regulation strategies only effect emotion depending on the stage of emotion generation) or 
open new ways to investigate emotion regulation through their indicator’s individual 
relationships with emotion.  
7.2.1 Limitations 
 
A limitation found across each of these studies is a dependence on student 
populations. The main method used to try and balance this bias was ensuring that where 
possible studies could be completed online to allow for greater diversity of recruitment. 
Although this would have reduced the bias to the student population, this medium still 
generally recruited younger individuals. Secondly, where online advertising was used for 
studies, there was still only very limited uptake. While this limitation should cause some 
scepticism on how well these results generalise to other populations, it does not infringe on 
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the conclusions made throughout this thesis. This limitation is best interpreted as highlighting 
the need to test older populations in future studies and that replications should also account 
for age. Additionally, other diversity measures were not taken to account for race, culture and 
socioeconomic background. This means that the data may not be fully representative of the 
diversity in the United Kingdom. Further studies may benefit from taking these measures or 
intentionally balancing sample diversity to more representatively match the United Kingdom. 
For questionnaire or online studies this could be tackled through random digit sampling used 
in political polling, where the recruiter randomly draws from an extensive list of phone 
numbers and then can apply weights to the sample to match recent census data for sex, age, 
race and geographical locations for the British public (Lambert, Langer, & McMenemy, 2010). 
The primary drawback to this approach is the extensive time taken to recruit and experiment. 
Another impact of diversity worth discussing separately is caused by primarily relying 
on Psychology undergraduates where there tends to be a gender imbalance leaning towards 
females. There is literature that suggests males tend to use different emotion regulation 
strategies to females, which are just as effective (Nolen-hoeksema, 2012). These differences 
may lead to different relationships between mental health indicators and emotion regulation. 
However, there is no current research to suggest that these different methods would result in 
structurally different relationships between mental health and emotion regulation. Again, this 
limitation should not undermine the work in this thesis, but instead prompt replications in 
different samples. 
The undergraduate participants were motivated to volunteer and complete the 
experiments to gain course credit. This means that they may not have approached the study in 
the same way as a volunteer and therefore may not be as engaged with the process. 
Alternatively, they may also be more engaged with more taxing studies to attain their credits 
where many volunteers would be lost due to attrition. Chapter Six provides one example of 
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this where the attrition for online participants was considerably higher than undergraduates 
completing it for course credit.  
These studies all targeted emotion regulation and its relationship with mental health, 
but these experiments were all conducted on community samples. Ultimately, understanding 
the relationship between mental health and catastrophising, or any emotion regulation 
strategy will require some studies drawing from clinical populations. 
In many emotion regulation studies, demand characteristics have significant potential 
to undermine the results. While it would have been difficult for a participant to work out that 
Chapter Two was considering emotion regulation profiles, or where Chapter Four successfully 
disguised the intentions of the catastrophising induction; participants may have assumed their 
own purpose for the study and acted to either promote or frustrate that intention.  
 Another limitation across the studies in this thesis is that the methodology was 
confined to self-report measures. These measures are limited by the level of personal insight 
of the participants and many of these studies would benefit from some physiological measures 
or measures of facial expression to help triangulate emotion changes and therefore increase 
the reliability of the methodology in this thesis. Also, other points of reference, which are not 
necessarily deliberate or conscious can facilitate spotting inconsistencies that may be due to 
demand characteristics. However, where studies have used self-report measures alongside 
physiological measures or facial expression they tend to come to the same conclusions (For 
example, Gross, 1998 and Gruber, Harvey, & Gross, 2012) suggesting that this is not a major 
limitation but these methods provides useful evidence of robustness.  
 This thesis contains a variety of cross-sectional and experimental designs, even though 
this is generally restricted to self-report measures. Although, Chapter Six had a minor 
longitudinal component as the experiment took place at three points over a two-week period. 
However, this did not capture more the long-term effects of emotion regulation. Previous 
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studies such as Berking, Orth, Wupperman, Meier, & Caspar, (2008); Kassel et al. (2007) and 
McLaughlin et al. (2011) who used emotion regulation strategies to predict future mental 
health issues over long time periods. If catastrophising was found to be a significant predictor 
of mental health issues, this would add considerably more weight to the hypothesis that 
catastrophising causes mental health issues.  
7.2.2 Further Studies 
 
To counter some of the limitations of the studies in this thesis, further studies could apply a 
greater variety of methods to record data, such as vagal tone (Porges, 1994), skin conductivity 
(as conducted in Gross, 1998) and facial expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1978). Due to the 
nature of these procedures this suggests laboratory studies that could target inducing and 
reducing catastrophising and measure the effects with greater rigor. To generate emotion, 
participants would be presented with a difficult reaction time task where each wrong answer 
immediately elicits a small electric shock. The first group would be instructed to minimise their 
emotions and the second group would be instructed to catastrophise, much like in Chapter 
Four. The third group would be a control group instructed just to focus on the task to function 
as a means of comparison against the two experimental groups. The control group would also 
be required to report the methods they used to regulate their emotions, where participants 
could be excluded if the experimenter felt they had reported applying successful strategies. 
This would further establish the causal connection between catastrophising and mood. 
Each of the studies in this thesis focused on indicators such as depression, anxiety and 
stress, which are closely related to clinical mental health issues. Next steps to better 
understand the causal relationship between catastrophising and mental health would be 
through testing in clinical populations. A replication of Chapter Four, the catastrophising 
induction, could identify the strength of the effect in clinical samples. This could be replicated 
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in a very similar manner for Chapter Six, where the intervention and its modules could be 
tested for their effectiveness in a clinical group.  
A further study that could build on Berking, Orth, Wupperman, Meier, & Caspar's (2008) 
study to instead use catastrophizing scores to predict the causal relationship of catastrophising 
on mental health indicators. This would be a longitudinal study that would need to take 
monthly measurements of measure mental health indicators (DASS), catastrophising (through 
the CQ) and whether the individual has received a clinical diagnosis. This will test how well 
catastrophising can predict both clinical and subclinical mental health outcomes over time. 
This could be conducted in a population of undergraduates over the duration of their course. 
Developing an understanding of how the fundamentals of emotion regulation interact is 
not the only way to deepen our understanding. For example, another new area would be 
exploring the boundary where generally maladaptive emotion regulation strategies can 
become adaptive and vice versa. These examples are often provided by the many incarnations 
of Gross’ modal model (e.g. Gross, 1998; Gross & Jazaieri, 2014; Gross, Sheppes, & Urry, 2011; 
Gross & Thompson, 2006) such as a surgeon who has received particularly bad personal news 
but uses suppression to be able to focus on an important surgery. These boundaries between 
adaptive and maladaptive can also occur in the literature, for example in the creation of CERQ 
(N Garnefski et al., 2001) where a scale was designed to capture the adaptive aspects of 
acceptance but instead captured either the maladaptive or a combination. 
 Exploring the varying features of emotion regulation strategies where applied 
adaptively or maladaptively is rarely examined by the literature. Subsequently, very little is 
known on how adaptiveness may vary in cognitive load, strength and valence of mood change 
and other strategy specific side effects. Taking catastrophising as an example, it could be 
adaptive in situations where the resulting emotion focuses on a credible threat that requires 
attention. This boundary between adaptive and maladaptive could also be key to 
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psychopathological development, where generally maladaptive strategies originally may have 
been used adaptively and become reinforced and applied out of context.  
Drawing from Gross’ (1998) modal model of emotion regulation there are three main 
components in defining adaptability. The first is how effectively the strategy can alter the 
emotion state and the second is the stage in the emotion generation process that the strategy 
intervenes. The latter is also proposed to determine the cognitive demand of the strategy, 
which further moderates the effectiveness of the strategy. Therefore, per Gross’ model, 
response focused strategies such as acceptance and suppression will always be more 
cognitively demanding than cognitive reappraisal. The third component is the context of the 
strategy, which is defined by how well it facilitates an individual achieving their goals. For 
example, an individual finds themselves in a burning building. They could use cognitive 
reappraisal to think that the fire is not there or pleasantly warm, which is more maladaptive 
than applying avoidance.  
 A further study could serve as a proof of concept on whether there are differences in 
cognitive load, mood change and task accuracy based on the adaptiveness of an emotion 
regulation strategy. The experiment would have three counterbalanced within-subject’s 
groups: control, maladaptive catastrophising and adaptive catastrophising. These groups all 
perform the same reaction time task, but with different instructions. Participants focus on a 
cross in the centre of the screen, which is replaced by an image from one of two categories 
(plant or animal) for 200ms. Each time the participant sees a plant they must press one button 
and each time they see an animal they must press another. The maladaptive catastrophising 
condition would receive instructions to focus on how terrible it would be to get an answer 
wrong and how much worse they would be than other participants. The adaptive 
catastrophising condition would be instructed to focus on how terrible and horrible the 
category is; this would be an adaptive use of catastrophising to help focus on the target. The 
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control condition is then just instructed to complete the task. Across all three conditions 
heartrate monitors could be used to measure vagal tone (Porges, 1994), a video camera will 
measure pupil dilation and facial expressions and micro-expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1978) 
to detect emotional arousal. 
 The first hypothesis for this experiment is that adaptive catastrophising will result in 
significantly faster reaction times than the control condition and that maladaptive 
catastrophising will react significantly slower than the control. This would suggest that when 
used adaptively, catastrophising is not as effortful. The second hypothesis is that adaptive 
catastrophising will result in significantly higher accuracy than the control and maladaptive 
conditions, demonstrating its adaptiveness in this context.  The third hypothesis will predict 
that both catastrophising conditions will demonstrate greater arousal than the control 
condition. Crucially, the third hypothesis will predict that the adaptive condition will 
demonstrate less negative and more positive emotion than the maladaptive condition. This is 
because the catastrophising is focusing the individual, which will negate the negative mood. 
Should these occur it would suggest there are differences in the effects of emotion regulation 
strategies are somewhat based on their adaptiveness and not just based on when they are 
applied in the emotion generation process (in this case the adaptive and maladaptive groups 
focus on the appraisal stage of emotion generation). However, the most significant 
contribution this experiment would make to the literature is opening an entirely new avenue 
of research focusing on how various emotion regulation strategies have different effects in 
adaptive or maladaptive situations. Further experiments could also be made into associated 
areas such as decision making. The results could also be used to inform clinical interventions 
by identifying the unique effects of different emotion regulation strategies. 
7.2.3 Clinical potential 
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 Much of the clinical potential of this thesis is reviewed in the discussion of Chapter Six 
and in other chapters where individual studies could be replicated in clinical samples or tackle 
more clinical questions. There is also a great deal of potential discussed in Chapter Five on the 
use of the Catastrophising Questionnaire. This thesis contributes to the literature by 
expanding our understanding of catastrophising. Currently, research is progressing across 
many different emotion regulation strategies and this information must be used to build onto 
the bigger picture. While there is still a considerable journey remaining, the literature has 
accumulated a tremendous amount of knowledge across a range of emotion regulation 
strategies. 
As emotion dysregulation is a significant factor in many mental health disorders (DSM 
V) using emotion regulation literature to develop interventions is the best clinical use of this 
knowledge. One example use of this data is developing a more nuanced understanding of the 
emotional dysregulation presented by a client where a wide range of emotion regulation 
strategies are considered separately. This could be using tools such as the CQ or clinical 
intuition to diagnose specific emotion regulation issues. This focuses the intervention onto 
problem areas and harness a symptom based modular structure to treat clients. This could be 
implemented as an extension of CBT in a similar but more flexible way than ERT (Mennin & 
Fresco, 2014) or as its own discrete intervention, somewhat like ART (Berking, 2008). 
However, to develop ART or a similar emotion regulation focused therapy does not imply 
reactively fixing emotion regulation difficulties, but a proactive and educational journey 
towards extinguishing maladaptive strategies and replacing them with predetermined 
adaptive counterparts. 
Where the literature can provide tremendous help to those suffering from clinical 
mental health problems, the potential of the emotion regulation literature does not stop 
there. The nature of emotion regulation lends itself well to low intensity interventions and 
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across many strategies even education alone could help employees deal with stress, anxiety 
and depression.  
The amount of time it has taken the discipline of Psychology to focus on emotion 
regulation strategies is reflected on the lack of understanding by members of the public of 
their own emotion regulation. How we deal with our emotions is generally not deliberately 
considered (Gross & Thompson, 2006) and therefore challenging this way of life is just a small 
step that could have large positive effects. Additionally, this form of therapy lends itself 
towards automation through apps or websites. This gives it the potential to affordably reach 
any individual who needs it that also owns a smartphone or has internet access.  
7.2.4 Final Summary 
 
 The literature on catastrophising as an emotion regulation strategy is little more than 
several handfuls of papers. Many of these do not place catastrophising at the centre of the 
discussion. This thesis has strived to gain a deeper understanding of how this emotion 
regulation strategy could be key to depression, anxiety and stress. Hopefully, this thesis has 
also highlighted the need to fill this gap in the literature and has demonstrated that the 
approaches applied could also benefit the understanding of other strategies. There is still a 
great deal of research to be done to complete our picture of catastrophising and other 
strategies. However, it is important not to dwell on the limits of our current understanding but 
instead see the incredible potential of this relatively new field. After all, it’s not the end of the 
world. 
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9 Appendix 
9.1 Appendix 1 
 
Supervisor: Dr Craig Steel 
Email: c.steel@reading.ac.uk 
Phone: 0118 378 7550 
Experimenter: David Angell 
Email: D.J.Angell@pgr.reading.ac.uk 
Thank you very much for choosing to complete our study! 
Participation will take approximately 15-25 minutes, during which time you will 
complete a series of questionnaires on emotion, anxiety and mood. 
Your data will be kept confidential and securely stored, with only an anonymous 
number identifying it. Information linking that number to your name will be stored 
securely and separately from the data you provide us. All information collected for the 
project will be destroyed when possession of the data is no longer deemed necessary 
and the project is complete. 
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Taking part in this study is completely voluntary; you may withdraw at any time 
without having to give any reason. If you have any questions about this study, 
please email David Angell on the email provided above. 
This application has been reviewed by the University Research Ethics 
Committee and has been given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct. 
Thank you kindly for your help. 
David Angell 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Consent Form 
 
 
1. I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and that I may 
withdraw any time without giving any reason. 
 
2. I have read the information about this study and the method of the study has 
been explained to me. 
 
3. I have read the information above. 
 
4. I have been given the opportunity to ask any questions by email and that 
these have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
*This question is required. 
 I have read the information and give my consent for this study. 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in our study! This first section will just ask a series of 
questions about yourself. This should take no more than half an hour. 
2. Gender: *This question is required. 
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 male 
 female 
3. Age: *This question is required. 
 
4. Race: *This question is required. 
 
5. Would you say that you grew up in a single parent family? *This 
question is required. 
 
6. How many close friends do you have at the moment? *This question is 
required. 
 
7. Would you like us to contact you again when we repeat this study in 
one year's time? If so, please enter the email address you would like to be 
contacted on. 
 
8. If you are taking part through the University of Reading SONA and want 
credit for completing this survey, please enter your username:  
9.2 Appendix 2 
 
 
Please read the following statements and score how much you believe in each one. To make 
your rating click on the slider and drag it. These range from 0% (you do not believe in that 
statement at all) to 100% (you believe it completely). Try not to think too much about each 
question, there are no right or wrong answers. 
9. When I have a lot of energy, I still need some support from other 
people or things:   
10. When I feel restless, the world becomes full of unlimited opportunities for 
me:   
11. When I feel more active I realise that I am a very important person  
12. I have all my best ideas when I feel extremely good about myself:   
13. If I feel agitated and restlessness, it does not affect me a great deal:  
14. When I feel full of energy I am extremely funny and witty:   
15. When I get very agitated about something I still have control over my 
behaviour:   
16. I have control over whether I get excited when something good happens 
to me:   
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17. I need to be the centre of attention to enjoy myself:   
18. When I feel really good, people still understand me:   
19. When I try hard to get what I want, other people try to stop me:   
20. I need to have complete control over my moods in order to prevent 
myself from having a breakdown:   
21. When I feel restless, what happens to other people is at least as 
important as what happens to me:   
22. If I am very special to everyone around me then all my problems will 
disappear:   
23. When I get excited about something I still have some control over my 
thoughts:   
24. When I feel excited, my fears and worries are no longer real:   
25. My feelings need to be very intense to feel real to me:   
26. When I am with other people it is most important that they admire me:   
27. When my mood reaches a certain extreme, I still have responsibility over 
dealing with it:   
28. When I feel good, I know that whatever I do, I could do no wrong:   
29. When I feel good, I am sure that everything will work out perfectly:   
30. What things are like in a few days time is more important to me than 
what happens right now:   
31. When I get new ideas I must tell people at once and at length so that 
they admire me:   
32. If I notice something new when I am feeling good, I must make every 
effort to think about how it connects with everything else:   
33. It is OK to occasionally have a bad night's sleep:   
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9.3 Appendix 3 
HAPPI Questionnaire 
Please answer whether the following descriptions are true of you or not: 
107. A hundred years after I'm dead, my achievements will probably have 
been forgotten.   
108. I am so good at controlling others that sometimes it scares me.   
109. I am frequently in such high spirits that I can’t concentrate on any one 
thing for too long.   
110. I am considered to be a kind of ‘Hyper’ person.   
111. I often have moods where I feel so energetic and optimistic that I feel I 
could out-perform almost anyone at anything.   
112. In unfamiliar surroundings I am often so assertive and sociable that I 
surprise myself.   
113. I like to have others think of me as a normal kind of person.   
114. I am usually in an average sort of mood, not too high and not too low.   
115. I often get into moods where I feel like many of the rules of life don’t 
apply to me.   
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116. I very frequently get into moods where I wish I could be everywhere 
and do everything at once.   
117. I have often felt happy and irritable at the same time.  
118. Sometimes ideas and insights come to me so fast I cannot express 
them all.   
119. I seem to have an uncommon ability to persuade and inspire others.   
120. I frequently find that my thoughts are racing.   
121. There are times when I am so restless that it impossible for me to sit 
still.   
122. When I feel an emotion, I usually feel it with extreme intensity.   
123. Many people would consider me to be amusing but kind of eccentric.   
124. I seem to be a person whose mood goes up and down easily.   
125. I often feel excited and happy for no apparent reason.   
126. I do most of my work during brief periods of intense inspiration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.4 Appendix 4 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale (DASS-21) 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the statement applied to you 
over the past week.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on any statement. 
The rating scale is as follows: 
0  Did not apply to me at all 
1  Applied to me to some degree, or some of the time 
2  Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of time 
3  Applied to me very much, or most of the time 
1 I found it hard to wind down 0      1      2      3 
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2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0      1      2      3 
3 I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all 0      1      2      3 
4 I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid breathing, 
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion) 
0      1      2      3 
5 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things 0      1      2      3 
6 I tended to over-react to situations 0      1      2      3 
7 I experienced trembling (eg, in the hands) 0      1      2      3 
8 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0      1      2      3 
9 I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make 
a fool of myself 
0      1      2      3 
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0      1      2      3 
11 I found myself getting agitated 0      1      2      3 
12 I found it difficult to relax 0      1      2      3 
13 I felt down-hearted and blue 0      1      2      3 
14 I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with 
what I was doing 
0      1      2      3 
15 I felt I was close to panic 0      1      2      3 
16 I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything 0      1      2      3 
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0      1      2      3 
18 I felt that I was rather touchy 0      1      2      3 
19 I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical 
exertion (eg, sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat) 
0      1      2      3 
20 I felt scared without any good reason 0      1      2      3 
21 I felt that life was meaningless 0      1      2      3 
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9.5 Appendix 5 
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale for Children (CES-DC) 
Below is a list of the ways you might have felt or acted. Please check how much you have felt 
this way during the past week 
1. I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me.  
2. I did not feel like eating, I wasn’t very hungry.  
3. I wasn’t able to feel happy, even when my family or friends tried to help me feel better.  
4. I felt like I was just as good as other kids.  
5. I felt like I couldn’t pay attention to what I was doing.  
6. I felt down and unhappy.  
7. I felt like I was too tired to do things. 
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8. I felt like something good was going to happen.  
9. I felt like things I did before didn’t work out right.  
10. I felt scared.  
11. I didn’t sleep as well as I usually sleep.  
12. I was happy.  
13. I was more quiet than usual.  
14. I felt lonely, like I didn’t have any friends.  
15. I felt like kids I know were not friendly or that they didn’t want to be with me.  
16. I had a good time.  
17. I felt like crying.  
18. I felt sad.  
19. I felt people didn’t like me.  
20. It was hard to get started doing things.  
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9.6 Appendix 6 
BIS 15 
1 I plan tasks carefully 
2 I do things without thinking.  
3 I make-up my mind quickly.  
4 I am happy-go-lucky.  
5 I don’t “pay attention.”  
6 I have “racing” thoughts.  
7 I plan trips well ahead of time.  
8 I am self controlled.  
9 I concentrate easily.  
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10 I save regularly.  
11 I “squirm” at plays or lectures.  
12 I am a careful thinker.  
13 I plan for job security.  
14 I say things without thinking 
15 I like to think about complex problems.  
 
 
 
 
9.7 Appendix 7 
NMR 
 For the last 30 questions please answer how much you agree or disagree with these 
statements: 
127. I can usually find a way to cheer myself up:   
128. I can do something to feel better:   
129. Worrying about it is all I can do:   
130. I’ll feel okay if I think about more pleasant times:   
131. Being with other people will be a drag:   
132. I can feel better by treating myself to something I like:   
133. I’ll feel better when I understand why I feel bad:   
134. I won’t be able to get myself to do anything about it:   
135. I won’t feel much better by trying to feel some good about the situation:   
136. It won’t be long before I can calm myself down:   
137. It will be hard to find someone who really understands:   
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138. Telling myself it will pass will help me calm down:   
139. Doing something nice for someone else will cheer me up:   
140. I’ll end up feeling really depressed:   
141. Planning how I’ll deal with things will help:   
142. I can forget about what’s upsetting me pretty easily:   
143. Catching up with my work will help calm me down:   
144. The advice friends give me won’t help me feel better:   
145. I won’t be able to enjoy things I usually enjoy:   
146. I can find a way to relax:   
147. Trying to work the problem out in my head will only make it seem 
worse:   
148. Seeing a movie won’t help me feel better:   
149. Going out with friends will help:   
150. I’ll be upset for a long time:   
151. I won’t be able to put it out of my mind:   
152. I can feel better by doing something creative:   
153. I’ll start to feel really down about myself:   
154. Thinking that things will eventually be better won’t help me feel any 
better:   
155. I can find some humour in the situation and feel better:   
156. If I’m with a group of people, I’ll feel “alone in a crowd”: 
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9.8 Appendix 8 
CERQ 
how often you have felt this way over the past week: 
34. I feel that I am the one who is responsible for what has happened  
35. I think that I have to accept that this has happened:   
36. I think of pleasant things that have nothing to do with it:   
37. I think that I have to accept the situation:   
38. I think that basically the cause must lie within myself:  
39. I often think about how I feel about what I have experienced:   
40. I am distracted by what I think and feel about what I have experienced:   
41. I think about how to change the situation:   
42. I think about a plan of what I can do best:   
43. I think of something nice instead of what has happened   
44. I continually think how horrible the situation has been:   
45. I think I can learn something from the situation:   
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46. I think that I can become a stronger person because of what has 
happened:   
47. I think that it hasn't been too bad compared to other things:   
48. I tell myself that there are worse things in life  
49. I keep thinking about how terrible it is what I have experienced:  
 
Additional Catastrophizing Questions 
I often think that what I have experienced is much worse than what others have experienced  
I keep thinking about how terrible it is what I have experienced  
I often think that what I have experienced is the worst that can happen to a person  
I continually think how horrible the situation has been 
 
 
 
9.9 Appendix 9 
ART-Q 
Answer each of these questions from a scale of 1(never/not well) to 10 (all of the time/very 
well). 
98. How often are you aware of the emotions you may be experiencing?   
99. To what extent do you think you are able to correctly work out what 
emotion you are feeling, while you are feeling it?   
100. To what extent are you able to work out the emotion you are having by 
noticing how you are feeling in your body? (For example a 'sinking feeling', 
feeling 'tense' or energetic).   
101. To what extent do your emotions make it difficult to work out what you 
want to do or how you want to act?   
102. How well can you make yourself feel better when you are feeling bad?   
103. If you are experiencing something that makes you feel bad, how good 
are you at thinking about it differently, so that you feel a bit better?   
104. When you have an emotion, to what extent do you just let it happen, 
without thinking about it too much?  
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105. When you are feeling negative emotions, how well can you at carry on 
as normal?   
106. To what extent are you able to just carry on and get on with your plans, 
even if it is making you upset? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.10 Appendix 10 
STERQ Phase 1 Trait Items 
When you have a POSITIVE/NEGATIVE emotional experience, to what extent do the following apply to you? Please 
use the following answer key: 
1=Not at all or very little 
2=A little 
3=Somewhat 
4=Quite a lot 
5=Very Much 
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 1 2 3 4 5 
I could use my feelings about the experience to my advantage      
I want to avoid the situation by trying to escape      
I think about ways in which I can change the experience      
The situation had such a big impact on me I wished it would just 
go away 
     
I can stay calm and not be affected by the situation      
It is difficult to get the experience out of my mind      
I avoid the experience because I know it will be emotional      
I try to change the situation so I can change how I feel      
When I know in advance about the experience, I can choose to 
stay calm 
     
I feel like this is not going to last      
I use substances (e.g. alcohol or drugs) to change how I am 
feeling 
     
My feelings interfere with my ability to carry on with daily life      
I try to see the funny side of the experience      
I can hold on to the emotions I felt in the situation      
I control my feelings by not showing them      
I  experience emotion but am not aware of it until sometime 
later 
     
I feel like the same things were going round and round in my 
head 
     
I seek out information related to the event to understand or 
change how I am feeling 
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It is easy for me to show my feelings      
I do not generally pay much attention to how I feel      
I think about something different to change how I am feeling      
I try to avoid feeling anything      
I feel that I am responsible for what has happened      
Sharing the experience with someone I trust changes the 
intensity of the experience 
     
My feelings were out of control      
My feelings impacted on how I interpreted the situation      
I find it easy to describe how I’m feeling      
My faith influenced how I felt about the experience      
I analyse the experience to try to understand why I feel the way I 
did 
     
 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
I find it easy to talk to other people about the experience      
I seek out the experience because I know it will be emotional      
The experience had a big impact on my mood      
My feelings were overwhelming      
I am tempted to use extreme behaviours to change the intensity 
of what I’m feeling 
     
I change the way I think about the experience to alter how I am 
feeling 
     
I try to hide how I was feeling      
My feelings made it difficult to concentrate      
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It is difficult for me to make sense of what I am feeling, whilst I 
am feeling it 
     
It was easy to manage what I was feeling      
I find that my feelings make it difficult to focus on other things      
I feel that something good will come of it      
I believe the cause of the experience is outside of my control      
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9.11 Appendix 11 
STERQ Phase 1 State Items 
Whilst you were in the situation, to what extent did the following statements apply to you? 
1=Not at all or very little 
2=A little 
3=Somewhat 
4=Quite a lot 
 247 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
I reminded myself that I was not part of the situation      
I changed the way I thought about the situation to alter how I 
was feeling 
     
I felt like my emotions were out of control      
My feelings make it difficult to concentrate      
I reminded myself that the situation was not real      
I wanted to avoid the situation by closing my eyes or looking 
away 
     
I felt that my emotions were overwhelming      
It was easy for me to show my feelings      
It was difficult for me to make sense of my feelings at the time      
I could accept my feelings about the situation      
The situation had such an effect I wished it would just go away      
I paid attention to my feelings       
I felt like I could stay calm and not be affected by the situation      
I thought about something different to change how I was feeling      
I felt like I could use what I was feeling to my advantage      
I was able to manage the emotions I was feeling      
It was easy to describe how I was feeling      
I tried to see the funny side of the situation      
I analysed the situation to try to understand why I was feeling 
the way I was 
     
I felt like the situation would not last      
I was aware of my feelings      
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After you were in the situation to what extent did the following statements apply to you? 
1=Not at all or very little 
2=A little 
3=Somewhat 
4=Quite a lot 
5=Very Much 
I tried to avoid feeling anything      
My feelings affected how I interpreted the situation      
I controlled my feelings by not showing them      
I felt something good would come of the situation      
The situation had a big impact on my mood      
I tried to hide what I was feeling      
 1 2 3 4 5 
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I could hold on to the feelings evoked by the situation      
I felt like the same things were going round and round in my 
head 
     
My feelings made it hard to focus on other things      
It was difficult to get the situation out of my mind      
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9.12 Appendix 12 
 Mood ratings conducted before and after the mood induction video and video memory 
questions 
Mood Ratings: 
To what extent do you currently feel the following? 
 
Memory Questions: 
 
In the film clip you have just viewed, you watched the main character, Mr Bean, encounter a 
range of situations. Please answer the following questions about the film clip:  
 
1. What comic did he want to read?  
a) Superman  
b) Spiderman  
c) Batman  
d) Ironman  
 
2. Who did he visit?  
 Not at all A little Somewhat Quite a lot Very much 
Happy      
Amused      
Sad      
Anxious      
Excited      
Angry      
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a) A friend  
b) A dentist  
c) A doctor  
d) An optician  
 
3. What does he go looking for in his attic?  
a) Christmas decorations  
b) Antiques  
c) Comics  
d) A coat  
 
4. What does he try to cook?  
a) A lobster  
b) A turkey  
c) A fish  
d) Some mince 
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9.13 Appendix 13 
DERS 
Please indicate how often the following 36 statements apply to you by writing the appropriate 
number from the scale above (1 – 5) in the box alongside each item.  
1 I am clear about my feelings (R)  
2 I pay attention to how I feel (R)  
3 I experience my emotions as overwhelming and out of control  
4 I have no idea how I am feeling  
5 I have difficulty making sense out of my feelings  
6 I am attentive to my feelings (R)  
7 I know exactly how I am feeling (R)  
8 I care about what I am feeling (R)  
9 I am confused about how I feel  
10 When I’m upset, I acknowledge my emotions (R)  
11 When I’m upset, I become angry with myself for feeling that way 
12 When I’m upset, I become embarrassed for feeling that  
13 When I’m upset, I have difficulty getting work done  
14 When I’m upset, I become out of control  
15 When I’m upset, I believe that I will remain that way for a long time  
16 When I’m upset, I believe that I’ll end up feeling very depressed  
17 When I’m upset, I believe that my feelings are valid and important (R)  
18 When I’m upset, I have difficulty focusing on other things  
19 When I’m upset, I feel out of control  
20 When I’m upset, I can still get things done (R)  
21 When I’m upset, I feel ashamed with myself for feeling that way  
22 When I’m upset, I know that I can find a way to eventually feel better (R)  
 253 
 
23 When I’m upset, I feel like I am weak  
24 When I’m upset, I feel like I can remain in control of my behaviours (R)  
25 When I’m upset, I feel guilty for feeling that way  
26 When I’m upset, I have difficulty concentrating  
27 When I’m upset, I have difficulty controlling my behaviours  
28 When I’m upset, I believe that there is nothing I can do to make myself feel better  
29 When I’m upset, I become irritated with myself for feeling that way  
30 When I’m upset, I start to feel very bad about myself  
31 When I’m upset, I believe that wallowing in it is all I can do  
32 When I’m upset, I lose control over my behaviours  
33 When I’m upset, I have difficulty thinking about anything else  
34 When I’m upset, I take time to figure out what I’m really feeling (R)  
35 When I’m upset, it takes me a long time to feel better  
36 When I’m upset, my emotions feel overwhelming 
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9.14 Appendix 14 
Information 
Supervisor: Dr Craig Steel 
Email: c.steel@reading.ac.uk 
Phone: 0118 378 7550 
Experimenter: David Angell 
Email: D.J.Angell@pgr.reading.ac.uk 
Thank you very much for choosing to complete our study! 
Participation will take approximately 15-25 minutes, during which time you will complete a 
series of questionnaires on emotion, anxiety and mood. 
Your data will be kept confidential and securely stored, with only an anonymous number 
identifying it. Information linking that number to your name will be stored securely and 
separately from the data you provide us. All information collected for the project will be 
destroyed when possession of the data is no longer deemed necessary and the project is 
complete. 
Taking part in this study is completely voluntary; you may withdraw at any time without 
having to give any reason. If you have any questions about this study please email David 
Angell on the email provided above. 
This application has been reviewed by the University Research Ethics Committee and has 
been given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct. 
Thank you kindly for your help. 
David Angell 
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9.15 Appendix 15 
 Consent Form 
 
 
1. I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary and 
that I may withdraw any time without giving any reason. 
 
2. I have read the information about this study and the method of 
the study has been explained to me. 
 
3. I have read the information above. 
 
4. I have been given the opportunity to ask any questions by 
email and that these have been answered to my satisfaction. 
 
 I have read the information and give my consent for this study. 
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9.16 Appendix 16 
STERQ Positive Trait Questionnaire post phase 1 
When you have a POSITIVE experience to what extent do the following apply to you? 
 Not at All or 
Very Little 
A little Somewhat Quite a Lot Very Much 
1. My feelings made it difficult to concentrate      
2. I can hold on to the emotions I felt in the situation      
3. I avoid the situation because I know it will be emotional      
4. I control my feelings by not showing them      
5. I feel that something good will come of it      
6. I want to avoid the situation by trying to escape      
7. I try to hide how I was feeling      
8. I do not generally pay much attention to how I feel      
10. The situation had such a big impact on me I wished it would 
just go away 
     
11. It is easy for me to show my feelings      
12. I could use my feelings about the situation to my advantage      
13. It is difficult for me to make sense of what I am feeling, 
whilst I am feeling it 
     
14. I change the way I think about the situation to alter how I 
am feeling 
     
15. I could accept my feelings about the situation      
16. I analyse the situation to try to understand why I feel the 
way I did 
     
17. My feelings were out of control      
18. I seek out information related to the event to understand or      
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change how I am feeling 
19. I  experience emotion but am not aware of it until sometime 
later 
     
 
Emotion Focus: 1, 12, 15 Suppression: 4, 7, 10 Avoidance: 3, 6, 9 Reappraisal and 
Understanding: 13, 15, 17 Harnessing: 2, 5, 11 Mindfulness: 8, 14, 18 
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9.17 Appendix 17 
STERQ Negative Trait Questionnaire post phase 1 
When you have a NEGATIVE experience to what extent do the following apply to you? 
 Not at All or 
Very Little 
A little Somewhat Quite a Lot Very Much 
1. My feelings make it difficult to concentrate      
2. I feel like the same things are going round and round in my 
head 
     
3. I avoid the situation because I know it will be emotional      
4. I control my feelings by not showing them      
5. It is difficult to get the situation out of my mind      
6. I want to avoid the situation by trying to escape      
7. I try to hide how I am feeling      
8. I do not generally pay much attention to how I feel      
9. The situation had such a big impact on me I wish it would just 
go away 
     
10. It is easy for me to show my feelings      
11. I can use my feelings about the situation to my advantage      
12. I can stay calm and not be affected by the situation      
13. I change the way I think about the situation to alter how I 
am feeling 
     
14. It is easy to manage what I am feeling      
15. When I know in advance about the situation, I can choose to 
stay calm 
     
16. My feelings are out of control      
17. I feel like this is not going to last      
18. I can accept my feelings about the situation      
19. I analyse the situation to try to understand why I feel the 
way I do 
     
20. It is difficult for me to make sense of what I am feeling, 
whilst I am feeling it 
     
21. I seek out information related to the event to understand or      
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Emotion Focus: 1, 12, 15 Suppression: 4, 7, 10 Avoidance: 3, 6, 9 Reappraisal and 
Understanding: 13, 15, 17 Harnessing: 2, 5, 11 Mindfulness: 8, 14, 18 
 
  
change how I am feeling 
22. I  experience emotion but am not aware of it until sometime 
later 
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9.18 Appendix 18 
STERQ State Questionnaire post phase 1 
STERQ STATE: 
Whilst you were in the situation, to what extent did the following statements apply to you? 
 
Not at all or 
Very Little A Little 
Somewhat 
Quite a 
Lot 
Very 
Much 
1. My feelings made it difficult to concentrate 
     2. I felt like the same thoughts were going round and round in 
my head 
     3. I wanted to avoid the situation by closing my eyes or looking 
away 
     4. I controlled my feelings by not showing them 
     5. It was difficult to get the situation out of my mind 
     6. I tried to hide what I was feeling 
     7. I paid attention to my feelings  
     8. I could hold on to the feelings evoked by the situation 
     9. The situation had such an effect I wished it would just go away 
     10. I reminded myself that I was not part of the situation 
     11. I felt like I could use what I was feeling to my advantage 
     12. I felt like I could stay calm and not be affected by the 
situation 
     13. I changed the way I thought about the situation to alter how I 
was feeling 
     14. I was able to manage the emotions I was feeling 
     15. I reminded myself that the situation was not real 
     16. I felt like my emotions were out of control 
     17. I felt like the situation would not last 
     18. I could accept my feelings about the situation 
     19. I tried to see the funny side of the situation 
     20. I felt something good would come of the situation 
     21. I was aware of my feelings 
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22. It was difficult for me to make sense of my feelings at the 
time 
     23. My feelings made it hard to focus on other things 
      
Emotion Focus: 1, 16, 22 Suppression: 4, 6 Resilience: 12, 14, 17, 18 Avoidance: 3, 9 
Reappraisal and Understanding: 10, 13, 15 Rumination: 2, 5, 23 Harnessing: 8, 11, 19 20 
Mindfulness: 7, 18, 21 
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9.19 Appendix 19 
Memory questions phase 2  
What was the name of the mini-game? Dirty dancers, Helping hands, Wrestlehypomania, Foot 
n’mouth 
What character was Ryan playing? A drunken Irish chocolatier, An angry German dancer, A 
claustrophobic Japanese ninja, A lovesick Italian pizza maker 
What gimmick was Ryan wearing? A moustache, A ninja outfit, 
A booze stained vest, A tutu 
What does Ryan use? A screwdriver, a cane, a ladle, a rolling pin 
What does Ryan eat at the end of the clip? Parmesan cheese, pickle, pepperoni, pineapple 
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9.20 Appendix 20       
Initial Factor Analysis – Trait Positive Variance 
 
 
 264 
 
9.21 Appendix 21 
Initial Factor Analysis – Trait Positive Pattern Matrix 
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9.22 Appendix 22 
Initial Factor Analysis – State Positive Variance 
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9.23 Appendix 23 
Initial Factor Analysis – State Positive Pattern Matrix 
Pattern Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
SP25 .743        
SP26 .733        
SP28 .615        
SP15 .559        
SP18 .557        
SP8 .442        
SP30  .816       
SP29  .785       
SP31  .709       
SP32  .600       
SP4  .577       
SP12   .812      
SP21   .730      
SP10   .707      
SP17   .550      
SP20 -.451  .461      
SP23   .448      
SP1    .921     
SP5    .890     
SP2    .410     
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SP11     .751    
SP6     .701    
SP3      .742   
SP13      -.635   
SP16      -.592   
SP7      .485   
SP27       .830  
SP24       .672  
SP9        .705 
SP22        .661 
SP14     .505   .619 
SP19         
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
a
 
a. Rotation converged in 14 iterations. 
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9.24 Appendix 24 
Initial Factor Analysis – Trait Negative Variance 
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9.25 Appendix 25 
Initial Factor Analysis – Trait Negative Pattern Matrix 
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9.26 Appendix 26 
Initial Factor Analysis – State Negative Variance 
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9.27 Appendix 27 
Initial Factor Analysis – State Negative Pattern Matrix 
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9.28 Appendix 28 
Initial Cronbach’s Alpha – Trait Positive 
Factor label Cronbach’s alpha Items Cronbach’s alpha if 
item deleted 
Avoidance .843 TP2 .814 
TP3 .829 
TP4 .811 
TP7 .822 
TP8 .796 
TP21 .835 
Emotion Focus .733 TP12 .664 
TP17 .670 
TP25 .702 
TP37 .654 
TP38 .692 
TP39 .841 
TP40 .650 
Suppression .528 TP15 .388 
TP19R .314 
TP22 .401 
TP27 .794 
TP30R .341 
TP31R .546 
TP36 .336 
Reappraisal .709 TP18 .595 
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TP29 .638 
TP35 .625 
Harnessing .681 TP1 .543 
TP14 .648 
TP41 .567 
Rumination .485 TP6 - 
TP32 - 
Resilience .489 TP5 .409 
TP9 .302 
TP13 .454 
External Regulation .262 TP11 - 
TP28 - 
Mindfulness .480 TP16 - 
TP20 - 
Pessimism .076 TP10R - 
TP24 - 
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9.29 Appendix 29 
Initial Cronbach’s Alpha – State Positive 
Factor label Cronbach’s alpha Items Cronbach’s alpha if 
item deleted 
Harnessing .787 SP8 .770 
SP15 .754 
SP18 .755 
SP25 .740 
SP26 .749 
SP28 .758 
Rumination .785 SP4 .799 
SP29 .710 
SP30 .693 
SP31 .747 
SP32 .756 
Mindfulness .698 SP10 .637 
SP12 .633 
SP17 .665 
SP20 .726 
SP21 .589 
SP23 .685 
Reappraisal .702 SP1 .563 
SP2 .755 
SP5 .443 
Avoidance .703 SP6 .620 
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SP11 .540 
SP14 .673 
Emotion Focus .581 SP3 .495 
SP7 .577 
SP13R .468 
SP16R .464 
Suppression .618 SP24 - 
SP27 - 
Perspective & 
Avoidance 
.545 SP9 .593 
SP14 .283 
SP22 .407 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 276 
 
9.30 Appendix 30 
Initial Cronbach’s Alpha – Trait Negative 
Factor label Cronbach’s alpha Items Cronbach’s alpha if 
item deleted 
Emotion Focus .881 TN12 .869 
TN25 .863 
TN26 .876 
TN32  .867 
TN33 .858 
TN34 .876 
TN37 .856 
TN38 .428 
TN40 .857 
Suppression .780 TN15 .750 
TN19R .712 
TN20 .783 
TN27R .742 
TN30R .743 
TN36 .742 
Resilience .614 TN1 .571 
TN5 .523 
TN9 .560 
TN10 .592 
TN39 .551 
Avoidance .695 TN2 .601 
 277 
 
TN4 .591 
TN7 .598 
TN8 .714 
Reappraisal .646 TN3 .629 
TN18 .534 
TN29 .524 
TN35 .606 
Intrusion .715 TN6 .617 
TN14 .669 
TN17 .582 
External Regulation .468 TN28 .303 
TN41 .320 
TN42 .464 
External Avoidance .494 TN11 - 
TN22 - 
Perspective Taking .438 TN13 .304 
TN21 .312 
TN24 .410 
Harnessing .327 TN31 - 
TN39 - 
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9.31 Appendix 31 
Initial Cronbach’s Alpha – State Negative 
Factor label Cronbach’s alpha Items Cronbach’s alpha if 
item deleted 
Avoidance & Emotion 
Focus 
.859 SN3 .829 
SN4 .841 
SN6 .843 
SN7 .822 
SN9 .861 
SN11 .832 
SN16R .861 
SN26 .845 
Rumination .852 SN28 .883 
SN29 .792 
SN30 .790 
SN31 .816 
SN32 .813 
Mindfulness .692 SN10 .662 
SN12 .607 
SN17 .619 
SN21 .583 
SN23 .731 
Suppression .694 SN8R .732 
SN22 .654 
SN24 .533 
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SN27 .571 
Harnessing .549 SN15 .433 
SN18 .502 
SN19 .526 
SN25 .446 
Reappraisal .689 SN1 .539 
SN2 .673 
SN5 .553 
Resilience .399 SN13 - 
SN20 - 
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9.32 Appendix 32 
Information sheet 
Cognitive processing and Memory 
Supervisors:   Email:      Phone: 
Dr Craig Steel   c.steel@reading.ac.uk    0118 378 
7550 
 
Experimenters:    
David Angell               D.J.Angell@pgr.reading.ac.uk       0118 378 7937 
 
What is the study about?  
This is a study to investigate how you process watching video clips and your subsequent memory of this 
information.  
 
Are there any restrictions on who can take part? 
You must be aged 18 or over to participate in this study. You should not participate if you have a current 
diagnosis of a mental health problem such as anxiety or depression. 
 
What do I have to do? 
First you will complete some questions about yourself. Then you will watch a selection of video clips 
depicting a series of scenarios with specific instructions. Following this, you will complete a few more 
questions before the experiment is over. There is a chance that you may find watching the videos mildly 
uncomfortable. However, we do not anticipate any prolonged impact. 
 
How long will it take? 
The study will take approximately 30 minutes. 
 
What will happen to my data if I take part? 
Your data will be kept confidential and securely stored, and you will only be identifiable by an 
anonymous number. Information linking that number to your name will be stored securely and 
separately from the data you provide us. 
 
What if I want to withdraw my consent? 
Taking part in this study is completely voluntary; you may withdraw at any time without having to give 
any reason. Please feel free to ask any questions that you may have about this study at any point.  
 
This application has been reviewed by the University Research Ethics Committee and has been given a 
favourable ethical opinion for conduct. 
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9.33 Appendix 33 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 282 
 
 
School of Psychology and Clinical 
Language Sciences 
University of Reading 
Whiteknights 
Reading  RG6 6AL 
 
 
Appendix 34 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
1. I have read and understood the accompanying Information Sheet 
relating to the project on Individual differences in emotional response 
 
 
2. I have had explained to me the purposes of the project and what will be 
required of me, and any questions I have had have been answered to my 
satisfaction.  I agree to the arrangements described in the Information 
Sheet in so far as they relate to my participation. 
 
 
3. I understand that participation is entirely voluntary and that I have the 
right to withdraw from the project any time, and that this will be 
without detriment. 
 
 
4. This project has been reviewed by the University Research Ethics 
Committee and has been given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct. 
 
 
5. I have received a copy of this Consent Form and of the accompanying 
Information Sheet.  
 
 
6.    I do not have any mental health problems, such as anxiety or 
depression. 
 
 
 
 
Name: 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Date of birth: 
……………………………………………………………………… 
 
Signed: 
……………………………………………...……………………………… 
 
Date: 
………………………………………………………...……………………… 
 
Research Ethics Committee 
 
Initials 
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9.34 Appendix 35 
Demographic Questions and Instructions 
Demographic questions: 
 
1) Age: 
2) Gender: Male/Female 
3) Race: Black/White/Asian/Hispanic/Other 
4) Is English your first language? 
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9.35 Appendix 36 
Video Clip Instructions 
 
Catastrophising condition 
 
Next you will be watching a series of video clips and writing about how you have imagined 
them. We will need you to watch these clips very carefully and focus all of your attention to 
them. While watching the following video clips you will need to imagine that you are the 
person facing these situations. When putting yourself into their shoes you will need to imagine 
that the situation is the absolute worst that it could be. Please focus on how terrible the 
situation is and that it is happening to you. How horrible it is that you are going through this 
situation and how it is the worst thing that could have happened. Think about the different 
aspects of the clip and how they all add up to make the situation even worse. You will be 
asked questions relating to your memory of these videos at the end of the study. 
 
Watch condition 
 
Next you will be watching a series of video clips and writing a few details about them. We will 
need you to watch these clips very carefully and focus all of your attention to them. While 
watching the following clips pay careful attention to what is going on so that you are able to 
write a few details about the scene. You will be asked questions relating to your memory of 
these videos at the end of the study. 
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9.36 Appendix 37 
 
Questions following each video 
 
7. Please fill in some of the thoughts and views you had while watching 
the video: 
 
8. Please fill in how you were imagining the worst of the situation 
within the video clips: 
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9.37 Appendix 38 
Sources of Support 
Mood and mobile phone use 
 
Project Supervisor:   Dr Craig Steel:     c.steel@reading.ac.uk   
Researcher:   David Angell:             D.J.Angell@pgr.reading.ac.uk 
 
In this study In this study took part in an intervention, if you feel that you need further support 
and need to talk to someone, please see the information below for your consideration: 
 
 The University of Reading Counselling Services 
See online at http://www.reading.ac.uk/Counselling/oldindex.htm 
Or send an email to arrange an appointment to: counselling@reading.ac.uk 
Or call in, either at  
 
The University Counselling Service,  First Floor, The  Health Centre, 9 Northcourt 
Avenue,  Reading, RG2 7HE (Tel: Tel: (0118) 975 1823) 
 
OR 
 
The University Counselling Service Drop-in, First Floor, Carrington Building, Students 
Services Centre, Whiteknights RG6 6UA (Tel: (0118) 987 5123) 
 
 Your General Practitioner, who will be able to offer support or arrange for you to be 
referred to a counsellor. 
 
 Your Personal Tutor or the Principal Investigator of the study you have taken part in, 
either of whom will be able to offer you guidance about other sources of support. 
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 A national organization, such as the Samaritans. You can call the Samaritans on 08457 
90 90 90, or you can call in at the local branch which is located at 59a Cholmeley Road, 
Reading, RG1 3NB (local branch phone: 0118 926 6333).  
 
 Dr Craig Steel, Clinical Psychologist. Dr Steel is the principal investigator for this 
study, and is a member of the Psychology Department at the University of Reading. He 
can provide immediate support and/or guide access to NHS services. He can be 
contacted on e-mail: c.steel@reading.ac.uk; Phone 0118 378 6668 or in room 2s08. 
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9.38 Appendix 39 
Item generation instructions and questions 
 
When we encounter a situation we perceive as negative there are many different ways we 
can react to that emotional response. Catastrophising is one of these possibilities. 
Catastrophising is the tendency to imagine the worst and most dangerous thing that could 
possibly happen in the situation. Quite often these catastrophic thoughts prove to be 
unrealistic and afterwards can seem like making a mountain out of a molehill. Some 
examples of typical catastrophic thoughts are: "this is the worst thing ever", "this is all so 
terrible", "I have absolutely no chance and will totally fail" and "I will never be able to do 
any of this". 
These questions require quite a lot of thought, so take your time to come up with your 
answers. 
 
2. Can you give three examples of situations that felt negative at 
the time, which often result in catastrophic thinking? If you cannot 
think of three just try to think of as many as you can. 
Exampl
e  
Situatio
n 1  
Situatio
n 2  
Situatio
n 3  
3. When we catastrophise we often fall into common patterns of 
thought and find ourselves repeating specific phrases, such as 
the thoughts given above. If you can think of any common 
examples of this please enter them below, you may also use the 
examples if they feel true for you. 
Exampl
e  
Thought 
1  
Thought 
2  
Thought 
3  
 
 
Seeing the orange w arning light on a car dashboard.
Oh my god I'm going to fail.
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9.39 Appendix 40 
Initial Questionnaire 
Catastrophising Questionnaire (CQ) 
People react differently to all sorts of situations. We would like you to respond to the following 
questions which ask you about the kind of thoughts you have when you experience a situation 
that might seem difficult or challenging in some way. Please read each of the questions below, 
which describe different situations and a particular kind of response. Indicate the extent to 
which you respond in that way, ranging from never (0) to 100% of the time (10). 
1) When you come across a situation that you see as a threat to your safety, to what extent do 
you generally assume the worst? E.g., I’m going to crash on the way home and die, I’m going 
to get mugged or this plane is going to crash. 
0-10 
2) When you come across a situation that you see as a risk to yourself and others, to what 
extent do you generally assume the worst? E.g., I am going to have an incurable disease, my 
pet is never going to recover or when you hear someone close to you has been hospitalised. 
0-10 
3) When you come across a situation that you see will affect your ability to achieve personal 
goals, to what extent do you generally assume the worst? E.g., I am going to get fired, I’m 
totally going to fail or no one is ever going to recognise my hard work. 
0-10 
4) When you come across a situation where you fear your organisational skills may let you 
down, to what extent do you generally assume the worst? E.g., realising a deadline the night 
before, losing your keys or being late because you missed a train. 
0-10 
5) When you come across a situation that you see as negative and out of your control, to what 
extent do you generally assume the worst? E.g., your train being cancelled, I am happy 
therefore something terrible will happen or your computer crashing with unsaved work. 
0-10 
6) When you come across a situation that involves confrontation with others, to what extent 
do you generally assume the worst? E.g., an argument with a significant other, boss or friend. 
0-10 
7) When you come across a situation that you see as negative to your finances, to what extent 
do you generally assume the worst? E.g., I am never going to be able to afford to fix that, there 
is no way I’ll be able to support myself or someone has stolen all of my money. 
0-10 
8) When you come across a situation that you see as negative and potentially humiliating, to 
what extent do you generally assume the worst? E.g., giving a presentation, I am going to look 
like an idiot in front of everyone or everyone else is laughing at me. 
0-10 
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9) When you come across an issue between yourself and others, to what extent do you 
generally assume the worst? E.g., a partner saying ‘we need to talk’, that you have offended 
your friends or when asking for help. 
0-10 
10) When you come across a social situation that you see as negative, to what extent do you 
generally assume the worst? E.g., everyone is going to hate me, I am going to be alone forever 
or no-one cares about me. 
0-10 
11) When you come across a situation that you see as negative, to what extent do you tend to 
ask dramatic questions about yourself? E.g., why is this always happening to me? Why am I so 
useless? Or what did I ever do to deserve this? 
0-10 
 12) When you come across a situation that you see as negative, to what extent do you 
generally criticise yourself and assume the worst? E.g., It went wrong so it must be all my fault, 
I’m such a total idiot or I don’t deserve anything good to happen to me. 
0-10 
13) When you come across a situation that you feel helpless in, to what extent do you 
automatically assume the worst? E.g., I will lose everything, It’s all over now and there is no 
point or there is nothing I can do to make anything better. 
0-10 
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9.40 Appendix 41 
Situations Question 
Key: 
SAFETYHEALTHACHIEVEMENTORGANISATIONGCONTROLCONFRONTATIONFINANCEEMBARRA
SSMENTPERSONAL 
 
Hearing the fire alarm being set off 
 
being diagnosed with cancer 
Not getting the degree classification that I wanted 
Finding out about a deadline only a short time before 
Going into a meeting that I didn't feel prepared for 
having the upstairs sewage pipe leaking down my wall day before surveyor comes to value property 
As a result of medical situations 
Found changes in a mole 
Not getting up when the alarm goes off 
a request for a meeting without an agenda (i'm going to get fired!) 
Running late for invigilation and not being able to find the exam papers! 
Looking at the calendar and realising a deadline is closer than you think. 
Waiting for a delayed train. 
Forgetting something, and thinking that means I've got alzheimer's 
Getting an angry email 
Experience a bit of plane turbulence 
Putting diesel into a petrol car 
trains running late-running late for work 
Problem with gear stick in car - not going into reverse 
driving in the dark on an unknown road 
starting a new job and feeling overwhelmed at the beginning 
Job review date 
Anything unusual happening to/with my car while I'm driving 
 
 
not achieving required A level grades 
There's a problem with the car, but i don't know what. 
 
Going into your overdraft 
Whenever my husband goes out in the car I'm convinced he'll have an accident 
when redundancies have been proposed at work 
Can't find my keys  
being lost in an unfamiliar place 
kitchen leak as I'm about to leave for holiday 
Having to engage in a public speaking event 
Being late 
Sleeping through my morning alarm 
When I am with people who I perceive to be of higher intellect than myself 
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Flat battery in the car when I need to travel..... 
Going for an job interview 
realising you have an exam and have left it too late to do as much study as you want 
Forgetting to complete student finance 
A situation where my children may be hurt, such as them running away from me in public 
I can't get my new car to start! 
husband not picking up phone 
Not getting offered a job I apply for 
A letter from HMRC. 
An increase in workload given during staff meetings 
my boyfriend breaking up with me 
being late 
Argument with husband 
car overtaking when cars are coming towards you   on the oppisite side of road 
Forgetting to do something at work. 
there's a traffic jam, we'll miss the plane and the holiday will be ruined 
Receiving a phone call in the middle of the night 
Having a tight deadline at work 
Missing a train that would make me late for another mode of transport 
Coming to late for school for the very first time. 
Realizing I made a mistake at work 
Making a small professional mistake. 
being exposed to gaseous methyl methacrylate (about a drop worth evaporated, about .15 grams exposure would kill me 
though) 
Seeing police outside my apartment complex. 
Playing out imaginary arguments in my head with my in-laws 
When the computer freezes. 
wallet stolen with bank cards in it 
Pet is sick and needs to go to the vet.  
getting medical symptoms which might hint towards more than simple ailments 
A test that is slightly harder than expected 
Not hearing from someone you expect to and not knowing why  (job interview, friend, parent...) 
Being locked up for 7 hours in a mental ward for a panic attack. 
Confessing feelings. 
the "check engine" signal beeps when driving my car.  
Hearing a loud thump from my kids room 
Trying to lose weight 
Noticing behavioural changes In my dog attitudes 
 
being stood-up on a date 
Having a journal article rejected 
Having to give a talk 
Waking up after a night out where I wasn't quite sure how it ended 
When I was much younger, having someone I fancy not text back 
If I feel someone else's plans are not thought out 
Noise coming from car engine 
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Not earning enough money  
being late 
Running late to hand in the marking papers ;) 
Stuck in traffic and looking at the time, thinking you'll definitely be late for something. 
Being told my pay may be delayed. 
Having shakes (from Caffeine), and thinking that I'm getting parkinson's 
Partner upsetting me 
Have an evening without plans 
missing a flight  
partner late home and cant get hold of him by phone. 
Losing a piece of work on the computer 
being at the front at a music gig 
Being stuck in traffic on way to airport 
Asked to attend meeting with boss 
Momentarily losing sight of children I'm looking after when in a busy public place  
 
 
text message from parent saying "its urgent phone me back" 
I'll need to get this looked at by a mechanic. 
 
Being late for work 
Not being up to date with my marking (I'm a teacher) 
when one of ones nearest and dearest is diagnosed with cancer 
Multiple missed calls from same person 
somebody saying 'we need to talk' 
husband made redundant when expecting a baby 
Running a new / unfamiliar group session 
making a mistake at work 
seeing an empty bank account 
when I am with people who are more confident than myself 
When I realise the deadline for a report has passed and the stakeholder has sent an urgent note. 
Giving a presentation 
having an argument with husband 
missing a period 
A 'near miss' accident when driving 
My husband is home late from work and has not text me 
health symptom that could be something terminal 
Being let down by builders 
A phone call from OFSTED. 
When presented with an assignment at university 
a relative being hospitalized in a psychiatric facility 
being misunderstood 
Baby not feeding 
Young children running freely around a coffee shop when the mother is too busy talking to her friend 
Having to ask for help or support. 
offended someone, they won't speak to me and I won't have any friends 
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Getting called into the boss's office 
Having my phone die when I was supposed to call my husband and plan to meet 
Not being able to access university resources in time for work 
My cat didn't come back home like normal until the day after. 
Not getting a job offer 
Coming ill-prepared for an exam. 
finding the rash on my neck had gotten a bit bigger  
My friend doesn't respond to my texts. 
Recalling negative events from the past 
 
dog goes missing 
Significant other calls to say you need to talk.  
condom might've not worked 
A birthday party where the first people to RSVP can't come 
Finding that something valuable is not where you expect it (triple tap goes wrong: phone wallet keys) 
Losing a full-ride scholarship to my dream school. 
Preparing for an exam. 
my 2mo daughter vomits all her milk on her newly, entirely clean and unworn apparel.  
Feeling I did not do well on an exam 
Trying to pass a test 
Receiving a telephone call late at night 
 
driving past a speed camera well over the speed limit 
Not being successful in an application for job etc 
Not being able to find my phone immediately 
Waiting for feedback on work 
getting a B instead of A* for gcse drama 
Car issues or something that will impact financially  
Mammogram 
Being unprepared for a work situation 
seeing doctor / being asked to go for a blood test.  
 
Feeling painful and avoiding activity for fear of more hurt.  
A large bill comes in the post. 
A stranger shouting something, and worrying that they will attack me 
Getting ill 
Don't know the answer to a question 
losing a graduation certificate  
Pets appear unwell.  
blur screen of death on computer 
driving test 
Having to find a new apartment 
Got to meet somewhere new 
My dad not answering his home phone, office line or mobile when I call in the evening 
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expecting someone to arrive but they are late and are not answering their phone 
 
Missing your period and thinking your pregnant 
Having to make decisions 
 
Partner home late 
my period being late 
car needs costly repair when already overdrawn on bank account 
 
saying something silly 
 rowing with my husband 
 
Toothache 
 
making a mistake at work 
forgetting to put oil in the car and its below the minimum line 
Making a (generally minor) mistake at work (I really don't do anything life saving at work!) 
I have to give a presentation 
 
Running late to work 
Your child becoming ill. 
When being challenged during an exercise class 
not being able to find a job 
relationship not working out 
Ill health 
 
Getting a letter from the tax office! 
 
Coworker quitting without notice 
Having to lead a meeting with senior management 
Getting locked out of my home 
I forgot to deliver an assignment on time.  
Not hearing back about a job past the day they told me I'd hear 
Not being able to sleep at night (insomnia). 
the edtpa. all of it. (teachers performance assessment. needed to become a teacher in WA.) 
 
 
 
parent diagnosed with cancer 
You find you have 3 missed calls from your boss.  
fucking up in interpersonal relationships 
Someone you love not texting back for a long time 
Feeling a pain or something somewhere 
Loving someone who can't love me back. 
Ending a relationship. 
I accendatally press no when Word ask to save when quitting, wasting 1 hour of work.  
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Running late 
Looking for something that is lost 
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9.41 Appendix 42 
Thoughts Question 
Key: HealthAchievementCONTROLEmbarrassmentRhetoricalSelf-
criticismOrganisationalHelplessSafetySocialFinance 
Oh my god. Is this a real fire that will burn everything to the ground? Will I lost everything? 
 
I'm going to die 
I'm never going to get a job 
I will look so stupid 
I can't do this, it will be a disaster 
why is this happening to me 
What can I do  
I have cancer 
Why am I so useless? 
what did i do? is it that bad, yes, of course, why didn't you realise before, you idiot 
Oh mon dieu! I am very late! 
This is not going to work.  
I can't deal with this right now. 
 
Going to be fired 
This plane is going to crash and then my parents will be too sad to cope with life or if it doesn't I'm 
going to be too scared to ever fly again and will never be able to go on holiday ever again 
It's gone totally irreplaceable  
i'm going to fail. 
Why does it always happen to me?? 
someone is going to get hurt 
I will Not be able to do this  
What have i done wrong 
Someone has stolen away the kids to abuse them and it's all my fault 
 
 
Why does this always happen to me 
I can't do this 
 
MY LIFE IS OVER AND I WANT TO DIE 
I'm a terrible teacher 
this is the end of the world 
Something terrible had happened 
I am going to humiliate myself 
this is the last thing I need 
What should I do?! 
Everyone thinks I'm an idiot 
It's all over now there is no point 
You think I am stupid  
I will be perceived badly in the team 
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I won't be able to do this 
I'm going to fail and its all my fault 
I'm going to fail/ I'm a failure 
What if he / she died? 
My husband has crashed the car! 
I am happy so therefore something bad is going to happen 
Am I going to get in trouble? 
What have I done? 
How am I supposed to do this? 
I cannot face the loneliness 
ill never get another chance 
I must have a terrible disease 
I am too old to be doing this the youngsters are laughing at me 
I've screwed up 
I am useless 
I just can't take anymore. 
I will never get this done 
I'm going to be stranded 
Oh F**K, my father is gonna be mad! 
I'm a complete failure 
I'm not going to sleep at all tonight. 
I'm going to die of a rare disease 
 
Everyone hates me 
 
they (the thieves) will empty my bank account 
This will never work.  
i should have X instead of Y 
No one likes me 
What did I ever do to deserve this?!  
Why bother living if they treat me this way? 
See example: "Oh my god I'm going to fail." 
it's gonna be really expensive and time consuming to fix that.  
Ugh, this is going to end up bad 
There's no point in even trying. 
Oh my god. My dog might be sick and going to die 
 
He/she doesn't love me 
My relationship won't survive because my career required moving around 
It's all going wrong  
Everyone will hate me I'm the worst person ever 
everything is ruined 
I knew it would happen 
this is going to cost lots of money 
This is never going to work 
shit shit shit shit, everyone is going to hate me because i've been disrupted 
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 I will never make it on time! 
What to do? What to do? 
This is not going to get any better. 
 
Loosing partner 
Noone likes me, I am friendless and am going to be lonely and sad forever 
they won't choose me  
I'm going to lose someone i love. 
No, no, no, no!!! 
what if a bomb goes off 
This is not going to work out  
He must want to fire me/tell me off 
What if my dad is dead?! 
 
 
It's all going wrong 
I'm useless, a child could do this 
 
I could not feel anymore worse than i already do,  
I'm never going to be able to do this 
things will never be the same again 
I will be humiliated  
my life is ruined 
I cant cope with anymore of this 
People are going to think I'm stupid. 
theyll realise I don't know what I'm doing  
It will never work 
I am useless and I should not be doing this 
I have let everyone down. 
I do not have the expertise to do well at this 
He's going to walk out 
I have let people down 
I'm a terrible driver 
I will never be able to work out how to drive this car 
I dont deserve to have something good happen to me so it will go go wrong 
I'm never going to get the job I want 
Why is this happening to me? 
I don't know what I'm doing 
He is going to turn mad/schizophrenic 
i  can neve make it better 
My partner will leave 
why did i start this its going to be awful 
 
I'll never be able to do this 
No, not now. Oh god, why now? 
Everyone will laugh at me 
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I'm going to fail 
Oh what if he is dead? 
I can't do this job, I should just quit and be a super highly educated waitress 
If all else fail I have this solid backup plan. 
I'm going to crash my car as I drive home tonight 
 
I'm incompetant 
 
my dog will be hit by a car and die 
I hate my life.  
i'll work it out probably 
I am not smart enough 
Why is everything going wrong all the time! 
Why even go to school? 
I'll never be happy. 
 
Why didn't I do something different 
I give up because it's too hard. 
Oh my god. There is a healthy emergency with someone in the family 
 
I'm going to loose my driving licence 
I won't be able to have a happy, comfortable family life 
I will lose everything 
Everyone will think i'm an idiot 
I can't cope 
 
this will not end well 
I don't know what to do 
oh, so i'm going to die then.   
 
 I can't believe this is happening.  
This is shit. 
 
long term health problems 
I am too stupid for this job, I'm never going to make anything of myself or succeed in anything, and 
my stupidity will make me too boring to talk to 
not qualified enough  
I'm going to lose my job 
 
 
everything always goes wrong  
 I can't do anything right any way 
I'm going to crash and die, and probably kill other people too 
 
 
I don't know what to do 
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I'm a bloody idiot 
 
WHY AM I SO AWFUL AT BEING A HUMAN 
I don't care enough anymore 
You just dont care  
I will be shamed  
 how am I going to get myself out of this 
what is the point, everything I do goes wrong 
Am I ever going to understand this?! 
im not good enough  
Nothing will ever be the same again 
 
The system never allows me to succeed. 
I am going to totally embarrass myself 
I'm going to lose my job 
i am an idiot 
 
I won't be able to cope with this 
 
I'm not good enough / I'm not as good as other people 
How on earth am I going to solve this? 
I'm not as good as they think 
I won't be able to support myself/I'm worthless 
i will always feel this awful 
I will lose everything  
That car is going to hit me if it does not slow down, 
 
 
I don't want to do this; I don't want to do any of this. 
I will embarass myself 
I'm going to get mugged 
 
Everyone will know how much I suck 
 
I'm going to fail every portion of the edtpa and have to spend another year in college 
 
 
 
my mum will die of cancer 
I've screwed everything up.  
? 
I will never be successful 
I just need a few days off from everything.  But then I'll be bored. 
I'm going to be alone for the rest of my life. 
I'll never recover. 
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Shit!  
This is a waste of time. 
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9.42 Appendix 43 
Competing models – item kurtosis and skew 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Mean Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Safety 143 4.45 7.588 .243 .203 -1.154 .403 
Health 143 4.42 6.400 .115 .203 -.910 .403 
Achieve 143 5.38 6.379 -.153 .203 -.670 .403 
Organise 143 5.25 8.077 -.175 .203 -1.070 .403 
Control 143 4.26 7.320 .267 .203 -.895 .403 
Confront 143 5.28 7.386 -.093 .203 -.943 .403 
Finance 143 4.74 7.249 .051 .203 -.873 .403 
Embarrass 143 5.32 7.501 -.091 .203 -1.006 .403 
Personal 143 5.98 5.993 -.536 .203 -.386 .403 
Social 143 4.64 8.358 .096 .203 -1.059 .403 
Rhetoric 143 4.42 7.710 .175 .203 -.985 .403 
SelfCriticism 143 4.65 7.891 .071 .203 -1.020 .403 
Helpless 143 4.53 6.983 -.036 .203 -.909 .403 
Valid N (listwise) 143       
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9.43 Appendix 44 
PCA Eigenvalues 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Rotation Sums 
of Squared 
Loadings
a
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
1 5.517 42.435 42.435 4.917 
2 1.271 9.775 52.210 4.271 
3 .970 7.458 59.668  
4 .904 6.954 66.622  
5 .808 6.219 72.841  
6 .757 5.820 78.662  
7 .564 4.336 82.997  
8 .478 3.679 86.676  
9 .441 3.395 90.071  
10 .413 3.175 93.246  
11 .352 2.706 95.952  
12 .289 2.221 98.173  
13 .237 1.827 100.000  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added 
to obtain a total variance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 305 
 
 
9.44 Appendix 45 
PCA - Factor structure for 2 factor model 
Pattern Matrix
a
 
 
Component 
1 2 
Safety  .924 
Health  .938 
Achieve .272 .460 
Organise .736  
General  .759 
Confront .570  
Finance .515  
Embarrass .398 .304 
Personal .771  
Social .844  
Rhetoric .497  
SelfCriticism .737  
Helpless .528 .253 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser 
Normalization.
a
 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
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9.45 Appendix 46 
One factor model reliability 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.885 13 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Safety 58.88 439.627 .613 .874 
Health 58.92 447.289 .602 .875 
Achieve 57.95 451.089 .565 .877 
Organise 58.08 456.486 .440 .884 
Control 59.08 444.677 .579 .876 
Confront 58.06 452.335 .505 .880 
Finance 58.59 453.440 .500 .880 
Embarrass 58.01 447.676 .543 .878 
Personal 57.36 453.358 .563 .877 
Social 58.69 427.257 .690 .870 
Rhetoric 58.92 444.444 .563 .877 
SelfCriticism 58.69 434.245 .648 .872 
Helpless 58.80 441.525 .626 .874 
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9.46 Appendix 47 
Competing models - Two factor model reliability 
General 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.814 7 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Organise 29.71 135.431 .467 .805 
Confront 29.69 135.372 .501 .799 
Finance 30.22 138.316 .456 .806 
Personal 28.99 134.972 .588 .785 
Social 30.32 121.431 .701 .762 
Rhetoric 30.55 132.841 .529 .794 
SelfCriticism 30.31 126.443 .635 .775 
 
Health and Safety 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.820 3 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Safety 8.68 21.135 .722 .702 
Health 8.71 22.995 .726 .703 
General 8.87 24.195 .582 .844 
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9.47 Appendix 48 
Competing models – item kurtosis and skew 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Mean Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Safety 100 4.2700 .180 .241 -1.150 .478 
Health 100 4.1900 .076 .241 -.873 .478 
Organisation 100 4.7000 -.177 .241 -.983 .478 
Control 100 3.9200 .381 .241 -.809 .478 
Confrontation 100 4.9500 -.252 .241 -.858 .478 
Finance 100 4.7600 .159 .241 -.967 .478 
Personal 100 5.7300 -.436 .241 -.414 .478 
Social 100 4.6300 .110 .241 -.962 .478 
Rhetorical 100 4.4500 .211 .241 -.840 .478 
SelfCriticism 100 4.6500 .099 .241 -.891 .478 
Valid N (listwise) 100      
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9.48 Appendix 49 
Validation - Two factor model reliability 
General 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.832 7 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Organisation 29.1700 141.274 .541 .816 
Confrontation 28.9200 141.004 .525 .818 
Finance 29.1100 145.614 .460 .828 
Personal 28.1400 139.819 .612 .805 
Social 29.2400 128.487 .686 .791 
Rhetorical 29.4200 134.509 .605 .805 
SelfCriticism 29.2200 134.739 .635 .801 
 
Health and Safety 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
.806 2 
 
 
Item-Total Statistics 
 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
if Item Deleted 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Safety 4.1900 5.974 .679 . 
Health 4.2700 7.391 .679 . 
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9.49 Appendix 50 
About this App Control 
 We greatly appreciate you taking part in this study, we only ask that you do your 
best to complete tasks and questionnaires as they come so that you can get the most out 
of this app and so that we can get the data we need! 
 This app has been built to investigate how mobile phone use may influence 
mood. This experiment will last for two weeks, taking a minimum of a few minutes per 
day.  The information you provide is confidential to the researchers and will be stored 
on a secure server. 
 Towards the end of each day you will be required to fill in a brief questionnaire 
to represent your overall mood that day. These results can be viewed from within the 
app so that you are able to track your own mood over the fortnight. On other days, you 
may also have extra questionnaires to complete that will take a few minutes each. In 
addition, as you progress through the two weeks tasks will unlock to be completed. 
These will each involve downloading a free game from the app store and playing it for 
at least 15 minutes. If you have limited data download, we recommend you do this 
when connected to Wi-Fi. 
So, what first? 
• Set up notifications within the app to trigger alarms at a time in the evening that 
will be generally convenient to spend a few minutes on questionnaires or quizzes. 
• Take your time to read the information in the Introduction section. 
• Complete your first task! 
 
About this App Experimental 
We greatly appreciate you taking part in this study, we only ask that you do your best to 
complete tasks and questionnaires as they come so that you can get the most out of this 
app and so that we can get the data we need! 
 This app has been designed to help improve how we control our negative 
emotions using a small set of techniques.  This experiment will last for two weeks, 
taking a minimum of a few minutes per day. The information you provide is 
confidential to the researchers and will be stored on a secure server. 
 Towards the end of each day you will be required to fill in a brief questionnaire 
to represent your overall mood that day. These results can be viewed from within the 
app so that you are able to track your own mood over the fortnight. On other days, you 
may also have extra questionnaires to complete that will take a few minutes each. As 
you progress through the fortnight tasks will unlock for you to complete. These will 
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each involve reading about a new technique to keep potential negative emotions in 
check. This may also involve a few scenarios to give you some practice. These are all 
techniques that have been selected on the basis that they have been found to work with 
people from all walks of life. 
So, what first? 
• Set up notifications within the app to trigger alarms at a time in the evening that 
will be generally convenient to spend a few minutes on questionnaires or quizzes. 
• Take your time to read the information in the Introduction section. 
• Complete your first task! 
 
Information day 1 
What are emotions and how do they work?  
We are all aware of what emotions feel like, but over the past few decades science has 
shown us where they are located within the brain and body. Over the past decade 
scientists have taken large steps in understanding how those systems work. Part of this 
dramatic increase is due to functional magnetic imaging (fMRI), which allows us to 
observe the brain while it is working. In these studies people complete different tasks or 
are exposed to different images, to trigger certain emotions or emotional self-control. 
 Studies have found one area that is particularly associated with emotion, the amygdala. 
It has been found to be essential in order to feel a range of emotions including fear and 
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aggression. It is also constantly scanning the environment for potential dangers or 
threats to our goals. When the amygdala becomes activated in response to a potential 
threat, nerve cells within it send impulses to other areas of the brain, such as the 
hypothalamus. 
 
 
The amygdala. Shutterstock 
 
The hypothalamus controls the release of stress hormones like cortisol adrenaline and 
noradrenaline, which have huge impacts on your body, such as the fight or flight response. 
Often, when the amydala triggers the hypothalamus it also uses its control to release 
neurotransmitters such as acetylcholine in the brain, to make it more alert. Alongside the stress 
hormones, the amydala then sends impulses to the body to activate the sympathetic nervous 
system, which increases processes such as respiration and heartrate.  
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The hypothalamus. Shutterstock 
 
This can prepare us for actions needed to deal with threats at the slightest hint of danger. It 
prepares our muscles and keeps us awake and focused, ready to flee or fight. While this very 
rapid process is activating, the prefrontal cortex (PFC, located just behind and above your eyes) 
and the hippocampus are activated by their connections to the amydala. 
 
The PFC and hippocampus begin a much slower and deeper investigation than the amygdala. 
Depending on the outcome of this analysis, the initial stress response is inhibited (if it was a 
false alarm) or further developed into the emotions we are more familiar with like sadness, 
anxiety, anger, guilt, shame, fear and disgust. These emotions serve evolutionary roles to 
facilitate responses to difficult situations. This could be when escaping from a dangerous animal 
or seizing an opportunity to kill an injured predator.  
 
Information Day 2 
What are emotions and how do they work? 
 
So, yesterday we looked at how the brain develops emotions in the brain and the processes 
involved. These complex emotional processes involving the PFC, amygdala and hippocampus, 
among other associated areas developed as an adaptive evolutionary response. Our more 
emotional ancestors were more able to adapt to the environment and protect their offspring than 
their less emotional counterparts. This led to a very meaningful advantage in the evolutionary 
process selecting for human beings that react emotionally to important events. While these 
emotions were perfect for an ancient world’s predators and threats, they can appear quite 
useless when you have just lost several hours of saved work. For example, in that situation the 
most adaptive response would be to stay calm and redo it in the knowledge that it will be easier 
this time around. However, it is much more tempting to throw the computer out of the window 
and complain to a friend.  Unfortunately for us, neither the destruction of the threat (the 
computer) nor needing sympathy from others will get that work done. 
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This group of processes, both behind the development of emotions and the emotions themselves 
are designed to help and protect us. However, as this system has not caught up with modern day 
life the way it assesses situations may prompt emotions that can drive us to behave in unhelpful 
ways. It is good to recognise that these emotions are doing their best to help us but that they are 
often deeply outdated. So it is always wise to critically question what behaviours your emotions 
are driving you to do and if that action would actually help you. Alternatively, you could wait 
for evolution to catch up if you have a few million years to spare.  
 
In the short term, stress is perfectly healthy and gives us a wide range of improvements still 
relevant in the modern world, such as the extra focus we get before a deadline. However, long 
term high stress levels have very different and negative effects on the body. This can result in a 
mixture of issues, whether it is physical such as, muscle tension, insomnia, headaches or more 
mental health issues, such as depression, anxiety and burnout. 
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However, it is not all bad news! Our emotional processes have been developed over millions of 
years of evolution and what they do, they do very effectively. This means that when we learn 
how to work with our emotions, they can be amazing allies. Instead of treating them as a part of 
you, try treating them as advisors, which is their primal role. For example, sadness is trying to 
tell us that perhaps with our current efforts, we will not reach an important goal. Disgust is 
telling us that this is something we need to stay away from to stay safe. Anger is telling us to 
assert ourselves and defend our goals.  On the other end of the spectrum, happiness is also an 
excellent reward motivator to keep us chasing goals important to us. 
 
Remember to question your emotions and try to understand what they are driving you to do, and 
is it helpful? 
 
Information day 3 
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What is catastrophising and magnification?  
This app is focussed on two objectives, improving your understanding of emotions and 
using that knowledge to better regulate those emotions. One particular way people 
respond to a negative emotion is to catastrophise. Catastrophising is often an irrational 
belief that something is much worse than it actually is. Perhaps after an event has 
happened you have realised the horrors you expected never happened, maybe it wasn’t 
pleasant but felt like you had made a mountain out of a molehill. In these cases the 
catastrophising can feel a lot worse than the event itself. This is a reaction we are all 
prone to and typically takes one of two forms.  
 
The first type is situation based, for example if you get an email informing you that you 
did not get a job you were hoping for, you may believe that no matter how hard you try 
you will never find success and that you are too stupid to be worth hiring. Yet this might 
be a one off or perhaps it was incredibly competitive so you just need to keep trying. Or 
perhaps you made a fool out of yourself in front of co-workers and now you think they 
will all hate you and laugh at you. This form of catastrophising takes a negative 
situation and magnifies that negativity. 
 
The other type of catastrophising is centred around future events. These are usually 
based around thoughts and beliefs such as, I am going to mess up eventually and my 
other half will leave me or that everything is bound to go wrong. If you are not careful 
this belief in something going wrong in the future can also make it more likely to 
happen.  
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Catastrophising has all sorts of negative effects on us. Most noticeably, it can cause 
more suffering than the event or fear in question. However, its impact goes more deeply 
than this. Catastrophising can make you give up without even trying; it amplifies risks 
and fear, which in turn can limit the opportunities you take in personal and professional 
life. It can create an outlook on life based upon disappointment, under-appreciation and 
failure. It can be reinforced with confirmation bias, where you only remember events 
that confirm these catastrophic beliefs and lead to self-fulfilling prophecies. Much as in 
the short term, catastrophising can spiral negative expectations out of control. If it 
becomes a habit it can have similar long term effects on your life. 
 
Defeating Catastrophising! 
 
The previous information emphasised how significant catastrophising can be. The first 
step towards defeating catastrophic thoughts and beliefs are to recognise when you are 
doing it. This can be hard at times, and will take deliberate effort, especially in the 
height of the moment. However, the ability to label your own emotions and behaviours 
is the vital first step to retaking control. Once you can spot your catastrophising, you 
can take steps to evaluate the situation to work out the best way to achieve what you 
want. This app will teach you techniques to retake that control and work to take those 
unhelpful fears out of your life.  
Good luck! 
CONTROL TASKS 
Task 1 
Please download Drop 7 for free from the App Store and play for at least 10-15 
minutes. Please also play this for a few minutes each following day until your next task 
unlocks! 
 
Don’t know if you can link to it from within the app, if so it is this one 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/drop7/id425242132?mt=8 
Task 2 
Please download Crossey Road for free from the App Store and play this game and/or 
the previous game for at least 10-15 minutes. Please also play this for a few minutes 
each following day until your next task unlocks! 
 
Don’t know if you can link to it from within the app, if so it is this one 
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https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/crossy-road-endless-arcade/id924373886?mt=8 
 
Task 3 
Please download Super Stickman Golf 2 for free from the App Store and play this game 
and/or previous games for at least 10-15 minutes. Please also play this for a few 
minutes each following day until your next task unlocks! 
Don’t know if you can link to it from within the app, if so it is this one 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/super-stickman-golf-2/id585259203?mt=8 
Task 4 
Please download Bejewelled Blitz for free from the App Store and play this game 
and/or previous games for at least 10-15 minutes. Please also play this for a few 
minutes until you reach the end of the experiment! 
Don’t know if you can link to it from within the app, if so it is this one 
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/bejeweled-blitz/id469960709?mt=8 
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL TASKS 
 
Developing Goals   
How would you like to benefit from this app? 
There are two primary ways we can phrase goals we set for ourselves, which are called 
approach and avoidance goals. Avoidance goals are directed towards avoiding an 
undesirable outcome (to avoid failure); where as an approach goal is directed to a 
positive outcome (to do your best). Research has shown that avoidance goals are related 
to less satisfaction with progress, decreased self-esteem and feeling less capable of 
completing goals.  
 
This app has been designed to help reduce the tendencies we can have to see the worst 
in situations. However, you may have noticed that this is an avoidance goal! So, to 
come up with a good approach goal take a minute or two to imagine what you want to 
be like because of this app. Visualise what might be different about you if you did 
reduce the number of times you believed the worst might happen. Remember, an 
approach goal is something you wish to attain or become, it is positive.  
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I would like to be: WRITE GOAL HERE 
 
Now that you have come up with this goal, you can set up a daily reminder, which will 
help you keep your goal in mind for the following two weeks. We recommend that you 
set this notification for about a few hours after you generally wake up. 
 
Time: default 11am 
 
Acceptance  
Welcome back! So in the last task we learnt about setting the most effective goals for 
what we want to achieve. Now let’s take another step towards achieving that goal. 
When we find ourselves catastrophising over situations, we can easily lose touch with 
the moment and get lost in catastrophic thoughts and beliefs. These thoughts and fears 
can also generate unpleasant emotions.  
 
It is good to remember that being prepared for or preventing a worst case scenario is a 
very useful life skill, but when that skill damages your mood or your ability to cope, it 
has become unhelpful. Yet as a learnt skill it cannot be adjusted very easily through 
willpower alone, so unlike a robot you cannot just turn it off. Fortunately, this is not the 
only way to deal with catastrophising.  
 
So this technique is aimed at trying to regain control from your catastrophic thoughts 
and resulting unpleasant feelings to reduce the impact they will have on your life. For 
this exercise we would like you to take two minutes to do a short visualisation. 
 
NEXT PAGE 
First, just make sure that you are sitting or lying down comfortably. When you do this, 
you may close your eyes if you wish, although it is not necessary. Do not try to empty 
your mind, just sit or lay still and just be aware of your breathing in and out. Thoughts 
will automatically come into your head and that is alright. When a thought comes into 
your head, whether it is ‘I really need to be getting on with something’ or ‘well doing 
this is weird’ just let the thought be. Don’t develop on it or focus on it, just let it sit 
there. Many people find this easier to do by imagining their mind is a great big blue sky. 
Then the random thoughts are small clouds on that blue sky. There is nothing wrong 
with those clouds, they aren’t storm clouds or rainclouds, just small white and puffy and 
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just watch them drift on by. Once the thought has faded, return to your breathing and 
the clear sky, until the next thought comes up. This can seem difficult at first, remember 
having thoughts constantly popping up is no bad thing, just try not to focus on them or 
develop them. 
 
 
 
2 MINUTE TIMER BUTTON 
NEXT PAGE 
 
Now, why did I ask you to do that?  
Your task over the remaining 2 weeks is to try and use this technique when you feel 
yourself falling into catastrophic thinking. This does not mean you have to suddenly 
pause for 2 minutes mid conversation or even find a secluded place to sit down and 
carry out this visualisation (unless you want to, in which case go for it!). It is simply 
catching yourself thinking the worst and choosing not to develop it. Don’t try to supress 
it; just watch it like a puffy cloud on a warm summer’s day. Sometimes, this may only 
take a couple of seconds or sometimes longer. But the key is that you do not need to 
develop or even believe these unpleasant thoughts if you don’t think they are helpful. 
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Remember your feelings 
In the two minute visualisation task you may not have encountered any strong negative 
feelings, mostly thoughts popping into your head. When using this technique during a 
situation that does feel negative, it can seem a lot harder. It is much easier to tolerate a 
negative thought than a negative emotion. However, treat your emotions in the same 
way, just as thoughts are clouds you can watch from a distance, so are emotions. You 
don’t need to suppress or avoid the negative emotion, just let it be. Don’t obsess over it, 
just watch it floating by and when you are ready, direct your attention somewhere 
helpful.  
 
Good luck and remember you can practice this visualisation task as many times as you 
would like! 
 
Using Probabilities 
Hello again! So in the last task we looked at being more mindful and accepting of our 
feelings when we imagine the worst of a situation. We learnt to be able to sit with 
negative thoughts and emotions and not to engage with them. This can be difficult and 
don’t worry if you still don’t feel proficient in it yet, you have plenty of time. Now 
we are taking the next step to build on what you are already practicing. 
 
So, as we now know, catastrophising or magnification, is the tendency to imagine the 
worst or most upsetting consequences for any given situation. Often, the likelihood of 
these negative events happening is greatly exaggerated. Sometimes this can seem 
obvious with hindsight, but in the moment it can be impossible to see. 
 
Example: You are worried you are going to have a terrible first date at a good 
restaurant. You will be late, make an idiot of yourself and you will have nothing to talk 
about and there will be lots of awkward silences. 
Perhaps you might think that this has a 50% chance of happening. 
We can actually use some maths to estimate the probability of that happening. First, we 
need to list the conditions required for this event to happen and what chance they have 
of occurring. Also let’s be generous with the chances, so we get the highest chance of 
these bad things happening. 
- That you will be late. Let’s say 20% chance. 
- That you will say something really stupid. Maybe 30% chance? No one’s 
perfect! 
- That there will be really awkward silences. Perhaps 20% chance. 
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Therefore, if this is what is required for the first date to be terrible we do the maths! 
This just involves multiplying the percentages, so: 
.2 x .3 x .2 = .012 
This means that the probability of these three events occurring is only 1.2%! This shows 
how much catastrophising can rely on completely misjudging probabilities.  
 
 
 
So next time you find yourself thinking the worst about an event, try to use the last task 
to distance yourself from the thoughts and emotions. Then, try to break down that event 
into the components that would be required for it to happen. Whether it is forgetting if 
you left your door unlocked and everything will be stolen (requiring you to have left the 
door unlocked, someone actually selecting your place for a break in and them being 
nearby at the time). 
 
Still, don’t let this get in the way of problem solving. Remember to lock your door 
and date forgiving people! 
 
Good luck! 
What if?  
Welcome back! This is the last task of the two week app, which will continue to build 
on the skills you have been learning and practicing. You have been learning how to sit 
with and tolerate unpleasant thoughts and emotions and you have been shown how to 
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calculate the probabilities of the worst happening, in order to bring some perspective 
into those difficult moments. 
 
Today we will be looking at what if the worst did happen? When we catastrophise or 
magnify our perceived problems we are often not thinking clearly and emotions can 
make negative consequences seem unassailable. People often find that just taking the 
time to think through the consequences in a carefully structured way can make them 
seem much less scary. Let’s take an example:  
 
You are worried that you will completely run out of money for your degree, you will 
have to drop out and you will get stuck forever in a really boring job. 
 
So now we simply ask what if that did happen?  
Feared outcome What if? What would you do? 
I can’t afford to finish my 
degree and as a result get 
stuck in a dead end job? 
What if I cannot afford to 
finish my degree? 
-Get a part time job 
-Contact the university for 
potential help 
-Find cheaper 
accommodation 
What if I get stuck in a 
dead end job? 
- Use the money from 
the full time job to 
complete my degree 
through the open 
university 
- Keep applying for 
more interesting 
jobs 
- Use the work 
experience to my 
advantage once I get 
the degree 
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This structure serves dual purposes, as well as reducing the negative impact of 
potentially scary events, it helps give you a plan of what to do if “the worst” does 
happen. This can help us make sensible decisions in the moment and ensures that we 
always have a plan B and a softer landing if it does go wrong. Now have a go yourself, 
using a catastrophic thought you have realised yourself having. 
Feared outcome What if? What would you do? 
   
 
Now, when you come across other catastrophic thoughts, take a few moments and a 
piece of paper to jot down this little table. Give yourself a strong plan so if what you 
fear does happen, it is not the worst thing ever and you have a strong plan. It might be 
tempting to just do this in your head, but the release of having it written down on paper 
makes a significant difference! 
 
Best of luck and keep up the good work! 
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9.50 Appendix 51 
Final CQ 
 
People react differently to all sorts of situations. These questions ask you about the kind of 
thoughts you have when you experience a situation that might seem difficult or challenging in 
some way. Please read each of the questions below, which describe different situations and a 
particular kind of response. Indicate the extent to which you respond in that way, ranging 
from never (0) to all of the time (10) 
1. When you come across a situation that you see as a threat to your safety, to what 
extent do you generally assume the worst? E.g., I’m going to crash on the way home 
and die, I’m going to get mugged or this plane is going to crash. 
2. When you come across a situation that you see as a risk to yourself and others, to 
what extent do you generally assume the worst? E.g., I am going to have an incurable 
disease, my pet is never going to recover or when you hear someone close to you has 
been hospitalised.  
3. When you come across a situation where you fear your organisational skills may let 
you down, to what extent do you generally assume the worst? E.g., realising a 
deadline the night before, losing your keys or being late because you missed a train.  
4. When you come across a situation that involves confrontation with others, to what 
extent do you generally assume the worst? E.g., an argument with a significant other, 
boss or friend. 
5. When you come across a situation that you see as negative to your finances, to what 
extent do you generally assume the worst? E.g., I am never going to be able to afford 
to fix that, there is no way I’ll be able to support myself or someone has stolen all of my 
money. 
6. When you come across an issue between yourself and others, to what extent do you 
generally assume the worst? E.g., a partner saying ‘we need to talk’, that you have 
offended your friends or when asking for help 
7. When you come across a social situation that you see as negative, to what extent do 
you generally assume the worst? E.g., everyone is going to hate me, I am going to be 
alone forever or no-one cares about me. 
8. When you come across a situation that you see as negative, to what extent do you 
tend to ask dramatic questions about yourself? E.g., why is this always happening to 
me? Why am I so useless? Or what did I ever do to deserve this 
9. When you come across a situation that you see as negative, to what extent do you 
generally criticise yourself and assume the worst? E.g., It went wrong so it must be all 
my fault, I’m such a total idiot or I don’t deserve anything good to happen to me.  
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9.51 Appendix 52 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
1. I have read and understood the accompanying Information Sheet 
relating to the project on mood and mobile phone use. 
 
 
2. I have had explained to me the purposes of the project and what will be 
required of me, and any questions I have had have been answered to my 
satisfaction.  I agree to the arrangements described in the Information 
Sheet in so far as they relate to my participation. 
 
 
3. I understand that participation is entirely voluntary and that I have the 
right to withdraw from the project any time, and that this will be 
without detriment. 
 
 
4. This project has been reviewed by the University Research Ethics 
Committee and has been given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct. 
 
 
5. I have received a copy of this Consent Form and of the accompanying 
Information Sheet.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name: 
……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Date of birth: 
……………………………………………………………………… 
 
Signed: 
……………………………………………...……………………………… 
 
Date: 
………………………………………………………...……………………… 
 
 
 
Initials 
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9.52 Appendix 53 
Information sheet 
Mood and mobile phone use 
 
 
Supervisors:   Email:      Phone: 
Dr Craig Steel   c.steel@reading.ac.uk   0118 378 7550 
 
Experimenters:    
David Angell               D.J.Angell@pgr.reading.ac.uk       0118 378 7937 
 
 
 
What is the study about?  
This study is investigating links between mood and the use of tasks on mobile phones 
through an app. 
 
Are there any restrictions on who can take part? 
You must be aged 18 or over to participate in this study. You must also own an iPad or 
iPhone to use the app in the study. 
 
What do I have to do? 
First you will have to sign up to the app, which will then be enabled by the experimenter. 
Following this you will have access to the information on the app. Initially, you will complete 
some questionnaires, some of which will be repeated daily and others only at certain points 
during the two week period. Additionally, on certain days tasks will unlock that need to 
complete on that day at a time suitable for you. 
 
How long will it take? 
The study will take approximately two weeks, taking a few minutes each day. 
 
What will happen to my data if I take part? 
Your data will be kept confidential and securely stored, and you will only be identifiable by an 
anonymous number. Information linking that number to your name will be stored securely and 
separately from the data you provide us. 
 
What if I want to withdraw my consent? 
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Taking part in this study is completely voluntary; you may withdraw at any time 
without having to give any reason. Please feel free to ask any questions that you may 
have about this study at any point.  
 
This application has been reviewed by the University Research Ethics Committee and 
has been given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct. 
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9.53 Appendix 54 
Debrief Form 
Mood and mobile phone use 
 
Project Supervisor:   Dr Craig Steel:     c.steel@reading.ac.uk   
Researcher:   David Angell:             D.J.Angell@pgr.reading.ac.uk 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this experiment. This study was investigating the effect 
of a brief low intensity intervention targeting a specific method we sometimes use to control 
our emotions, called catastrophising. Catastrophising can be characterised as interpreting a 
situation that has been perceived as negative with the absolute worst outcomes. Afterwards it 
can often seem like making mountains out of molehills. This study was designed as a 
randomised controlled trial between a group with an app dedicated to targeting 
catastrophising and a control group asked to download and play games for the same time 
duration as the catastrophising tasks. 
 
Therefore, your data will be used to evaluate how much the intervention improved general 
mood over the duration of the intervention as well as how it changed catastrophic thinking. 
Your results will be anonymously compared with those of other participants taking part in the 
study. If at any point you wish to withdraw your results or ask any questions concerning this 
investigation please email the project supervisors (contact details above). 
 
The project has been reviewed by the University of Reading research Ethics Committee and 
has been given favourable ethical opinion for conduct. 
 
 
 
 
 
